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ABSTRACT  
   
The original mediums were not texts or technologies; they were ritual actors 
performing acts of mediumship. Mediating between determined norms (the status 
quo) and emergent trends (change), they invoked divine authority to conjure 
meanings that proved adaptive, nonadaptive and/or maladaptive.  With the advent 
of the written word, ritual became formalized and codified. The medium became a 
communication device, something abstract and external to the human condition. It 
then became possible to speak of “media effects” imposing influence in a logical 
deterministic manner. Yet with the advent of new media, we are witnessing a 
return to modes of cultural discourse that are spontaneous, interactive, communal 
and unscripted, all hallmarks of ritual action. This “ritual return” centers on the 
emergence of the “prosumer” (producer/consumer), a figure actively engaged in 
mediating practices. While resembling the original archaic “medium” in some 
respects, the prosumer is a “literate ritualist” allied with a multiplicity of cultural 
tribes. Thus the “new media” has given rise to “the new medium.” The pages that 
follow focus on acts of contemporary mediumship, examining related concepts 
such as “ecology,” “niche,” “role,” “affordance,” and “trope.” Each section 
considers how specific mediating practices afford and constrain modes of 
ritualized behavior. I call this practice-oriented approach to media studies 
“praxism.” 
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Chapter 1 





Figure 1. Kiss 
A photograph of two girls kissing is posted online. Is it child 
pornography? A hate-crime? Commercial exploitation? A declaration of 
love? The image alone does little to resolve such mysteries. Neither does 
the format in which it is being displayed. Personal biases will certainly 
influence how particular audience members interpret it, but these do not 
entirely override the author’s intentions. It matters if the image is posted 
on a lesbian activist website. It matters if the image is accompanied by 
text that is disparaging, erotic, or analytical. It matters because these 
added details carry real rhetorical weigh. When we contribute to public 
discourses in particular ways, we become the medium. This process 
involves submitting to the formal requirements of a particular ritual role 
that both affords and demands specific behaviors. We do not have 
complete control of how such acts of mediumship will be perceived, and 
yet our intentions and the manner in which we express them are 
significant. In other words, the meaning of this picture is not merely in 
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the eye of the beholder; it also has been inflected by the intentions of a 
particular “medium” seeking to conjure a particular type of reality.   
The following chapter examines how ritual mediums actively 
create—and are created by—culture. This marks a return to the original 
definition of the word “medium.” Before it denoted a type of text or 
technology, the central term of “media studies” referred to a ritual 
performer engaged in an act of mediation between determined norms and 
emergent change. I call the study of these mediating practices “Praxism.”  
Part one of this work examines the “epistemology” of praxism, 
which is defined in terms of two key characteristics: “reciprocity” and 
“multiplicity.” This section draws on the work of ecological psychology 
(Bandura 1977; Gibson 1979; Kaufmann & Clément 2007; Chemero 
2009), sociology (Goffman 1997), media studies (Bernardi 2002) and 
rhetoric (Burke 1935). Part two focuses on the “methodology” of 
praxism. While philosophy presumes logical categories and 
poststructuralism deconstructs them, praxism examines how logical 
categories come into being in the first place by examining the ritual act of 
“conflation.” This section draws on arguments from ritual studies 
(Douglas 1966), philosophy (Foucault 1977; Holland et al. 1998), 
sociology (Goffman 1997), cultural studies (Williams 1983; Hall 1996) 
and anthropology (Moore 2006).  
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PART ONE: Epistemology. 
There is paradox at the heart of the humanities: the view that 
human beings are both products of social environments and producers of 
cultural innovation. Rather than ignore or attempt to resolve this seeming 
contradiction, the following pages examine it. They do so by considering 
how ritual roles form dynamic feedback loops between individuals and 
environments, allowing them to exert mutual influence across multiple 
ecological domains. I call this approach “praxism.” 
In his prison notebooks, Antonio Gramsci often used the word 
“praxis” as a code for Marxism. He occasionally described Marxism as a 
“philosophy of praxis,” stressing its practical applications for achieving 
social justice (1935). Praxis, in the Gramscian sense, means activism 
aimed at achieving greater equality for the masses. As with all Marxist 
theories, it strives to entirely break with ideology and focus on the purely 
practical. 
In a similar sense, the praxis intervention initiated by Pierre 
Bourdieu in the 1990s strove to be “the solvent of doxa.” This 
perspective aimed to disabuse both observer and observed of false 
consciousness.  
I find these Marxist and Neo-Marxist interpretations of praxis 
problematic because they presume that analysis can transcend belief and 
operate a realm of pure, unalloyed rationality. To break with “false 
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consciousness,” after all, these theorists must be privy to “true 
consciousness,” but is this really the case?  
Human beings are forever attempting to transcend belief. 
Unfortunately, we’re not any good at it. Yet we are extremely good at 
“modeling belief.” We are the best “belief modelers” on the planet. This 
has given us a distinct advantage over other species. It is the basis of all 
of our cultural innovations. Unfortunately, we also have knack for being 
modeled by beliefs, and there’s the rub. The very gift that allows us to 
adapt to cultural change, leaves us vulnerable to ideological 
manipulations that may render us nonadaptive and even maladaptive, 
hence the value of closely examining mediation practices.  
Rather than positing an antidote to ideology, praxism examines 
“ideology in action.” It is a belief modeling kit, a “how to” guide for 
negotiating leaps of faith. Because the line between self-delusion and 
self-direction is necessarily blurry, it cannot presume to name a single 
path to “enlightenment.” It can merely hint at various means for 
achieving a degree of mastery over the many ritual roles each individual 
may simultaneously submit to and learn to deploy in order to engage with 
culture. Human beings do not automatically conform to tradition, and we 
do not automatically get caught up in the latest trends. We do a bit of 
both. This means we are adaptive in two ways. We can adapt to 
determined norms (the status quo) or emergent behaviors (change). 
Because determined and emergent influences seldom perfectly align, we 
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are almost always adapting to one, or the other, or striking a compromise 
between the two. The performance of a successful mediation rite, 
therefore, is a complex negotiation between the dictates of cultural 
custom and the influence of spontaneously evolving circumstance, which 
are related to two forms of complimentary and competing modes of 
cognition.1 
 
Logical cognition: reasoning according to determined principles. 
Analogical cognition: comparing emergent patterns. 
 
Logical thinking aims to be categorical, ahistorical and apolitical. 
It identifies cause and effect relations based on supposedly fixed 
categories. Its chief ally and opponent in this regard is analogical 
cognition, which both defines the categories in question and threatens to 
undermine them by suggesting alternative correlations. Whereas logical 
cognition is analytical and conceptual, analogical cognition is intuitive 
and context-sensitive. Logical cognition is deterministic. Analogical 
cognition is emergent.  
At times, the equilibrium of a particular “cultural ecology” is 
unsettled when tensions rise between logical and analogical cognition, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Kaufmann & Clément point out that, “cognitive and developmental 
psychologies tend to discriminate between two main modes of reasoning 
and understanding, namely the causal [logical] and the analogical.” The 
former focuses on causes and effect sequences of events, the latter on 
relational patterns (2007, 233-4). 
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that is between the existing symbolic order and changing circumstances. 
This threatens social stability, so some mode of intervention is required. 
The advent of culture has allowed human beings to domesticate nature, 
but it has also made us maladaptive. Whereas natural ecologies 
spontaneously seek equilibrium, cultural ecologies are tied to symbol 
systems, which are often resistant to change. What’s more, cultural 
ecologies do not merely emerge.2 They are also partly designed by social 
actors with specific agendas. In the jungle, the lion is king of the beasts. 
He can kill and injure other animals, dominating them with sheer power, 
but he does not get to decide if other animals count as symbolically 
legitimate. Any plausible theory of cultural ecologies needs to account 
for both institutional and ideological power relations, which are certainly 
interrelated but not always perfectly allied. Modes of mediumship that 
allow ritual actors to affirm and/or redefine social norms are not purely 
logical or analogical; they exist in a medial realm between these two 
modes of cognition. As empiricist David Hume notes, we are never 
purely rational. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 As anthropologist Roy Rappaport acknowledges, “cultures and 
ecosystems are not directly commensurable” (1979). Although Rapport’s 
groundbreaking work with the Tsembaga of New Guinea (1968) revealed 
that cultural rituals do, in some instances, perform an adaptive function, he 
maintains that cultures might also be maladaptive and even exploitative 
(Biersack 1999). Whereas ecosystems favor states of natural equilibrium, 
cultures often harm the natural environment (Hoey, 590). When 
considering the impending threat of global warming, it is seems apparent 
that nature and culture are, in many respects, at odds with one another.  
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When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the 
operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover 
any power or necessary connection; any quality, which binds the effect to 
the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. 
There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an 
inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that 
medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent 
on those to produce it, who assert that it really exists, and is the origin of 
all our conclusions concerning matter of fact (1737, 35). 
 
As the name suggests, “the medium” inhabits the middle ground, 
a betwixt and between space, a domain that is neither here nor there. The 
medium is a go between, a lynchpin standing at the intersection of being 
and becoming, logical determinism and analogical emergence.3 This 
requires critical thinking, or what I call “ecological cognition.” 
 
Ecological cognition: counterpoised analogical and logical cognition. 
 
Ecological cognition holds logical and analogical cognition in a 
state of mutual tension, negotiating ongoing cultural compromises 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In Marxism and Literature (1978), Raymond Williams discuss two types 
of cultural influence, “emergent” and “residual,” the former occurring 
spontaneously and the latter handed down from previous generations. 
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between the two.4 Often acts of mediumship are triggered by emergent 
circumstances. “Emergence”—which is the root of the word 
“emergency”—is unpredictable and context-sensitive, highly productive 
and extremely disruptive. Not surprisingly, it frequently culminates in a 
public crisis. At its best, it is emancipation, at its worst, mob rule. All 
members of a social group potentially contribute to the emergence of 
collective patterns: flocking, shunning, scattering, etc. But only specially 
sanctioned “mediums” can create significant alterations to the structure 
of the ecology itself. Ritual mediums have long sought to grapple with 
emergent complexity as effectively as possible. After all, an especially 
gifted medium can stop to a revolution or create one.  
 
Locating the Medium. 
Between the earth’s crust and its molten core, there is the 
“mantle.” This is the region that mediates between the roiling pressures 
below and the rigidly stratified surface above. Earthquakes and volcanoes 
are not flukes of nature, they are adaptive processes, signs that the mantle 
is busy negotiating between emergent pressures and determined 
structures. In the age of global warming, the planet’s ecology is under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ecological cognition is indebted to James J. Gibson’s “ecological 
psychology,” which focuses primarily on direct perception (1979). 
Subsequent theorists have modified Gibson’s approach to allow for the 
environmental influence of conceptual constructs such as ritual practices 
(Neisser 1993; Shore 1996; Kaufmann and Celément 2007; and Chemero 
2009). 
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intense stress and the mantle is working hard to adjust, hence the many 
“acts of nature” now plaguing our species.  
In the age of New Media, cultural ecologies are also under 
tremendous stress. The advent of interactive and participatory media 
allow for all sorts of novel cultural clashes. The spread of international 
sex trafficking, the drag trade, Islamic jihad, organized crime and gang 
violence are a few symptoms related to this state of radical flux. Such 
changes do not merely destabilize the norms of conventional cultural 
ecologies; they also destabilize one another as each vies for increased 
global influence.  
Because we are living in an era of drastic cultural upheaval, 
scholars are addressing new theoretic challenges. While continuing to 
consider the ways in which hegemonic institutions determine normative 
behaviors, we are simultaneously considering the influence of emergent 
change. This means digging beneath the textual artifacts that comprise 
culture toward the zone of “negotiation” and “adaptation” where 
competing ecologies actually come into being, the site of the shifting 
mantle, the realm of the medium. 
The rationalist tradition created a false dichotomy between logical 
and analogical thinking, defining the former as “reason” and the latter as 
“superstition.” Human progress according to this view is a process of 
gradually shedding analogic intuition and moving toward a mindset 
characterized by pure, unadulterated logic. Because we cannot even begin 
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to reason without first drawing analogical comparisons, the Logocentric 
fantasy is deeply deceptive. As D.R. Hofstadter explains, the idea that 
logical categories are stable entities is an illusion. “Categories are 
quintessentially fluid entities; they adapt to a set of incoming stimuli and 
try to align themselves with it.  The process of inexact matching between 
prior categories and new things being perceived (whether those ‘things’ 
are physical objects or bit-sized events or grand sagas) is analogy-making 
par excellence” (2001, 503). In other words, while logic deduction is the 
bedrock foundation of culture, analogical intuition is the substance 
undergirding it. Because logic derives from analogy, it can never be pure. 
The instant we draw a single conclusion, we are in the grip of ideology. 
We cannot reason without it. Reason needs belief. The recognition of this 
intuitive substrate has been unsettling philosophical discourse for some 
time now. It has allowed theorists to view cultural production more 
critically and to cultivate an increasingly ecological mindset. 
 
The Flailing Signifier. 
 Some of the first significant cracks in the bedrock of western 
rationalism emerged in the early 20th century when Swiss linguist 
Ferdinand Saussure attempted to discern between the historically 
emergent and ideologically determined aspects of linguistic production. 
In Saussure’s terminology, a “signifier” is any linguistic “sign” that 
conveys meaning. For instance, the signifier “apple” denotes the image of 
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particular type of fruit that grows on trees (1983). Structuralist 
philosopher Claude Lévi-Strauss would later coin the phrase “floating 
signifier.” By this, he meant a signifier with no universally accepted 
meaning. For instance, the slang term “oomph,” which has no fixed 
definition (1987, 55).  
In the mid-1960s, Jacques Derrida would inaugurate the 
Poststructuralist critique by arguing that all signifiers are in some respects 
“floating” because the act of interpretation always distorts meaning. 
Derrida calls this phenomena “freeplay.” The notion of freeplay is 
radically unsettling to the Logocentric tradition, which is founded on a 
belief that linguistic signs refer to something ultimately fixed and stable 
and that the dialectic process allows us to move closer to that meaning. 
By arguing that discourse is inherently anti-reductive, that it actually 
“adds” meaning rather than distilling language down toward some 
ultimate Truth, Derrida turned western rationalism on its head, drawing 
attention to the shifting analogic mantle at its base. 5 
The poststructuralist critique reminds us of the aspects of 
discourse that are undecided, unstable and “free.” For over forty years, 
poststructural theorists have dug through the bedrock of hegemonic 
discourse, past the mantle, and clear down to the molten core of 
emergence, locating cultural significance primarily in this roiling 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 “The movement of signification adds something, which results in the fact 
that there is always more, but this addition is a floating one because it 
comes to perform a vicarious function, to supplement a lack on the part of 
the signified” (Derrida 2001, 365 6). 
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temporal realm. The American strain of poststructuralism—AKA 
“cultural studies”—has been particularly interested in deconstructing 
cultural hierarchies and exposing their historically contingent status. This 
has proven a highly effective means of unsettling countless ideological 
commitments. However, in an age of mushrooming complexity, 
reflexively deconstructing ideologies to reveal still greater complexity 
has become a bit like battling a hydra-headed monster. What theorists 
need now is a way of managing the complexity already apparent by 
considering how cultural innovation is initially achieved and/or resisted.  
Praxism proceeds from the assumption that the signifier is not 
merely floating; it’s flailing, tethered by many competing worldviews, 
each vying for allegiance. Certainly, individual psyches add an 
interpretative element at the moment of reception, but shared knowledge 
is also possible. In fact, it is the basis of social cooperation and 
contestation, the lynchpin of cultural mediation. The attempt to define the 
signifier in a particular way in order to serve the interests of a particular 
group is the essence of mediumship. Thus, such practices demand closer 
attention. 
Poststructuralism disassembles determined structures. In contrast, 
praxism examines how such ideological structures are formulated in the 
first place. Rather than dismantling texts, it examines the mantle itself, 
that shifting indeterminate realm where culture first comes into being. In 
so doing, it addresses a number of theoretical questions related to the 
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actual practice of mediation, including, how does a ritual medium 
reassert the validity of determined norms? How does she adapt culture to 
emergent change? And why are certain mediation rites more or less 
effective in certain cultural contexts?  
Before attempting to address these crucial questions, I want to 
first define the two key characteristics of ecological cognition: reciprocity 
and multiplicity. 
 
Reciprocity: the individual and the environment are mutually influential.  
 
Praxism studies the dance between the individual and the 
environment. This dance has no fixed rules, only guidelines, no constant 
tempo or tune, just an array of familiar but variable themes. The manner 
in which the individual and environment interrelate betrays fleeting 
glimmers of agency that suggest cultural intent. The praxist perspective, 
therefore, is a conceptual leap from “reception” to “feedback,” from 
“active audiences” to “reciprocal ritualists.”6  
When we become the medium we are not merely “receivers” 
reacting to incoming stimulus, nor are we sites of political “resistance.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Albert Bandura’s theory of “reciprocal determinism” addresses the 
“dance-like” nature of engaging with the environment in a manner that 
entails both cultural complicity and strategic thought. He states, “Contrary 
to the unidirectional view, human accomplishments result from reciprocal 
interaction of external circumstances with a host of personal determinants, 
including endowed potentialities, acquired competencies, reflective 
thought, and high level of self-initiative” (1977, 207). 
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Instead, we are negotiators engaged in a process of constant compromise. 
The more a particular role empowers us; the more compliance it demands 
in return. As it permits us to articulate one view, it insists that we 
disarticulate another. It may even influence us to migrate to new cultural 
domains, or adopt new ritual personae. Thus we do more than merely 
acquire or reject input, flashing between green light and red light; we 
strive to marshal the abilities necessary to afford the dance in exchange 
for what the dance will afford us. This affording dance, or “affordance,” 
is a single step in a ritual role allowing us to mediate between our selves 
and the cultural environment.  
Engaging in an act of mediumship means inhabiting the space 
between our physical selves and the environment. It is a complex 
negotiation involving an elaborate system of feedback loops. These 
cultural sinews bend and flex as the dance goes on and on.7 In order to 
truly grasp the dance metaphor, we must allow it to grasp us back. 
Whether we like it or not, the environment tends to see us in certain 
ways. We not only gravitate to certain roles, they also gravitate to us. 
Some ritual personae attach like barnacles. Others— try as we might to 
claim them—slip through our arms, time and again. When we accept or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
7 Asserting the mutuality of individual and environment, Holland et al. 
state, “We reject a dichotomy between the sociological and the 
psychological. “Person” and “society” are alike as sites, or moments, of 
the production and reproduction of social practices” (1998, 270). 
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invite “attaching roles,” they offer empowerment along predictable lines, 
but limit less orthodox modes of empowerment. 
Returning to the photograph of the young women kissing, we 
might assume that it was taken at a party, and that one of them is 
considering posting it online. She knows that her family will be upset if 
they see it, as it goes against their traditional values. On the other hand, 
many of her friends have been posting similar pictures attracting 
humorous responses and heightening their online visibility. Eventually, 
she decides to go ahead and post it. At that moment, what exactly is 
happening? Is she resisting determined norms? Or submitting to an 
emergent trend? Is this a case of a bold innovator defying tradition? Or a 
fad-follower going with the flow? In order to support one of these 
arguments, we need to spotlight a single type of adaptation, and keep the 
other hidden off stage, presuming it insignificant, but this is misleading. 
Acknowledging the co-existence of two primary forms of cultural 
adaptation presents significant conceptual challenges. Yet when we only 
theorize in terms of one type of adaptation, we unduly restrict human 
agency. After all, if the environment is strictly hegemonic, how can the 
individual expect to create meaningful social change? Accepting or 
resisting the influence of monolithic power structures hardly constitutes 
cultural innovation. On the other hand, when an individual embraces 
emergent change, she risks being characterized as a mindless fad-
follower. Some people do follow fads. Others cling to traditions. But 
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these inclinations do not foreclose the possibility that a fad-follower 
might occasionally gravitate toward a more conventional path, and that a 
traditionalist might occasionally make a novel choice.  
When someone is described as a product of her environment, we 
are obliged to ask, “which one? The environment determined by our 
ancestors? Or the environment that is newly emergent, ushering in social 
change?” After all, we live at the intersection of being and becoming. 
Every moment of every day is an agonistic struggle between determined 
and emergent forces, and although they are not always ideologically 
opposed, these phenomena are, nonetheless, distinct. This means that the 
tension between them is irresolvable. At every turn, we are confronted 
with this irreducible complexity, thus consciously or unconsciously, we 
are constantly required to make choices. If we are not adapting to the 
status quo, we are adapting to change. If we are not accepting received 
knowledge, we are getting swept up in the latest trend. And more often 
than not, we are striking a compromise between the two. In fact, this is 
how cultural innovation occurs (the young women might decide to get 
married!)8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Cartesian mentalism and Behaviorist psychology are both post-political. 
The former defines human beings as purely self-determined. The latter 
defines us as strictly socially constructed. In either case, the individual is 
robbed of anything resembling true agency, the ability to consciously 
choose between competing modes of adaptation. Yet the world we 
actually inhabit is deeply political. We have no choice but to constantly 
change and/or resist change. 
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Lest we mistake the ongoing tension between emergence and 
determinism as the age-old struggle between tyranny and freedom, one 
quick survey of the Internet will disabuse us of this fantasy. As Daniel 
Bernardi writes in reference to the homegrown hate groups proliferating 
online, “Unlike public television, cyberspace is by the people for the 
people. It is, as technophiles like to point out, the most democratic form 
of mass communication in human history. But democracy, like polysemic 
television and postmodern ‘identity,’ doesn’t always lead to emancipation 
and critical consciousness. Hate is democratic” (2002, 162). 
Thus oppression is not merely something that is determined by the 
formal architecture of dominant discourse; it is also reproduced in viral 
patterns resonating in the psyches of every day people caught up in the 
sweep of historic circumstances. Because of this, it is naïve, and even 
dangerous, to automatically characterize emergence as the rejection of 
outmoded cultural norms, or to automatically and uncritically valorize 
such rejections when they occur. 9 Without some semblance of cultural 
authority, communities are thrown into chaos. A worthy goal, therefore, 
is not the automatic rejection of all ordering systems, but rather a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Writing during the Great Depression, an era still reeling from the 
indulgence of the 1920s, Kenneth Burke describes the ways in which 
emergent behavior can take on a reactionary quality: “As the world tries 
painfully to retrench after its long debauch, we see, not without 
misgivings, the emergent outlines of a justification by conformity. If a 
race for conformity became the basis of a new competitiveness, it would 
be the critic’s problem to present as many counter-influences as possible” 
(1935, 265). 
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growing tolerance for multiple systems that can serve to counterbalance 
once another, mitigating instances of abusive and exploitative hegemony. 
 
Multiplicity: multiple relations between individual and environment.   
 
Human beings are psychologically complex and the social worlds 
we inhabit are complex as well. Because we live at the intersection of so 
many dynamic forces, we cultivate multiple ritual roles to navigate the 
interplay between them. Rather than crystallizing into coherent 
predetermined dispositions (Bourdieu, 1972), these “performances of 
self” are ongoing negotiations between the individual and environment. 
Sociologist Erving Goffman explains, “It is a basic assumption of role 
analysis that each individual will be involved in more than one system or 
pattern and, therefore, perform more than one role. Each individual will, 
therefore, have several selves, providing us with the interesting problem 
of how these selves are related” (1997, 36). 
Let’s returns to the young woman at the moment before she posts 
the photograph online. As I’ve said, she knows many people who have 
posted similar pictures, but she is also concerned about how her family 
will respond. Yet in addition to existing within the ecology of her close 
friends and relations, she also lives in the ecology of young people in the 
United States at the start of the new millennium. She has read opinion 
polls that indicate this group is increasingly tolerant of same sex 
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relationships. At the same time, she is a Catholic and the church 
publically opposes homosexuality. She is not, in fact, certain that she is 
gay, so she may or may not entirely belong in the lesbian ecology. To 
further complicate matters, she has shown the photograph to two of her 
sisters. One has expressed shock and disapproval. The other has 
encouraged her to post it. Meanwhile, her mother has begun pressuring 
her to get married.  
Clearly, no single preconstituted “disposition” is capable of 
meeting the competing demands of all of the unstable ecological 
domains. A decision has to be made, and somebody has to make it. Even 
if the other young woman in the photo urges her to post it, our heroine 
can simply refuse, or put off making a decision indefinitely. While the 
individual must decide which social demands to meet, the demands 
themselves are not her creation. As Erving Goffman explains, 
“identificatory demands” are both opportunities and obligations related to 
a menu of social roles. The individual “frees [herself] from one group, 
not to be free, but because there is another hold on [her]. While actively 
participating in an activity system, [she] is, nevertheless, also obliged to 
engage in other matters, in relationships, in multi-situated system of 
activity, in sustaining norms of conduct that crosscut many particular 
activity systems” (40). 
Because determinism and emergence exert simultaneously 
influence in all of these competing contexts, we must allow for some 
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degree of conscious choice on the part of individuals negotiating within 
and through these echoing ecologies. Still, there is a risk. The value and 
the chief danger of a more multi-centered perspective are related. A 
multi-centered mediascape promises new modes of empowerment and 
new alternatives to dominant regimes of representation. However, it 
should not to be mistaken for the final realization of that promise. 
Dominant ecologies are remarkably resilient. These massive galaxies of 
entrenched belief exert significant gravitational pull. Individuals are 
drawn to them because they are reliable sources of empowerment and 
social stability to those who willingly accept traditional roles, i.e. 
conforming to gender or ethnic stereotypes in order to gain acceptance. 
At the same time, people may achieve media visibility, and thus a degree 
of social prominence, by openly rejecting dominant discourses, hence, the 
many popular counter-culture and sub-culture ecologies. Because such 
alternate discourses are constantly emerging, we must allow that culture 
is formed according to multiple rules in multiple domains, thus 
innovation is not only possible, it is all around us. 
 
PART TWO: Methodology. 
Praxism resists viewing the media as an accomplished thing to be 
defended or taken apart. Instead, it examines media in media res, 
considering it a constant process of cultural negotiation and renegotiation. 
This means finding ways to theorize the act of ideological “conflation.” 
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Figures 2-4. Conflation 
Take two ideas and push them together. Insists that they constitute 
a single fixed cultural category. This is how conflation works. It plays to 
the cultural biases of particular groups in an effort to manufacture greater 
consensus. The image of the kissing girls might be conflated with a 
cartoon heart and become part of a YouTube slideshow with slow 
dissolves to other pictures of the young lovers and soft romantic music 
throughout. This would be a “positive conflation.” The same picture 
might be combined with a shot of another young woman simulating 
vomiting and accompanied by a long blog entry, disparaging lesbianism 
and equating it with “sickness” or “repulsion.” This would be a “negative 
conflation.” Or the image of the two girls might be conflated with the 
American flag and then intercut with footage of soldiers marching and 
headlines about the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Policy” being 
repealed. This would be a “complex conflation,” expressing a degree of 
ambivalence on the part of the medium.  
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Mary Douglas stresses the cultural significance of ritually 
defining and redefining symbolic meaning. “The more we know about 
primitive religions the more clearly it appears that in their symbolic 
structures there is scope for mediation on the great mysteries of religion 
and philosophy” (1966, 6). To the members of any given culture, an 
inherited symbol system seems timeless and unchanging. “But there is 
every reason to believe that [such systems] are sensitive to change. The 
same impulse to impose order, which brings them into existence, can be 
supposed to be continually modifying or enriching them” (5). Douglas 
explains that, by creating new symbols and remediating old ones, we 
discriminate between good and evil, pure and impure. “The analysis of 
ritual symbolism cannot begin until we recognize ritual as an attempt to 
create and maintain a particular culture, a particular set of assumptions by 
which experience in controlled” (158). 
Conflation is the essence of belief modeling because it attempts to 
view analogical and logical thinking as perfectly aligned. Yet while the 
two are occasionally compatible, they are fundamentally distinct. The 
analogical mind proceeds by correlation, the idea that, “this is similar to 
that.” The logical mind proceeds by causation, the idea that, “this causes 
that.” Rationalism tends to uncritically champion the logical mind, but 
logical arguments are necessarily premised on analogical intuition. Keith 
Holyoak, et al. explain, “In the aftermath of analogical reasoning, 
learning can result in the generation of new categories and schemas” 
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(2001, 9-10). In other words, the logical mind needs the analogical mind 
to set the stage. Logic cannot proceed until analogic has helped to create 
the categories it places in opposition to one another.  These categories 
often appear stable and those that are based as they are on empirical 
observations are certainly more defensible than those that are primarily 
speculative. Yet at some level, even bedrock convictions are always at 
risk of coming unglued. This is unsettling to the logical mind, which 
seeks out certainty and order. It wants to fuse correlations together, to 
transform them from analogical patterns to immutable categories, hence 
“conflation.”    
Like all faith-based enterprises, this is an alchemical process, 
requiring an act of mythological transmutation. Enter the medium. The 
essence of mediumship is conflation. If the medium isn’t busy conflating 
two correlated ideas, he or she is busy dismantling a conflation that no 
longer seems relevant. This is what myth in motion looks like: conflating 
and deconflating, constructing and deconstructing. 
 
Conflation is Identification. 
Conflation is the center of gravity that the dancers pivot around 
and the fulcrum they leverage their positions against when colliding with 
other dancers.10 It is both a game of “keep away” and a game of “hot 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 With its emphasis on emotional bias and intuitive pattern recognition as 
the basis of analytical thought, conflation is similar Raymond William’s 
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potato,” claiming positive qualities for ones own group, and foisting 
negative qualities onto rivals. It is preaching to the choir, and 
mischaracterizing the competition. It is how fervid emotions pretend at 
impartiality and how similarity disguises itself as exact equivalence. 
Regardless of the approach taken, mediumship always involves some 
form of conflation. This requires a “source” and a “target.”  
 
Source: a subject associated or dissociated with the medium. 
Target: a subject to be conflated with the source. 
 
Rather than merely comparing and contrasting the target and the 
source—as in analogy—conflation considers them perfectly integrated, a 
singular whole. This reflects the medium’s ideological agenda. Even if 
her identity is not directly conflated with the performed rite, the manner 
in which she strives to maintain or modify the status quo necessarily 
betrays a degree of self-interest. Erving Goffman explains, “Ritual is a 
perfunctory, conventionalized act through which an individual portrays 
his respect and regard for some object of ultimate value to that object of 
ultimate value or to its stand-in” (1997, 114). 
In works such as Discipline and Punish (1975), Michel Foucault 
described social subjects largely constrained by institutional domination, 
yet before his death, Foucault was in the process of amending these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
notion of “affective structures” (1983) and Henrietta’s Moore’s concept of 
“pre-theoretical commitments” (2006). 
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views.11 Stuart Hall believes he was striving to formulate a less one-sided 
view of identity formation (1996, 2). With this in mind, he describes the 
“suturing” of the individual subject to a particular “subject position” and 
argues that this should be thought of as a two-sided process that involves 
both a fairly automatic and unconscious response to ideological 
conditioning, but also a degree of strategic identification (6).  
Holland et al. agree with Hall’s reciprocal, two-way street model, 
but object to his use of the term “suturing.” They argue, “A better 
metaphor for us is not ‘suture,’ which makes the person and the position 
seem to arrive performed at the moment of suturing, but ‘co-
development’—the linked development of people, cultural forms, and 
social positions in particular historical worlds” (1998, 33). 
If we view the subject position as a type of ritual role that both 
adopts the medium and is adopted by her, as she strives to achieve a 
particular end, we may view it as not entirely sutured, but nonetheless, 
aspiring toward that level of conflation. The medium strives to fuse 
perfectly with the ritual role and might, at times, appear to do so. At such 
moments, she begins to actually live the performance. In fact, this is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Later in his career, Michel Foucault was particularly interested in 
emergence, moments when “in certain orders of knowledge, there are 
these sudden takeoffs, these hastenings of evolution, these 
transformations.” He notes how these changes are related to “the sign of 
something else: a modification of rules of formation of statements which 
are accepted as scientifically true” (1977, 112). I argue that one of the 
adaptive functions the medium performs is modifying the symbolic order 
in response to emergent change. 
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goal of the ritual act, to become deeply immersed, larger than oneself, 
ceremonially sutured.12 But why conjure conflations in the first place? 
Let’s say I observe a recurring pattern: several men appear to be 
effective leaders. Because I am a male, I identify with this group and 
wish to view it in a positive light. This is not merely social conditioning; 
it is tied to my actually physiological identity. In order to promote a 
positive self-image, I conflate the pattern of “leadership” and the pattern 
of “masculinity” and fuse them together, arguing that they are one and 
the same. As I exist in a social world rife with long determined 
patriarchal norms, many cultural discourses affirm my status as “strong 
male leader,” but there are two problems: emergence and perception. 
First, emergence: while the social ecologies I inhabit are largely 
patriarchal, the emergent discourse known as feminism has called into 
question many of these longstanding assumptions. This perspective often 
equates masculinity with aggression, exploitation and sexism, negative 
traits in a leader. Then there is the issue of perception. Inevitably, I 
observe that some men are poor leaders, and many women are good 
leaders. So is the subject position of “strong masculine leader” neatly and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The visual rhetorics of digital media seem particularly conducive to 
such suturing, as J. Anthony Blair states, “Visual arguments tend to be 
one-dimensional: they present the case for one side only, without 
including the arguments against it, or without doing so sympathetically, 
and without representing alternative standpoints and their merits and 
defects” (2004, 361). Visual conflations militate against critical thinking, 
forcing the viewer to perceive separate concepts as inherently 
consubstantial. This is the source of their power and their appeal. What’s 
more, the text and audio accompanying these images often underscore the 
conflation rather than complicating it. 
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unproblematically sutured to my identity? Hardly. It is under threat by 
both the emergent force of feminism and observable reality. The “sutured 
subject” is never a fait accompli. Try as he might, he will never entirely 
transcend the shaky analogical substrate. The neatly fused concepts that 
define his assumed identity are always in danger of coming unglued. 
Thus, in order for the conflation to hold, it must be continually defended 
and reinforced and this requires ritual.13 
The first duty of a conflation is to pretend that it is a fixed 
category. In conservative discourse in the United States, it may 
synonymize “families” with “values,” “radicalism” with “Islam,” 
“freedom” with “capitalism,” “morality” with “heterosexuality,” “Osama 
bin Laden” with “Saddam Hussein,” “George W. Bush” with “Ronald 
Reagan,” “Barack Obama” with “Adolph Hitler,” and “liberalism” with 
“degeneracy.” In progressive discourse, it may synonymize “masculinity” 
with “sexism,” “blackness” with “authenticity,” “religion” with “war-
mongering,” “George W. Bush” with “Adolph Hitler,” “Barack Obama” 
with “Abraham Lincoln,” “The Tea Party” with “Racism” and 
“conservatism” with “intolerance.” 
By establishing such conflations, these discourses attempt to 
control what can and cannot be said regarding a particular subject. They 
are ways of making the playing field less even by equating positive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Often what is not conflated is as important as what is. NRA members 
argue: “guns don’t kill people. People kill people.” By refusing to 
recognize the connection between the availability of automatic weapons 
and murder, they argue that gun control legislation makes no sense. 
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values with one’s own group and negative values with the opposition. If 
religion is synonymous with patriotism, then nonreligious people must be 
less patriotic. Conversely, if nonreligious people are thought to be 
unpatriotic, then religious people, by implication, must be patriotic. As 
John Fiske states, “The struggles over whose discourse events should be 
put into is part of the reality of the politics of everyday life. The 
discursive patterns of domination, subordination, and contestation are 
where the weaving of the social fabric is politicized” (1996, 7). Because 
the patterns that characterize this “fabric” are woven by ritual practice, 
we need tools for examining how and why such mediation rites operate as 
they do.  
Conflation appears to simplify the world, but the act itself is 
highly complex. This is because it cuts multiple ways. It can justify 
institutional force, or oppose it. It can advocate conformity, reform, 
subversion, or revolution. In terms of reciprocity, conflation not only 
connects actors to ecologies; it also connects actors within ecologies. 
What’s more, it connects whole ecologies to one another and/or pushes 
them apart. The picture of the two girls kissing conflated with the cartoon 
heart appears on Flickr. Members of a conservative group post negative 
comments about it. This creates a reaction from those who support the 
girls. Back and forth, comments are exchanged. The participants seldom 
alter their opinions, but they do define them with increasing adamancy. 
These online discourses become ritual spaces where they can define and 
	  	   29	  
refine their particular worldviews and possibly exert a measure of 
influence on the larger ecology. 
Because conflations are context-sensitive, their relative influence 
is tied to ecological conditions. Thus, in a context where particular type 
of emergence is pronounced, a mediation rite that conflates an emergent 
source with a particular target will prove successful. For instance, in an 
ecology celebrating newfound gay rights, a conflation that equates the 
picture of the girls with a positive cultural value such as the cartoon heart 
will attract positive identification. On the other hand, in a context where 
determined norms are deeply engrained, a mediating rite that associates a 
determined source with a target phenomenon should prove more 
successful. For example, in a heteronormative ecology, a conflation that 
equates the picture of the girls with a negative cultural value symbolized 
by a woman sticking a finger down her throat will serve to justify 
negative identification. 
In terms of multiplicity, a single conflation may influence 
multiple cultural ecologies in multiple ways. For instance, conflating the 
image of the kissing girls with the cartoon heart will have positive 
salience within the academic discipline known as “queer studies,” but in 
terms of the cultural ecology of the entire United States, it will likely 
attract support, condemnation, ambivalence and various combinations of 
all three. 
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By reclaiming the original definition of the communication 
“medium,” praxism acknowledges the many diverse modes of ritual 
practice. In so doing, it steps away from the postmodern dissection table 
and toward the premodern ritual space. It stops deconstructing 
institutional power and starts reexamining competing modes of ritual 
authority. This move necessarily redirects critical focus. Rather than 
dismantling textual artifacts, it locates the shifting “mantle” underlying 




 This volume consists of a series of ecological domains bookended 
by an introduction and a conclusion. The first domain is titled “Ritual.” It 
focuses on the mediating practices involved in the maintenance and 
modification of cultural discourses. The next domain, “Ecology,” focuses 
on ecological theory in general and how it relates to media studies. This 
is followed by “Niche.” A niche is a microcosm of a larger ecology 
attracting individuals engaged in particular types of ritual roles. I 
examine how different cultural niches compete to define a single cultural 
discourse. The next domain is titled “Role.” It focuses on the component 
features of particular niches. In particular, it suggests how various roles 
afford ecological agents different modes of cultural empowerment. The 
domain titled “Affordance” defines the “media affordances” that 
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comprise each ritual role. These behavioral models are the roadmaps of 
particular mediation rites. The domain titled “Trope” considers the 
perceptual and conceptual components comprising particular media 
affordances. It examines how life imitates art and visa versa. Lastly, the 
conclusion, “We Will Never Be Secular,” asserts that attempts to study 
human behavior according to any single theory or ideological scheme 
will always fail. It suggests that a more achievable goal for media studies 
and the humanities in general is an ecological analysis of contending 
ideologies.  
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Chapter 2 
RITUAL 
               tag YouTube Chronos   medium 
       kairotic space   types  analogical     gang 
   mythos  shaman logical  praxism  
        Duchamp  logos ritual return 
         patterns cultivating identity      kiva   Dionysiac  
Appoline Bronze Age one-to-many one-to-one     agency 
 many-to-many   paradigm   aura  
 
Figure 5. Ritual Cloud 
 
A gang member enters enemy territory and tags a project wall. He 
does a “cross out” on the name of a rival that his crew recently killed. 
Now, he is claiming a piece of his rivals’ domain. In the days to come, 
the owner of the building will see this graffiti and shake his head in 
frustration. To him, it will seem little more than an act of senseless 
vandalism. But for the gang member and his crew, it is a ritual 
performance, a way of creating meaning. The deed to this piece of 
property will never belong to them. Nonetheless, this building has 
become their turf. 
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Figure 6. Tagging 
This chapter explores the ritualized nature of new media 
discourses. It explains how mediumship was practiced in the ancient 
world and how the advent of writing transformed the concept of the 
medium into a material object. It also examines how new media 
discourses are growing increasingly ritualistic and defines some 
characteristics of the contemporary ritual actor or “new medium.” 
Finally, it explains how mediumship allows individuals to claim a degree 
of “ritual authority” by cultivating culturally significant identities. This 
section builds on the work of classical scholars (Dodds 1951; Havelock 
1963; Jaynes 1976; Cohen 1995; Freund 2003), new media studies 
(Andrejevic 2003), anthropology (Turner 1975) and philosophy (Barthes 
1957).  First, however, I return to the issue if tagging. 
 
Tags.  
The practice of “tagging” long related to gang activity has 
recently become a staple of online discourse. As it turns out, this all-too-
familiar cultural practice is a highly sophisticated means of constructing 
meaning via conflation. It is how ritual mediums challenge conventional 
wisdom, constructing alternate Truths for themselves, in defiance of the 
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status quo and especially their rivals. Tagging is very much about control. 
It is about which gang dominates which area of a specific community in a 
specific way. In a similar sense, online tagging is about staking out bits of 
ideological terrain related to particular cultural concepts and contexts. 
In the early days of the Internet, search engines relied chiefly on 
logical cognition. They located websites based on simple categorical 
distinctions. Yet as the online community grew, the flaws in this 
approach were revealed. For instance, a word such as “salsa” might refer 
to a type of food, a type of music or a type of dance. In a network divided 
by fixed categories, it had to mean just one thing. Thus, people searching 
for salsa the dance might only be directed to websites about salsa the 
food. The addition of analogical “tags” helped to remedy this issue.  
These days, when uploading a video to YouTube, you are 
prompted to identify it as a fixed category, i.e. “entertainment,” 
“education,” “business,” etc. In order to do so, the analogical mind must 
propose a rigid conflation. If this were the only way YouTube classified 
its content, a video of a dance class identified as “education,” would not 
show up on a search for “entertainment.” This is why YouTube also 
allows users to add “tags.” Tags suggest alternate associations that may 
both compliment and conflict with the initial categorical conflation. Thus, 
if the video of the dance class is tagged as a “performance,” it may well 
show up under a search for entertainment content. As with a building 
tagged by both allied and rival gangs, a bit of online content featuring 
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various tags is a multiplicity that cannot ultimately be confined to a single 
categorical definition, it relates to a variety of overlapping and 
interpenetrating categories in a variety of ways.   
While attempts have been made to construct purely tag-based 
search engines, these have proven difficult to navigate. The best 
compromise appears to be a mix of both “types” and “tags,” both logical 
and analogical processing.14 The hyperlinked graphic known as a “tag 
cloud” is a fitting emblem of this ecological approach. It is a kind of 
“conceptual organism,” a cluster of analogical relations centering on a 
particular logically defined category. As with all complex systems, it can 
never be completely understood only partially mapped. Of particular 
interest are patterns that recur in more than one tag cloud, echoing across 
domains and up and down scales. These fractal relations are the feedback 
loops between various sociocultural contexts.  
Of course, tagging isn’t just about marking territory. It is also a 
powerful communication strategy, a means of advocating particular 
worldviews and opposing others. Tags contain information about a gang's 
identity, values, members, activities and opponents. When gangs are at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 As opposed to the concept of the rhizome (Deleuze & Guattari 1987), 
tag clouds are not purely nonlinear or purely nonhierarchical. In fact, they 
are defined by key hierarchical distinctions, specifically the hieratic sizing 
and shading employed to place emphasis on key words. Even if all of the 
words were the same shade and size, they could not be arranged in a 
purely nonhierarchical fashion. Due to the western technique of reading 
from left to right, terms on the left side of the cloud must necessarily 
command immediate attention and thus be viewed as particular significant. 
What’s more, due to the basic rules of visual composition, images in the 
center of cloud tend to be seen as particularly significant as well.  
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war, they aggressively tag one another’s territory, sending threats, 
making boasts, commemorating and celebrating deaths. These acts of 
signification are never free-floating. They are ongoing power struggles, 
symbolic truths to fight and die for. The building’s owner is guided by a 
different symbolic order. To him, the signs seem illogical. But for the 
gangs, their meaning is profoundly real.  
The theoretical approach that I call “praxism” focuses on these 
types of mediation practices. It does so by utilizing a combination of 
digital ethnography and ritual analysis to examine the relations between 
various cultural ecologies. Because praxism focuses on mediation 
practices, it strives to view tagging rites according to their own terms. In 
many respects, the gang members engaged in these practices are 
reproducing self-destructive and socially disruptive trends passed down 
from previous generations. Yet they have not merely been programmed 
to behave this way, and when they assume that institutional power is 
structured in a manner inimical to their interests, they are not entirely 
deluded. Their actions may be anti-social and self-destructive, but the 
gang members are not merely products of a bad environment. They are 
ritual actors capitalizing on environmental opportunities to the best of 
their ability. Their disenfranchisement and recourse to “street justice” is 
more than mere social conditioning. There is some measure of strategic 
thought at play, some sense that the rules of their own game may be a bit 
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less rigged than the rules designed by wealthy white politicians who steal, 
lie and even commit murder, but seldom go to jail.  
When a gang member “tags” a particular building, he assumes his 
rivals will recognize the significance of the act. Although the two groups 
are at war, they are members of the same overall “gang ecology,” so the 
general meaning of the tag is commonly understood. In contrast, the 
property owner only has a vague sense of its significance. Because 
human beings inhabit different “symbolic universes,” (Berger & 
Luckman 1966), different groups interpret observed phenomena in 
different ways. There may, in fact, be no such thing as a meta-
phenomenon that means the exact same thing to all people; yet particular 
ecologies can share the same general views about specific topics.15 
Affirming the supposed truth or falsehood of these “ways of knowing” 
requires cultural engagement, the active creation, maintenance and 
transformation of media discourses, and this requires the performance of 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 When a tag cloud is displayed on a web site, one can click on a 
particular term and link to the topic in question. Often multiple definitions 
will be proffered. This serves to destabilize the tag cloud by suggesting 
meanings incompatible with its central design, reminding us of the 
heteroglossic indeterminacy of linguistic construction (Bakhtin 1981). 
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The Original Medium. 
A “medium” in the original sense was a ritualist mediating the 
space between observed reality and the mind’s capacity for conceptual 
abstraction by “channeling” contact with the spirit world. Cultural 
psychologist Julian Jaynes has suggested that the ethereal voices that the 
original mediums heard were the stirrings of nascent cognitive abilities 
(1976, 67-83). A medium in this sense was a person engaged in a ritual 
process that allowed him or her to think abstractly about the physical 
environment to “mediate” it and transform it into a new type of 
conceptual space. In contrast to run-of-the-mill ritualists, ritual mediums 
did not merely perform formal rites; they spontaneously composed them. 
 
Figure 7. Delphic Oracle of Apollo 
When viewing images of ancient mediums in ecstatic trances, we 
may be tempted to dismiss their behavior as utterly nonsensical, but in 
many respects it reflects a high level of critical thinking. Ritual mediums 
were adept at improvising cultural innovations in a manner suggesting 
fairly sophisticated cognitive functions. The mediums of the ancient 
world were a special class of ritualist, capable of instructing the tribe by 
channeling spirits of the dead. In ancient Greece, this afforded them a 
high level of cultural distinction. Unlike the intoxicated mobs of 
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Dionysian cults, mediums were linked to the Appoline tradition and were 
charged with divining esoteric knowledge of the future or of the hidden 
present. As classical scholar E.R. Dodds explains, “Dionysiac experience 
is essentially collective or congregational … and is so far from being a 
rare gift that it is highly infectious,” whereas “mediumship is the rare gift 
of chosen individuals” (1951, 69).  
Two types of events occasioned acts of mediumship. First, there 
were regulatory, seasonal ceremonies performed to maintain social 
equilibrium. Then there were special rites performed in times of crisis 
and meant to combat disequilibrium (Turner 1969). In both instances, the 
particular role invoked was directly related to the emergent forces the 
medium was attempting to manage. By scrupulously cultivating 
collective illusions meant to validate the existing power structure, savvy 
mediums were able to maintain their own status in the social hierarchy. In 
general, this meant convincing the community that the spirit world had 
divinely anointed their leaders. In so doing, the mediums were also able 
to justify and safeguard their own authority. Thus, when ancient mediums 
negotiated between this world and the next, they were also negotiating 
between the community and its leaders, working to maintain a sense of 
cultural equilibrium.  
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Mediumship is a rhetorical art that can both buoy and undercut 
institutional authority.16 Thus ancient mediums were either the greatest 
allies or most threatening rivals of community leaders. Indeed, at times of 
extreme social crisis, ancient mediums might break with the existing 
power structure, advocating change and even open revolt. This might 
result in a social revolution, their own martyrdom, or both (as in the case 
of Jesus of Nazareth). Because the mediums’ brand of ritual authority 
was both a boon and a threat to the powers-that-be, their social status 
could be precarious. Both the community and its leaders were known to 
regard them with a mix of reverence and suspicion. Nonetheless, their 
role was vital.  
Managing emergence means modeling discourse, but because 
ancient mediums were also engaged in multiple discourses, their behavior 
was, in many respects, influenced by predetermined norms and emergent 
circumstances. They were not “free thinkers” in the sense of being 
divorced from all cultural imperatives. Though in many respects, they 
were critical thinkers, innovators adept at fashioning productive 
perspectives on the very material and historical forces they were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Raymond Williams cautions against viewing cultural mediation as 
merely a means of serving the interests of ruling elites. “The cultural 
process must not be assumed to be merely adaptive, extensive and 
incorporative. Authentic breaks within and beyond it, in specific social 
conditions, which can vary from extreme isolation to pre-revolutionary 
breakdowns and actual revolutionary activity, have often in fact occurred” 
(1977, 114). 
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enmeshed within, thus influencing what could and could not be said or 
even considered about certain subjects.  
Because human beings are fallible and biased, and because all 
prophets are, to some degree, “false,” mediumship was far from an exact 
science. A medium might favor one form of adaptation over another, 
automatically clinging to tradition as a “conservative” pundit might, or 
uncritically celebrating change, in the fashion of a “progressive” pundit. 
Some mediums chased after emergence in the manner of a politician who 
shifts opinions to score higher approval ratings. While some mediums 
stubbornly ignored emergence, as with a politician who holds fast to his 
views despite plummeting approval ratings. Some mediums actually 
reduced social equilibrium, growing despotic and holding society back, 
while others pushed society to the brink of chaos. Fortunately, there 
always has been another medium waiting in the wings, eager to step in 
and take the necessary corrective measures. 
 
Chronos, Logos, and Mythos 
Because emergence spreads quickly, ancient mediums attempted 
to control it by stopping the clock, hence ritual. The Greeks had different 
conceptions of time. “Chronos” or “chronological time” involved 
emergent circumstance. “Logos” was the eternal moment, related to 
principles of order and logic that were, supposedly, unchanging. And 
then there was “kairos,” the medial zone between the irresistible force of 
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chronos and the immovable object of Logos. This was the realm of 
mythology or “mythos.” Kairos was a sort of “time out of time,” a break 
from the ceaseless flow of human affairs. The ritual space was a kairotic 
realm where time stood still and common knowledge could be 
reengineered. It was a sort of “common knowledge generator,” a machine 
for manufacturing consensus. The Sophists believed gifted rhetors could 
utilize kairos to negotiate cultural transformation.17 The medium assumed 
this role, placating the tribe by renewing their belief in sacred signs, or—
when this proved ineffectual—modifying the symbolic order, altering 
culture at its very foundation by reconceiving or even supplanting its root 
metaphors. 
What we call “myths” are the ideological interventions of earlier 
times that have lost their cultural salience and no longer appear 
relevant.18 They are discarded “logics” whose mythic origins have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Victor Turner defines “liminal” or “limonoid” phases as periods in 
which “all previous standards and models are subjected to criticism and 
fresh new ways of describing and interpreting sociocultural experience are 
formulated” (1975, 15). According to him, each public crisis has “liminal 
characteristics,” because such events are thresholds between more-or-less 
stable phases of the social process. These anti-structural phenomena are 
moments when the symbolic order is in a state of flux and society is 
actually reinventing itself through the process of ritual action. When this 
occurs, ritual practice can be quite disruptive. “It takes up its menacing 
stance in the forum itself and, as it were, dares the representatives of order 
to grapple with it.  It cannot be ignored or wished away” (39).  
 
18 Barthes rejects the idea that the so-called “secular world” has 
transcended belief and no longer finds anything sacred. He sees myths 
everywhere: in photography, cinema, reporting, sports, TV shows, even 
wrestling-matches and plastic-ware. These are the apparently “timeless” 
Truths of the present era (1957). 
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exposed. These empty husks are now only significant as cultural artifacts. 
Yet every one of them was once an “innovation,” performing a valuable 
adaptive function, helping our ancestors negotiate an impasse between 
emergent change and determined norms.  
Myths are difficult to analyze because they are always in motion, 
flowing in one of two directions: either losing salience and betraying 
their historically-contingent status or gaining salience and becoming the 
invisible “Truths” underwriting common sense. There are countless 
living myths being formulated and fought over all around us, doing the 
hard work of aspiring to logic, resisting the forces that would expose 
them as mere intuition. Granted, no myth is ever universally embraced, 
but as long as a medium’s manna is influencing a large number of people, 
it should be considered culturally significant.  
 
The Word. 
The practice of mediumship would gain new authority with the 
advent of literacy, a phenomenon that invested the act of signification 
with a new source of immutable authority. The ascendancy of logical 
cognition was directly related to the advent of the written word. As our 
ancestors’ minds were able to reason more logically, they were able to 
invent symbol systems to transform oral language into logograms and 
alphabets. In turn, these systems served to further cultivate nascent 
logical cognition. As Gunther Kress points, out by creating “reading 
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paths” that “grant us very little or no leeway,” writing privileges logical 
thought process, which are linear and sequential. “The simple yet 
profound fact of sequence in time orients us towards a world of causality” 
(2003, 4). 
Additionally, the ability to write down our beliefs invested them 
with more perceived authority. Thus, the advent of literacy was a 
powerful ritual innovation. It gave the medium an external imprimatur far 
more impressive than a guardian spirit—one seemingly much more 
tangible, visible, and best of all eternal! Leonard Shlain explains, “The 
written word is essentially immortal. To a hyper-conscious primate who 
had become aware that death was inevitable, the discovery of a method to 
project one’s self beyond a single life span seemed nothing less than 
miraculous” (79). Once mediumship gave rise to her sister discipline 
“authorship,” ritual participants were demoted to mere audience 
members19 and inspirational spirits were demoted to mere muses. The 
real source of authority was thereafter located in the Word itself. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Theater Historian Philip Freund explains how ritual was “tamed” by the 
advent of theatrical scripts. “When it was apparent that the Dionysian 
revels were a fixed and possibly disruptive feature of the Athenian 
calendar, prompting a large outpouring of tipsy the garlanded participants, 
the more sober religious and civic leaders of the city state, concerned to 
subdue them, gradually took steps to change the tumultuous rites into 
stately processions and more orderly episodes.  They were transformed 
into sedate and official occasions, graced with Apollonian dignity and 
grave beauty.  An archon was appointed to preside over the ceremony, and 
the city council established strict rules to control and guide it. Its phallic 
aspect, the orgiastic element, was separated from the tragic to become 
what is now identified as comedy, a largely independent art form.  This is 
thought to have begun in the seventh century BC.” (2003, 43). 
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ability to convey detailed information across time and space afforded our 
most elite ancestors tremendous power, which is why, for the first two 
thousand years after the advent of literacy, the ability to read and write 
remained the jealously guarded privilege of social elites. It was not 
merely a means of conveying information; it was a way of consolidating 
power. The first attempts to “tame” ritual occurred twenty five hundred 
years ago during the Bronze Age. After the advent of the written word, 
culture was increasingly considered a textual product or technical mode 
of production rather than a cultural process. Western civilization since the 
age of ancient Greece has been “Logocentric.” That is, it has prized 
logical causation over analogical correlation, word over deed, product 
over practice.  
As Eric Havelock explains, Greek philosophers demanded that “a 
discourse of ‘becoming,’ that is of endless doings and of events, be 
replaced by a discourse of ‘being,’ that is of statements which are in 
modern jargon ‘analytic’, are free from time-conditioning” (Havelock, 
1963. 182). “It was simply a crystallization of the demand that the Greek 
language and the Greek mind break with the poetic inheritance, the 
rhythmically memorized flow of imagery, and substitute the syntax of 
scientific discourse, whether the science be moral or physical” (1963. 
182).  
Unlike ritual practice, the written word was not a transaction with 
nature. In fact, it broke with attempting to imitate nature altogether. 
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Instead, it collapsed verbal utterances into abstract patterns or “letters” 
that were then gathered into clusters that in no way resembled natural 
phenomena. This was a hermetic process, a sealing up, a closing off, a 
containment of ideas and experience. Clusters of symbols could actually 
confer a kind of immortality on the literate, preserving their thoughts long 
after they were dead. Thus, they became the ultimate repositories of 
meaning and the preferred measure of cultural significance. 
The classical age was the era of archetypal imagery, master 
narratives, and universalizing rhetoric. Human beings no longer wanted 
to imitate the natural world. They wanted to master it, isolating and 
identifying the essential facts beneath the messy particulars of day-to-day 
existence. In keeping with this trend, their gods grew increasingly 
anthropomorphic and fewer in number, an emergent trend related to the 
rise of monotheism, deism and finally rationalism and its deification of 
the human intellect.  
The rise of classicism was not an absolute shedding of ritual, so 
much as the emergence of a concomitant and, in some respects, 
competing perspective. With the advent of the written word and monetary 
systems, our ancestors were able to formalize the diverse sociocultural 
practices their rituals had long enacted. The Bronze Age saw the birth of 
the theater (the Ritual of Dionysus became the Theater of Dionysus),20 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Theater eventually supplanted ritual in Aztecan Mexico, serving as a 
form of instruction and socialization. It became a “preferred non-
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philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, the legal system and various civil 
institutions, including the first democracy. These changes signaled a shift 
of focus as people began to fixate more on products and modes of 
production than the practice of mediumship itself. Once we began to view 
the media as a thing external to human beings we could speak of it in 
terms of simplistic cause and effect arguments. The notion of “media 
effects” presumes that mediums are forces existing out there in the 
environment that impose influence on us, or, in the case of media 
producers (artists, authors, film directors), through us. But this 
estrangement is an illusion.  
At any rate, the birth of theater did not mean the death of ritual. 
As the dithyrams were danced on stage in the Theatre of Dionysus, 
approximately forty yards behind the skene (or stage house) on the 
hillside of the Acropolis, bulls were being ritualistically slaughtered on a 
sacred altar (Pizzato 22). And although he tended to debunk the 
theological superstructure—the ironic tragedian Euripidies also insisted 
on the preservation of ritual practice and included many examples of it in 
his plays (Foley 1985, 22). Even the supreme “rationalist” Plato 
expressed little doubt about the need for ritual (22). Yet despite the father 
of western philosophy’s misgivings about theater and advocacy of ritual, 
subsequent thinkers would consider ritual the inferior form. After all, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
physically coercive means of exercising social control through thought 
control” (Pizzato 24). 
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Platonism helped inaugurate the view that human progress is a 
teleological march toward increased perfection. The first theatrical 
producers, the Athenian priests, had drawn a key distinction between 
modern and primitive culture. After the advent of theater, ritual was 
considered not only archaic, but also suspiciously unstable, subject to 
radical transformations and reinterpretations. Both ritual and theater were 
long-lived and portable, but as specific rituals migrated from culture-to-
culture and era-to-era, they were much more readily inflected by local 
and historical particulars. In contrast, theater was far less improvisatory 
with fixed dialogue and predictable outcomes. Thus, it was thought to be 
the more perfect form.  As long as the rationalist mindset held sway, 
predictability and singularity would be valued over mutability and 
multiplicity, and ritual would be consigned to an increasingly marginal 
status in human affairs, often associated with primitive dogma and 
superstition (Goody, 1977). 
The advent of the audience increasingly diminished the public’s 
active participation in public events. To make allowance for this, new 
cultural practices were created that afforded our ancestor’s alternative 
means of influencing public discourse, including opportunities to vote, 
serve on juries, defend legal claims, compete in sporting events and 
dramatic and artistic contests. This type of “empathic engagement” 
(Shore 1996, 109) allowed them to feel they could still affect the larger 
social arena and gave them a new type of stake in social outcomes, while 
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formalizing the manner of their participation in order to limit the 
possibility for disruptive innovation. 
Rather than dispose of ritual altogether, Greek civil society 
partially dismantled it, stripping away some of its original functions. For 
instance, with the advent of the Athenian legal system, rituals were no 
longer charged with resolving blood feuds. Instead, these disputes were 
absorbed into a formal civic template that allowed wealthy citizens to 
protect their interests, while dominating, attacking and even declaring 
war on others with state approval.  
Cohen describes how, in his last dialogue Laws, “Plato grounds 
the rule of law in a “collective fiction” which removes legislation and law 
from the realm of politics by defining them as operating above faction 
and domination and by attaching to them an aura of sanctity and then 
mutability” (1995, 55).21 He rejects the notion that Greek society was 
growing more equitable, but stresses that it was important for citizens to 
believe that that was the case in order for civic rule to be established and 
maintained. “For the role of law to succeed, then, citizens must be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Plato spoke of educating the demos via a process of educational 
socialization, which would induce them to believe that they should not 
challenge established institutions because laws are inherently “sovereign,” 
“sacred,” “eternal,” and “just” (Cohen 1995, 49). In contrast, Aristotle 
believed that the best democratic state should combine both democratic 
and the oligarchic features in order subject the demos to coercive 
institutional control. He saw the state as performing a censorial function 
and believed that it must “concern itself with virtue” (48). 
 
	  	   50	  
educated to believe that they cannot make such fundamental changes 
because the laws are sovereign, sacred, eternal, and just” (49). 
For thousands of years, the written word has served to sanction 
such cultural formalities thus dominating cultural discourse. Yet since the 
advent of mass media, its primacy has been under threat. And now, in the 
age of new media, we are experiencing a resurgence of our most ancient 
mode of cultural discourse. 
 
The Ritual Return. 
As media discourses grow increasingly interactive and 
participatory, mass communication is taking on a highly ritualized 
quality, hence recent interest in mediation “practices.” One of the first 
theoretical works to seriously examine the concept of “media rituals” was 
Media Events by Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz (1992). It focuses on 
large-scale televised ceremonies such as Princess Di’s funeral and the 
Olympics. Dayan and Katz emphasize the manner in which such 
communal rites affirm collective values. Along with Dayan and Katz, 
James Carey originally stressed the communal aspects of 
“communication rituals” (1989), yet his more recent work defines them 
as a site of political engagement (1998).22 Nick Couldry opts for a more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 James Carey advocates expanding the definition of media rituals 
proposed by Dayan and Katz to allow for the possibility of political 
struggle. “In short, the existing analysis of media events is less able to 
handle drama without rest or resolution, drama without catharsis or 
consensus, drama which divides people more sharply and intensifies the 
	  	   51	  
media-centric definition, equating the term “media ritual” with all media 
related values” (2003, 29).23 Drawing on all three of these perspectives, I 
view media rituals in terms of ecological complexity. They are—
according to this perspective—means of creating communities, engaging 
politically and perpetuating inherent values. In the age of the Internet, the 
ritualized nature of mass-media discourse is more apparent than ever. 
Real time, interactive participation allows emergent trends to spread 
instantaneously across the globe in multiple directions. Our newfound 
ability to spontaneously meld the symbolic production of authorship with 
the symbolic action of ritual has profound implications for how we 
conceptualize culture. Specifically, it suggests that the newest thing about 
“new media” may be something quite ancient. 
In We Have Never Been Modern, Bruno Latour rejects what he 
considers an arbitrary distinction between the “archaic” and the 
“modern.” In this way, he suggests the possibility of a “comparative 
anthropology,” bridging the past and the present (1993, 10). He also 
suggests reconceptualizing social subjects as more than mere 
intermediaries (passive go-between) influenced by either natural or 
society. He believes we should instead view them as “mediators—that is, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
perception of social difference, drama which separates rather than unites: 
drama involving confrontation which spills outside its ritual frame to 
contaminate and reconfigure social relations” (1998, 67). 
 
23 Nick Couldry writes, “Media rituals are formalized actions organized 
around key media-related categories and boundaries, whose performance 
frames, or suggests a connection with, wider media-related values” (2003, 
29). 
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actors endowed with the capacity to translate what they transport, to 
redefine it, redeploy it, and also to betray it” (1993, 81). 
Our primitive ancestors did not have theaters, libraries, 
courtrooms, or cathedrals, but they did have ritual. Our earliest cultural 
artifacts are all tied to ritual practices, modes of public discourse that 
invite participation and serve to symbolically unite communities. Yet 
while ritual is the foundation of modern culture, for thousands of years, 
culture itself has been defined in opposition to it. According to this way 
of thinking, being “cultured” means transcending primitive rites and 
cultivating a more rarified theatrical sensibility. What then are we to 
make of the increasingly ritualized character of today’s participatory 
media? From the “soft scripted” melodrama of reality TV, to the primal 
trauma of terrorist spectacles, to the cabalistic protocols of social media 
cults, communication discourses are growing increasingly interactive, 
improvisatory, spontaneous and communal—all distinct characteristics of 
ritual practice.  
The “ritual return” is a reawakening of interest in ritual 
performance and the ways that it serves to mediate culture. This is not a 
regression, I argue, so much as a growing realization of the central role 
ritual has always played, and continues to play, in our attempts to make 
sense of the world around us. Ritual is not the antithesis of culture but 
rather the wellspring from which culture continually emerges. This fount 
of predictable reproduction and startling innovation includes the often 
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violent and orgiastic rites that serve to reify our highest aspirations and 
expose our most transgressive desires. I am not suggesting that new 
media practices mark a sudden return to primitive rituals. Such a view 
would prove insupportable, not because society has become too civilized 
to engage in such practices, but because, in fact, we have never stopped 
doing so. We cannot return to the ritual altar because we never left it. 
The ritual return is a reawakening of ritual consciousness, a re-
emergence of interest in the mediating practices that have always been 
central to the production of cultural discourse. As with tribal customs, 
interactive technologies invite participation, undermine notions of passive 
consumption and invite more direct engagement. Rituals—which have no 
audience per se, only participants—flourish in such an environment. As 
new media forms increasingly unsettle distinctions between authors, 
actors and audiences, the whole enterprise of creating culture appears to 
be gravitating toward the center of a vast and tumultuous ritual space.  
As Clay Shirky explains, before the Internet, there were two 
general types of media technologies: broadcast media and 
communications media (2008, 86).  
 
Figure 8. One-to-One Communication 
Traditionally, the one-to-one “communication model” has been 
associated with social interaction. 
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Figure 9. One-to-Many Communication 
The one-to-many “broadcast model” has been linked to cultural 
production. 
 
Figure 10. Many-to-Many Communication 
Now, participatory media signals a return to many-to-many 
communication, long the hallmark of ritual practice. 24  
 
Figure 11. Kiva 
 Building on a metaphor proposed by Michael Chwe, I associate 
this view of participatory media with the circular form of a Native 
American kiva, a ritual space affording a real-time “feedback loop” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Clay Shirky elaborates: “The distinction between communications and 
broadcast media was always a function of technology rather than a deep 
truth about human nature. The old habit of treating communications tools 
like the phone differently from broadcast tools like television no longer 
makes sense. The two patterns shade into each other and now small group 
communications and large broadcast outlets all exist as part of a single 
interconnected ecosystem” (2008, 99). 
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between its inward facing inhabitants, serving to generate “common 
knowledge” as all participants are aware that they are being observed by 
one another (2001).25  This concept resonates with what James Carey 
calls, “the ritual view of communication,” a perspective that has 
traditionally been deemphasized and even marginalized in industrial 
societies. This type of cultural interaction emerges organically and is 
“linked to terms such as ‘sharing,’ ‘participation,’ ‘association,’ 
‘fellowship,’ and ‘the possession of a common faith.’ What’s more, it 
exploits the ancient identity and common roots of the terms 
‘commonness,’ ‘communion’ and ‘community’” (1989, 18). 
The ritual return is a family reunion of unprecedented scale. The 
far-flung tribes of the world are converging in multiple overlapping ritual 
kivas, bumping into each other in surprising ways, recalling common 
ancestries, shared beliefs and age old rivalries. In the space of a single 
generation, we have gone from less than a million people distributing 
media globally to over a billion. As Clay Shirky points out, “We are 
living in the middle of the largest increase in expressive capability in the 
history of the human race” (2008, 105-6). But why are so many people 
expressing so much? Grasping the significance of this change involves 
viewing the media in a new (and old) way, not as something imposed on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Like Chwe’s kiva, Michel Foucault’s description of an all-seeing 
“panopticon” (1975) has been used as a metaphor of mass media 
discourse. Yet while the kiva acts as a common knowledge generator 
(Chwe 2001), the Panopticon’s power resides in its ability to isolate and 
atomize individuals subordinating them the control of a single central 
authority.   
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us from without, but rather something that resonates within, affording 
various patterns of behavior that we both perform and conform to. 
 
The Ritual Aura. 
In his essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Production,” Walter Benjamin argues that modern art has lost its “ritual 
aura.” Benjamin writes, “to pry an object from its shell, to destroy its 
aura, is the mark of a perception whose ‘sense of the universal equality of 
things’ has increased to such a degree that it extracts it even from a 
unique object by means of reproduction” (2009, 9). Benjamin is correct. 
Once digitized, even the Mona Lisa loses her “ritual aura,” the sense that 
she is rare and ephemeral yet somehow timeless. But this aura has not 
been obliterated. It has merely migrated to a new locale. In many 
respects, the work of art has always been, a stand-in for ritual and an 
imperfect one at that.  
This convenient container for ritual significance was portable and 
durable, though not particularly flexible. Thus, a work of art was a 
useable fetish and a reliable means of transmitting ritual protocols from 
place to place and generation to generation, yet any numinous quality it 
was thought to possess needed to be constantly reaffirmed by its handlers, 
the official curators of its use-value. 
The ritual aura has traditionally been one of the key 
characteristics of art, but ritual existed for thousands of years before 
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culture began to celebrate the works of famous artists. Certainly, ritual 
actors etched images on cave walls and grave markers, made pottery and 
wove fabric, but these creations were meant to serve practical functions 
as either physical tools or ritual fetishes. They were not viewed as works 
of self-expression belonging to a particular oeuvre. The creation of these 
objects was a ceremonial act. Artists never signed these pieces and there 
were no patrons to admire them other than the gods they were created to 
delight.  
As literacy redefined culture, it redefined art as well. For 
centuries, the Church censored the production of “graven images.” 
Though, gradually, it allowed artists to grace the walls of churches and 
cathedrals with sacred imagery. This proved to be a cultural risk as it led 
to the apotheosis of especially gifted artists whose reputations earned 
them quazi-divine status. As famous names such as Da Vinci and 
Michelangelo took on preternatural luster, art gained material value but 
began hemorrhaging its ritual aura. This process would accelerate 
throughout the modern era. As gallery owners and agents replaced the 
clergy as chief patrons, both the subject matter and status of art changed 
radically. It became more gritty and experimental, a vehicle for 
displaying the virtuosity and originality of the artist. It was suddenly a 
commodity, a “product” to be bought, sold, consumed and ranked. As 
Maureen Goggin points out, “Under a modernist conception of art, artists 
became identified with the products of their creation rather than with 
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praxis and knowledge of praxis. Concurrently, products became 
hierarchically organized, with privileged objects of art positioned at the 
top and other objects demoted as lowly crafts and often distinguished in 
negative terms as ‘useful’ objects that became positioned toward the 
bottom” (2000, 17). 
“High art” in this sense was venerated as a commodity first and 
ritual fetish last. Yet while Walter Benjamin laments the desacralization 
of the rarified objet d’ art, as ritual itself was increasingly devalued in the 
high modern era, lesser forms had no trouble retaining their ritual aura. 
The ritual space was demoted to a “sewing circle” where low status 
individuals could dabble in communal “crafts” and “folk art.” Status-
seekers did not create art as a form of ritual practice. They did so to rise 
above the community. A lone opera singer on a stage was considered an 
artistic triumph. A crowd of people harmonizing was a mere “sing 
along.” 
 
Figure 12. Duchamp Remediates Da Vinci 
If the art object became less holy and more of a commodity in the 
modern era, most artists didn’t seem to mind. Besides, as Marcel 
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Duchamp asserted, art is not an object. It’s an idea. 26 So perhaps the 
ritual aura never actually belonged to the rarified art object. 27   
Perhaps it was merely on loan. And now that we are all potential 
mediums—thanks to the advent of new media—perhaps ritual has come 
back home to roost. Benjamin was right. Mechanical reproduction does 
undermine the numinous significance of the art object, but this only 
directs our attention beyond its physical presence to the ritual practices, 
which gave rise to it and sustain its cultural salience. Once digitized, even 
Shakespeare loses his ritual aura, but each of his words instantly becomes 
a manipulable affordance ready to be deployed by a savvy ritualist 
adopting a particular role in order to attain a particular end. Thus, rather 
than merely vanish, the ritual aura has returned to its initial status as a 
disembodied state, a spirit of mediumship. As it becomes increasingly 
problematic to study culture as an object separate from social acts, our 
focus is drifting back toward the shifting medial realm. Certainly, 
powerful social forces continue to play tug-o-war with textual meaning, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 “Dada was an extreme protest against the physical side of painting. It 
was a metaphysical attitude. It was intimately and consciously involved 
with ‘literature.’ It was a sort of nihilism to which I am still very 
sympathetic. It was a way to get out of a state of mind—to avoid being 
influenced by one’s immediate environment, or by the past: to get away 
from clichés—to get free” (Duchamp 1946, 394). 
 
27 The surrealists lionized a young nihilist named Jacques Vaché who 
believed that all art is imbecility and refused to produce anything at all. 
André Breton credited him with being one of the inspirations behind the 
movement. He died from an opium overdose at age 26. 
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but politics also exists in the ritual space between the individual and the 
environment, the crucible from which culture continually rises anew.  
 
The New Medium. 
Throughout history, relatively few people have been able to exert 
wide scale cultural influence though acts of mediumship. Naturally, such 
unique individuals are often feared and admired. Yet we are all mediums 
on a more modest scale, seeking equilibrium between changing times (a 
car crash, an earthquake, turning thirty) and established norms (parental 
advice, commercial advertising, film narratives). With the advent of the 
Internet, much of this once private and personal mediumship has gone 
public, occurring on social networking sites, blogs and via email 
exchanges. We live in an age of unparalleled complexity. The spread of 
emergent patterns is now occurring at a speed, scale and intensity with no 
historic precedent, but what are we to make of all of this burgeoning 
chaos? Anything we wish, apparently. Though, of course, it is hardly that 
simple.  
In general, the viral patterns spreading across the mediascape 
conform to familiar cultural scripts. More unsettling than innovations 
occurring within particular ecologies is the clash between ecologies, both 
large and small. Increasingly, we are all compelled to navigate between 
these conflicting worldviews. And even when others aren’t paying 
attention, we are aware that they might be. Thus we are increasingly 
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conscious of the performed nature of our social interactions. This is the 
essence of ritual consciousness, an awareness of the “public self” 
enacting a particular role in pursuit of a particular aim.  
Today’s “new media” gives rise to “the new medium.” Unlike 
traditional ritualists, who emerged from oral traditions, the new medium 
is often (though not always) literate; spontaneously remediating received 
knowledge, manipulating copious amounts of multimodal information at 
the click of a mouse key. This is fortuitous. Individuals are only capable 
of adopting a select number of ritual roles and not all ritual roles are 
compatible with all social milieus. Because of this, mediumship is an 
uneven playing field. When we become the medium, we take on a role 
most amenable to our interests and abilities and best suited for exerting 
influence within a particular environmental context. For “new mediums,” 
this process means taking on multiple, often competing roles while 
navigating within and between the most diverse cultural niches 
imaginable: geographic, affinitive, ethnic, political and religious, while 
deploying all of the communication strategies at our disposal.  
 
Figure 13. The New Medium 
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All of us currently express ideas online are new mediums, 
negotiating between the status quo and emergent trends in any number of 
cultural ecologies. Currently, there are new mediums as far as the eye can 
see and there is no shortage of rituals for us to perform. A computer 
screen with several navigation windows open at the same time is a 
mosaic of potential associations waiting to be brought into vivid relief. 
All one has to do is connect the dots, but in what order? And to what 
end? 
The most technological adroit new mediums are often labeled 
“digital natives,” a descriptor that simultaneously exoticizes and 
pathologizes them. When viewed in this light, they become magical 
beings able to commune with technology as effortlessly as tribal 
“primitives” purportedly communed with nature. At the same time, they 
are considered crude savages ill-equipped to read novels or write in a 
manner not riddled with the defects borne of excessive text messaging. 
Both of these perspectives are partly true, but largely exaggerated.  
All new mediums—myself included—increasingly adopt a variety 
of virtual personae: video game avatar, photo-shopped still, CGI 
animation. We are disembodied, dismembered and disembedded, 
inhabiting multiple discourses, locations and historical eras at once, 
wresting information from the grip of tightly bound professional 
communities, flouting accreditation and membership of any kind, but at 
the same time, remaining somewhat deluded by our own press, the 
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techno-geek-mystique that declares we are capable of remodeling the 
mediascape with unbridled freewill. Many of us are addicted to the 
“new,” embracing a fashionable and suspect calculus that equates 
surrendering privacy and modesty with social empowerment.28 The 
transgressive displays of these ritual actors are less moral lapses than 
calculated bids for increased visibility. 
 When we engage in acts of “new mediumship,” we are standing at 
the intersection of the territory and the map and mediating between them 
in both directions at once, making the territory more map-like (flash 
mobs, speed dating, performance art) and the map more territory-like 
(reality TV, sexting, comedic improv). Increasingly, we prefer our 
information “just in time” and “on demand.” Our attention spans are 
growing shorter, and so is our patience with rigidly delimited cultural 
categories. Many new mediums are baffled by disciplinary silos that 
attempt to maintain distinctions between “us” (sociology) and “them” 
(anthropology) and are amused by gatekeepers who seek to maintain 
proprietary distinctions of any kind. Most of us are becoming more adept 
at multi-tasking, capable of tracking several interweaving narrative 
threads at the same instant (provided they can hold our interest). A 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 In his book Reality TV: The Work of Being Watched, Mark Andrejevic 
suggests that modern consumers have grown accustomed to surrendering 
privacy in them name of individuation. “The idea is that we can gain 
control by submitting to comprehensive monitoring of the rhythms of our 
daily lives” (2003, 6).  
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textual poacher, a mediator, a re-mediator, a tweeter, a blogger—all of 
these appellations apply, none of them epitomize.  
We are often susceptible to the homogenizing influence of “group 
think,” but we also celebrate the emergent genius of knowledge building 
collectives. The communities we join are often blind to differences of 
race, class and gender, and just as often predicated on them. We are 
equally suspicious of leaders and followers, but we are a bit of both. Our 
interactions are synchronous and asynchronous, insular and open source. 
We often encounter the same stores, products and cultural tropes as we 
travel the world in search of diversity. When ee find it, we are often adept 
code-switchers, able to assume a variety of context-specific personae. We 
almost certainly speak English. Our brand is transparency, accessibility 
and innovation. We appear eminently available, but are actually quite 
aloof, celebrating emancipation of the communal will while seeking to 
identify as unique, original and outré.  
Best of all, we can make almost any image or sound 
instantaneously materialize. We see media affordances everywhere. A bit 
of small talk, a narrative structure, a cell phone camera, a diary entry, red 
hair, the Pledge of Allegiance, a social bond, the clear blue sky, a 
software program, a giddy laugh, a camera angle, a slogan, a rhyme 
scheme, a metonymic trope, a video game, a dance step, a guitar solo—
all of it, raw material, a fathomless fund of inspiration and potential 
content crying out to be mixed, remixed and mixed again. So we seize 
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culture and let it seize us back, submitting to its thrall, enhancing, 
manipulating and transmitting new semblances of selfhood around the 
world and back in the blink of an eye. 
 
Next. 
 The following chapter explores how the diverse modes of ritual 
authority invoked by new mediums are forcing theorists to break with 
arguments emphasizing a single coherent scale of institutional power. 
Social hierarchies remain a key consideration, but mediumship takes on 
many forms and exerts many types of influence for a variety of reasons. 
Thus, the metaphor of a standardized 19th century economy favored by 
Marx is increasingly being supplanted by the metaphor of a complex 
cultural ecology. 




      media effects root metaphor Marxism hegemony 
    ritual authority   prosumer capital    gang 
   cross-out  public sphere revolution  cultural  
    agency  gender ecology paradox 
       symbolic universe class      percepts    
James J. Gibson race feedback loop industrial revolution 
     capital   gang     hegemony paradigm shift  
 
Figure 14. Ecology Cloud 
 
In the United States in the mid-1950s, television both promoted 
and facilitated the atomizing of human communities into nuclear families 
connected by one-way strands of cultural convention broadcast via the 
media airwaves. There were just three networks then, promoting 
consumerism and catering to particularly desirable sociocultural 
demographics.  
 
Figure 15. Nuclear TV
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TV representations showed viewers what it meant to count as a 
respectable and legitimate member of society. Specifically, late fifties TV 
celebrated white, male, middle class values. On “the tube,” dad worked. 
Mom stayed home. The neighbors kept to themselves. And almost 
everyone was Anglo Saxon, reasonably well off and politically 
conservative. In such an era, it was not particularly problematic to 
theorize media in terms of top-down effects, but then something strange 
happened.  
Rather than becoming entirely brainwashed into mindless 
conformists, the first generation of children weaned on “the boob tube” 
grew shockingly rebellious. Indeed, the baby boomers ushered in a 
massive counter-cultural revolution. Breaking with the traditions of past 
generations, they engaged in political activism, experimented with drugs 
and sexual liberation, promoted equality for all races and both genders 
and completely revamped the sociocultural landscape. But why should 
this occur? If the predominant values being instilled in young people 
were male and middle class and white, why would so many young men 
grow their hair long, dress in faded and torn clothing and sing black 
music? If gender conformity and mass consumption were being sold to 
the masses, why would so many young women develop more 
nontraditional attitudes toward sex and break with standard domestic 
roles? The “media effects” model had no way of accounting for these 
seeming anomalies.   
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One explanation for the rise of the counter-culture comes from 
Joshua Meyrowitz. He theorizes that television tends to undermine social 
hierarchies by breaking with the traditional developmental stages of 
childhood. Because there is no means of regulating the information 
children are exposed to, young people learn a great deal about the adult 
world before they have passed through processes of cognitive maturation. 
Because everyone is exposed to the same basic information, it is 
increasingly difficult to distinguish between the traditional social roles of 
adults and children (1985 264-5). Meyrowitz also believes that television 
blurs the distinction between the private and the public sphere, which, 
concomitantly, blurs gender distinctions (224-5). 
While these influences may well have mitigated the conformist 
messages saturating early television programming, we should also 
consider narratological influence. Television is primarily a form of 
entertainment, as such, it needs to convey stories, and stories require 
transgressions, conflict and extreme behavior, moments when characters 
clash and break with normative behavior. In a traditional televisual 
storyline such disruptions are neatly resolved before the final commercial 
break, but this may not entirely force the genie back into the bottle. If the 
dominant discourse is conformist, the most interesting characters will be 
those that oppose this worldview. Thus, the loners, rebels, outlaws and 
beatniks that were a regular staple on early television may have been 
more than mere cautionary figures. They may also have been “media 
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affordances,” potential modes of behavior on offer to anyone willing to 
risk breaking with majority norms in exchange for the glamour and 
excitement of social revolt. Fifties television, therefore, did not merely 
teach children how to consume and conform. It also provided them with 
many handy examples of how to rebel.  
 
Pop Goes the Culture. 
Of course, other social and cultural factors were related to the 
changes to come: the advent of the birth control pill, experimentation 
with drugs, the institution of the draft for the Vietnam war and the civil 
rights movement. Also, there was a shocking new development in the 
world of modern art. The cultural implosion of postmodernism collapsed 
high culture into pop culture and turned every aspect of contemporary life 
into a potential art object. This break with the private world of the artist 
was no neo-classical backlash. By this point, things were moving too fast 
for that. Postmodernism wasn’t about reclaiming formalism. It was about 
spontaneously shattering and recombining found objects, including 
narratives, images, film clips, magazine advertisements, just about 
anything else the artist could get his hands on.  
 
Figure 16. Andy Warhol 
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The figure at the vanguard of this cultural shift, Andy Warhol, 
availed himself of all sorts of media affordances: Campbell Soup cans, 
Brillo Boxes, movie cameras, buildings, even people. Through the mid-
to-late 1960s, he assembled an impossibly chic, outrageously disaffected 
coterie of self-described “superstars” made famous for simply being 
famous. He especially loved exotic cross-pollinations. Mixing his 
acquaintances like daubs of paint, Warhol connected gay with straight, 
black with white, glitterati with street culture and filmed all of these 
interactions.  
Along with fellow pop art pioneers, Robert Rauschenberg and 
Jasper Johns, Warhol created new type of “ecological art.” The subject 
matter had little to do with the concerns of modern ecological 
movements. Being inhabitants of a modern ecology, these artists focused 
less on rocks, trees and rivers and more on billboards and cereal boxes. 29 
Nonetheless, the works they created were intimately and complexly 
connected to the cultural environment, always referring to something 
outside the frame and beyond the screen. Pop art was deeply 
intersubjective. It only made sense in relation to the larger cultural world. 
The method was pastiche, the perfect mix of logical and analogical 
thought, category understood as pattern. The artist’s job was to remediate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Jean Baudrillard describes postmodern art as, “a parody of culture by 
culture itself as an act of vengeance, characteristic of radical 
disillusionment. It is as though history were rifling through its own 
dustbins and looking for redemption in the rubbish” (263). 
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and recombine, at will. After Warhol, anything or anyone could become 
art instantaneously (for at least 15 minutes). Pop art marked a shattering 
of the finally categorical distinction alienating the individual from the 
environment. It killed off the myth of the insular, inwardly directed 
artistic genius. If anything could be art, then anyone could be a medium. 
Pop art signaled the final collapse of the feedback loop between artist and 
audience, setting the stage for the arrival of new media and its many 
Warhol-like avatars: the new mediums.  
 
The Ecologics of New Media. 
This chapter examines the rise of the ecological metaphor that has 
gained prominence over several decades has begun to supplant the 19th 
century economic metaphor long dominant in cultural studies. In order to 
examine the intricacies of this paradigm shift, I will refer to the work of 
various Marxist theorists (Marx & Engels 1846, 1848; Adorno & 
Horkheimer 1944; Gramsci 1935; Bourdieu 1972) and Neo-Marxists 
(Hall 1980; Williams 1978; Laclau & Mouffe 1985), as well as many 
advocates of ecological theory (Bateson 1972; Gibson 1979; Latour 
2004; Fuller 2007). The pages that follow suggest that this conceptual 
shift represents the best way for theorists to grapple with the burgeoning 
complexity of new media discourses.  
In the current era, due to a number of interrelated factors—
including the advent of economic globalization, international travel and 
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the Internet—we find ourselves immersed in a complex and de-
centralized (or perhaps multi-centered) cultural environment. This does 
not mean that corporate powers are losing their ability to model public 
discourse. In many respects, media power has never been more 
concentrated. As Henry Jenkins (2006, 11) points out, corporations such 
as Disney, Viacom and News Corp have consolidated resources forming 
massive monopolistic multi-conglomerates. At the same time individual 
media users are increasingly able to produce, consume and freely share 
media discourses. The cultural impact of these changes is staggering. 
Media moguls can no longer impose direct influence, so they are 
scrambling to find new ways to persuade media users, convincing them 
to voluntarily cede a measure of control in return for perceived benefits 
and offering them a “seat at the table” in terms of increased ability to 
interact, participate and even perform publicly.  
As media influence can no longer be effectively asserted in any 
across-the-board manner, media discourses must grow increasingly 
persuasive. Largely, this is accomplished via permission marketing, 
social media tracking, product placement, multi-platforming and 
synergistic cross-promotion. As a result, media formats are becoming less 
nakedly assertive and more cunningly rhetorical. They are less about 
imposed effects and more about tantalizing “affordances.”30 In an era in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The term “affordance” was coined by James Gibson to connote a 
behavioral option offered by the environment, for instance, a chair affords 
sitting (1979).  
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which computer networks are digitizing all known literary works, 
artworks, films and TV shows, in which effective censorship is 
increasingly difficult to achieve, in which sampling, counterfeiting, 
copyright infringement and file sharing are near impossible to combat, in 
which the music industry is collapsing and the publishing, film and TV 
industries are under tremendous stress, in which commerce has gone 
virtual, driving many shopping malls, bookstores, and video game 
retailers into extinction, in which academia is going online and 
disciplinary boundaries are growing increasingly porous, and in which 
the neat distinctions between culture and society, producer and consumer, 
participant and audience are crumbling like the walls of a falling temple, 
a more expansive view of the media is certainly in order.   
Media studies, long relegated to the margins of the humanities, is 
now moving to center stage. Just as our conception of what constitutes a 
media discourse is becoming broader and looser, media studies itself is 
becoming more diverse and expansive, merging the social sciences with 
literary critique, ethnography with textual analysis, widening out to 
encompass new terrain. Increasingly, it is less about objects and artifacts 
than about specific types of people taking on specific roles in order to 
construct and be constructed by specific cultural discourses. But there is a 
risk to all of this outward expansion. As our field of inquiry grows more 
diffuse, our modes of inquiry must be modified as well. This can lead to a 
loss of common purpose and shared analytical approach. The interests of 
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communication studies and media studies have never been more germane 
to more diverse disciplines. Many of these fields—including design, 
marketing, political science, journalism and production—are looking to 
us for guidance. After all, the many profound changes radically 
revamping society are intimately related to new media. Thus media 
studies needs to develop new ways to make sense of them. Media studies 
needs to figure out how to meaningfully theorize the increasingly 
interactive and participatory nature of the diverse media discourses 
billions of people are now actively engaging in. 
Not long ago, there was a supposedly coherent thing called 
“culture” that one could actually claim to “study.” But that was an 
illusion. In the age of “social media,” the neat distinction between the 
social world and the cultural realm has become radically, perhaps 
permanently unsettled. If a photo shared on “Flickr” is both a cultural 
artifact and a mode of social interaction, we need to rethink some of core 
assumptions about how we conceptualize culture. Can the rubric of 
“cultural studies” be modified to meet these challenges, or is a new 
concept in order? These are the pressing concerns facing our discipline at 
this historic moment. In the age of new media, power increasingly flows 
in multiple directions. An individual authoring a blog is, no doubt, 
influenced by hegemonic regimes of representation imposed and 
maintained by industry titans, but he is also acutely aware of trends 
spreading virally online. Finding viable ways to account for the combined 
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influence of determined and emergent power is the new challenge facing, 
not only media studies, but all of the humanities.  
The first step in this process involves recognizing that culture is a 
relationship rather than an object of study. It is the social world 
commenting on itself. Rather than merely consuming received 
knowledge; the masses are increasingly generating and maintaining 
countless highly public discourses. This represents a significant challenge 
to analytical models that emphasize cultural norms imposed on audiences 
in a top-down fashion (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1944).31 Yet because the 
behavior of new media users often conforms to predictable cultural 
scripts, such activities also present a challenge to gratification models 
that, in some respects, suggest unconstrained, bottom-up agency 
(McQuail, Blumler and Brown, 1972).32 And while Stuart Hall’s 
encoding/decoding model allows that media audiences can accept, 
oppose or negotiate in relation to dominant readings (1980),33 media 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Key members of the Frankfurt School Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer coined the term “the culture industry” to describe how mass 
culture resembles a factory producing standardized cultural goods and 
manipulating the masses into passivity (1944). 
  
32 According to Ellen Seiter, “The uses and gratifications research 
represented a shift to a more optimistic and less harmful characterization 
of the relationship between media and audiences, emphasizing active 
engagement and the ways the media could be employed by individuals to 
satisfy needs and accomplish personal goals (Seiter 1999, 12). 
 
33 Seiter describes Stuart Hall’s encoding-decoding model as “an attempt 
to get away from a linear send-message-receiver model of mass 
communication. It posits three distinctive types of interpretations or 
decodings. The dominant reading is performed by viewers who accept the 
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users do more than merely comply or resist these days; we also 
participate in mediation rites that maintain, subvert and challenge highly 
public discourses. We too are belief modelers and complexity managers. 
We too are mediums. Thus Media Studies requires an alternative 
perspective for conceptualizing interactive discourses as complex, self-
organizing, multi-nodal networks in which information flows in multiple 
directions simultaneously and constantly feeds back on itself.   
David Gauntlett has called for a sweeping reconception of media 
studies in relation to the social networking capacity of “Web 2.0” (2009). 
Along with fellow theorist William Merrin, he has dubbed this nascent 
approach, “Media Studies 2.0.” While Media Studies 2.0 is very much a 
work-in-progress, Gauntlett hopes that it will eventually address 
“considerable changes in the media ecosystem” (147). Such changes 
include the ways in which Internet-based technologies “blur the range of 
places users can encounter, interact with and contribute to media 
content”…“collapse separate categories of ‘producer’ and ‘audience’” 
(cf. the media prosumer)…and encourage us to “turn away from 
‘professional’ media productions, toward every day participatory and 
creative possibilities” (147).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
program and its genre completely … In a negotiated reading, the viewer 
inflects his interpretation on the basis of a particular social experience. 
The viewer may enjoy a ‘pick and choose’ relation to the genre … The 
most radical viewing position is that of an oppositional reading—in which 
the viewer goes against the preferred reading” (1999, 14-5). 
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 Approaching the issue of new media theory in a more circumspect 
manner, David Morley suggests that, among media scholars, there is a 
widespread tendency to overestimate the ‘newness’ of the digital era” 
Interactive technology is often defined as active and participatory in 
contrast to traditional electronic media, which are considered merely 
passive (2007, 243). Morley points out that theorists have long known 
that TV viewers are never simply passive and that “the activities that 
most viewers of interactive media engage in are often relatively trivial, 
such as clicking a remote control or a mouse to select one item (a camera 
angle, for example) from a predetermined menu of choices.” He also 
laments a recent rash of “digitalization fever,” the “resanctification of 
Marshall McLuhan” and what he describes as the “rebirth of a strand of 
technological determinism in media and cultural studies” (240-44). 
Additionally, Morley draws our attention to a recent shift from studies of 
“media consumption” to ethnographic research involving “media in 
context.” He sounds a cautionary note regarding this process, indicating 
“the very real dangers of ethnography.” In his opinion, “context may be a 
crucial research issue, but too much of it can be a dangerous thing if a 
project is not to collapse under the weight of its own unanalyzed data” 
(251). 
 Although they stake out seemingly polarized positions, 
Gauntlett’s call to action and Morley’s concerns about properly 
theorizing digital media each stress the importance of developing a new, 
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compelling and coherent methodological paradigm. As Thomas Kuhn 
points out, paradigm shifts are generally discovered over time by 
likeminded thinkers, rather than invented by a single individual. Initially, 
they emerge as a means of more effectively theorizing a newly observed 
anomaly, something that traditional paradigms are not suited to address 
(1970, 53). In the case of new media, Gauntlet has outlined the 
anomalous aspects, and Morley has acknowledged the shortcomings of 
traditional models (both consumption and ethnography based). The 
remaining challenge involves outlining an emergent paradigm that builds 
off of the many ideas currently circulating in media studies as well as 
several related fields, including cultural anthropology, sociology, 
cognitive psychology, literature and rhetoric. 
In order to address this challenge, media theorists are primarily 
looking in two directions at once—back to our most ancient cultural 
practice: ritual (Dayan and Katz 1992; Carey, 1989, 1998; Couldry, 
2003), and forward to the farthest frontiers of ecological complexity 
(Hayles, 2002; Strate, 2006; Fuller, 2007). The former approach—
examining media rituals—allows theorist to address the participatory 
nature of interactive discourses, both old and new. Unlike cultural norms, 
which one can either accept or reject, rituals are complex, even 
paradoxical, requiring a constant process of negotiation and strategic 
thought. We can capitalize on the benefits they afford but only if we 
submit to their formal constraints and demands.  
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Rise of the Prosumer.  
In his book The Third Wave, Futurist Alvin Toffler (1980) coined 
the word “prosumer,” a neologism anticipating the eventual collapse of 
the distinction between producer and consumer. Recently, the term 
prosumer has been applied to media users in the age of the Internet 
(Rickert and M. Salvo, 2006), but Toffler was not actually speaking of 
media production and consumption. Instead, he was describing the 
production and consumption of material goods—the worldly province of 
the chief as opposed to the supernatural province of the shaman.  
Toffler predicted that as mass production and standardized 
products created a saturated marketplace, businesses would employ mass 
customization to appeal to consumer demands. This would afford 
consumers an opportunity to participate in the production process by 
designing their own goods. He also stated that prosumption is an old and 
familiar process. Before the Industrial Revolution, most workers 
supported themselves by producing and consuming crops and livestock 
on small subsistence farms and ranches. Thus, the masses retained the 
means of production until about two hundred years ago. On the scale of 
cultural evolution, therefore, the separation of material production and 
consumption appears to be a fairly recent development and a fleeting one 
at that. In contrast, the masses largely lost the means of media production 
around 500 BC when many key cultural rites were transformed into 
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theatrical productions and ritual participants became fairly sedentary 
audience members. Therefore, the reemergence of the ‘media posumer’ 
marks more than a minor leap back to the days before industrialization, it 
represents a far more dramatic and far reaching return to an archaic, and 
in some respects, primitive cultural dynamic. 
If we allow that that the materialist prosumer (chief) and the 
media prosumer (shaman) fulfill different—sometimes complimentary, 
sometimes competing—social roles, we can allow that the influence of 
these roles may have different historic trajectories. For instance, at the 
dawn of the Industrial Revolution, the era in which, according to Toffler, 
the masses stopped being material prosumers, a different type of 
revolution was afoot that would increasingly allow ordinary people to 
become media prosumers once again after thousands of years of restless 
spectating.  
Throughout the middle ages and well into the Renaissance, the 
clergy and the landed gentry had largely controlled the process of 
mediation. These taste makers supported artists who supported their own 
worldviews, producing works that celebrated humanity’s “noble traits,” 
and by extension, their noble patrons. With the birth of capitalism, 
democracy, and the industrial revolution, the monarchies began to 
disappear, and, increasingly, the general public began to dictate popular 
taste. Initially, the feedback loop between the media and consumer 
culture was fairly lax, based on annual trends. If a certain type of book 
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made a splash, the following year, several books similar to it would be 
published, and this trend would continue until the audience tired of it or 
discovered a more diverting fad to embrace. The birth of the penny press 
helped to tighten the feedback loop between the media and consumer 
tastes. Soon editors, particularly in the field of high fashion, began 
writing about seasonal trends that might only last only a few months.  
 By the mid-nineteenth century, public life was speeding up and 
the production chain was collapsing to such a degree that manufacturing 
and the popular press could also produce seasonal trends. This emergent 
phenomenon served to jog a long dormant aspect of cultural memory, 
revealing new stress points in the western rationalist tradition and 
signaling the first stirrings of the ritual return. As the burgeoning mass 
media grew increasingly sensitive to consumer tastes, it became apparent 
that the production chain still had the potential to function as a type of 
ritual feedback loop—albeit a rather sluggish one—a kiva in which 
common knowledge could be generated and free circulated. This era also 
saw the rise of modern sociology, anthropology, and psychotherapy, 
disciplines that reconceived the individual as a product of the social 
environment. These views served to further accelerate the collapse of the 
traditional sociocultural order. Shifting norms (woman’s suffrage, the 
emancipation of slaves, the rise of class consciousness), coupled with the 
advent of new media technologies (the telegraph, the photography, the 
phonograph, film, radio, and TV), and an explosion of popular culture 
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(the tabloid press, penny dreadfuls, “hit” songs) conspired to further 
collapse the production chain and increasingly tighten the ritual feedback 
loop.  
 Emergence was in. Tradition was out. And immediacy was the 
order of the day. The public wanted news “hot off the press” and straight 
from “the man in the street.” Reporters in the 19th century began 
haunting train stations hoping to catch commuting celebrities off guard. 
As Ponce de Leon explains, this type of interview-by-ambush often 
elicited a response of “no comment” and made many celebrities hesitant 
to make public appearances, which in turn, inspired reporters to try that 
much harder to gain access to their homes (2002, 96).34 While the public 
continued clamoring for details about the private lives of public figures, 
private citizens increasingly longed for higher public profiles. The 
distance between audience and performer was growing closer by the 
minute. 
 Although media production was still largely influenced by the 
agendas of the aristocracy, the masses were exerting increased influence. 
Managing this emergent trend presented a significant challenge for those 
“in power.” As the feedback loop tightened, popular tastes began to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 “In a sense, human interest journalism about these figures was meant to 
obliterate the physical and social distance that separated readers from the 
movers and shakers of the world. The mass circulation press played a vital 
role in enabling ordinary people to apprehend this new world, mediating 
its bewildering complexity and impersonality by offering stories that 
stressed the continued importance of individual agency. Like other forms 
of human interest reporting, celebrity journalism sought to make the 
remote and impersonal seems familiar and human" (Ponce de Leon 82). 
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influence more than tabloid culture. Via public opinion polls, leaders 
could track their approval ratings. This spawned a new style of “populist 
politics” characterized by fear mongering, pandering, whipping up and 
catering to public hysteria. 
 While such populist tactics were a threat to the reigning elite, 
those who deployed them at least sought to operate within the established 
cultural framework. Yet a far more disruptive breed of public figure was 
beginning to appear. These latter day mediums were newly empowered to 
influence public opinion via the industrial production and worldwide 
distribution of books, magazine articles, newspaper editorials and 
broadsides containing their subversive opinions. Perhaps the most 
influential of these “new mediums” was Karl Marx, a figure, who, like all 
great shamans, believed he had utterly transcended ideology (awaking 
from the nightmare of history). 
 
Figure 17. Marx 
 It is ironic to consider how Marxist thought resolutely denies the 
radicalizing potential of mediumship. After all, Marxist mediumship 
helped to trigger one of history’s great political revolutions by managing 
to posthumously instigate the emergence of communism in Russia. Yet 
he resolutely describes ideology as the lapdog of state power, little more 
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than a distracting “opiate,” meant to maintain and justify institution 
subjugation.35 Marx’s impoverished view of human psychology is 
characterized by a fixation on material wealth. According to him, 
ideology is nothing but a false promissory note, assuring the masses that 
they will be richly rewarded in the next life if they will just ignore the 
unequal distribution of wealth in this one.  
To maintain this narrow view of human aspirations, Mark 
overlooks the ways in which ideologues often run afoul of state power. 
Jesus of Nazareth who espoused many views similar to Marx’s—helping 
the least among us, redistributing wealth—is but one example of this type 
of ideological firebrand. At any rate, this blind spot in Marxist thought 
would, eventually, help to create Stalin’s demagoguery. Outlawing 
traditional religious practice, merely created the necessary conditions for 
the emergence of a god/king, the pernicious conflation of shaman and 
chief into one figure.36 Belief abhors a vacuum and in the absence of a 
separate and distinct ideological system, the masses tend to worship state 
authority and its human godhead uncritically.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Marx is never more ideological than when he claims to be transcending 
all belief in The Germany Ideology (1846). Materialism, in his view, is the 
antithesis of belief, a clear-eyed vision of humanity as it actually is, or at 
least, as it should be. 
 
36 Most tribal cultures are sophisticated enough to practice a separation of 
church and state, locating worldly authority in the figure of the chief and 
numinous power in the figure of the shaman or ritual “medium,” refusing 
to conflate the two.   
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Marx must have intuitively understood that media production is 
not the same as material production; otherwise, he would not have been 
such an inspired medium.37 His work does not reflect what must have 
been a largely unconscious conviction. Nonetheless, it has gone on to 
influence generations of thinkers, who find his economic and political 
insights a highly effective means of critiquing capitalism. 
 
Economics and Ecologics.  
In Metaphors We Live By, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson 
argue that the “root metaphors” that a culture embraces structure its view 
of the world (1980, 22). For example, thinking of marriage as a 
“contract” carries a different set of expectations than thinking of it as “a 
game,” or “a negotiation,” or “Russian roulette.” In the case of Cultural 
Studies, the dominant metaphor has long been that of an “economic 
system.” Because the field is grounded in Marxist theory, it posits a 
materialist view of cultural life. Races and Genders are described as 
social “classes” with individuals exchanging and stockpiling “cultural,” 
“social” and “symbolic capital” (Bourdieu 1972, 1984, 1994). Status is 
something to be “acquired” and “earned.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 According to Marx, when masses seize the means of material 
production, a communist utopia should naturally emerge. Yet while it is 
apparent that the masses now have the means of media production, our 
current political climate more closely resembles a free-for-all between 
rampaging capitalist exploitation and anarchy. 
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In contrast to Marx, contemporary economists view financial 
markets as complex and interdependent ecosystems based largely on the 
exchange of immaterial assets such as “stocks” and “derivatives.” They 
emphasize emotional affect, the ways in which sudden “panics,” waning 
“consumer confidence” and “investor timidity” influence markets. What's 
more, within a single geographical region such as the United States, 
citizens participate in multiple forms of economic exchange, garnering 
“frequent flyer miles,” “rewards points” and “game credits.” One 
economy represents the role of “world traveler,” another, the role of 
“savvy consumer,” still another, the role of “video game aficionado.” 
These alternate economies exist because human beings are complex. We 
seek out multiple economies because we crave multiple means of 
negotiating between the environment and our multiple selves. 
 
Figure 18. Multiple Economies 
Such complexity is alien to Marx, who was chiefly concerned 
with the exchange of capital within fairly predictable markets and 
between rigidly stratified class structures. Writing at the dawn of the 
Industrial Revolution, he framed his arguments in terms of rational and 
coherent economic structures. Through the years, this reductive paradigm 
has been challenged and modified in a number of ways, even as it has 
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continued to exert a strong influence on scholarly discourse (Hall 1980; 
Williams 1978; Laclau & Mouffe 1985). 
The economic metaphor long-favored by cultural studies is not 
unrivaled. Since the early 1970’s, the notion of a cultural “ecosystem” 
has been vying for increased consideration. Its inaugural moment was 
tied to the rise of modern ecological movements in the early nineteen 
seventies, but it has recently experienced a resurgence related to the 
emergence of the Internet and new media. As communication systems 
grow more complex and interactive, theorists increasingly invoke 
biological metaphors to describe their intricacies, yet the ecologic model 
sits uneasily beside the economic perspective, which remains the 
dominant paradigm for cultural studies.   
Marxism is a particularly effective means of critiquing the 
exploitive practices of capitalism, but it does have many blind spots. For 
one thing, it is based on a 19th century view of economics with little 
relevance to our current Post-Fordist age. Yet that is not its greatest 
shortcoming. After all, even in the 19th century, human beings were not 
merely influenced by economic forces. Like any savvy ritualists, Marx 
sought to define the world in terms that afforded him the highest degree 
of ritual authority. His materialist conception of human society enshrined 
the economist as a type of philosopher king with insights into the true 
nature of human existence. By conjuring a particular conception of 
material existence, he identified what ailed humankind and prescribed his 
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own cure: communism. Yet, ironically, by attempting to critique 
capitalism’s acquisitive nature, he made “capital” itself the measure of all 
things. Marx’s economic metaphor reduces human relations to little more 
than material negotiations. Such an approach standardizes and stratifies 
culture in a manner so “apparently rigorous,” it cannot help but appeal to 
the frustrated scientist residing in the heart of every humanist, yet, as with 
any business transaction, there’s a price to be paid. The economic 
metaphor makes all sorts of blanket assumptions, especially regarding 
human motives, which are homogenized almost beyond recognition. It 
asserts that everyone in all social contexts seeks the same singular mode 
of cultural empowerment—improved material conditions. This is simple 
not true. 
Marx wrote his doctoral thesis on the Greek philosopher Epicurus, 
who believed that the avoidance of fear and pain is the primary purpose 
of human existence. Epicurus was a sensualist who rejected the idea that 
the gods intervene in human affairs or that the soul lives on after death. 
Marx would break with the more elitist views espoused by the ancient 
philosopher, but in many respects, his is a modified Epicurean 
worldview. The similarity is most pronounced in Marx’s conception of 
man as “homo economicus,” a narrowly self-interested actor focused 
chiefly on the acquisition of creature comforts. According to this view, 
religion is little more than a promissory note for an “eternal reward,” a 
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way of duping the masses into accepting an unjust distribution of wealth 
here on earth in exchange for a big payday in the afterlife.38  
In The German Ideology (1846), in which he and Friedrich Engels 
formulate the views that will serve as the philosophical basis of the 
Communist Manifesto (1848), Marx argues that his “materialist” 
worldview is utterly non-ideological. He has, by his own account, 
transcended belief. Engels assists him in this regard by coining the term 
“false consciousness.” Victims of false consciousness have, according to 
Engels, been seduced by ideology. Losing sight of the fact that their class 
interests are closely aligned with members of their own economic strata, 
they fixate on other forms of difference: race, gender, sexuality, etc. The 
terminology is telling. Engels states emphatically that a perspective 
focusing on similarities other than class is not “different,” or 
“alternative.” It is purely and simply, “false.”   
One of the first major revisions of classical Marxism came from 
Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci. Karl Marx had predicted that workers in 
the Industrial Age would eventually rebel against the capitalist system, 
rising up in revolt. This eventually occurred in Russia and China, but not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Iain Chambers has this to say about the economic metaphor, “The 
critical monologue that drones on castigating contemporary culture as if it 
were a unique ideological bloc subject to the role of an unmediated, 
wholly rational, economic mechanism (Fredric Jameson’s ‘logic of late 
capitalism,’ David Harvey’s ‘condition of postmodernity’), is concerned 
with the philosophical fate of mankind and the alienation of MAN in 
abstract. It has little to say about how real woman and men get by and 
make sense of the conditions in which they find themselves. It cannot 
speak to the lives, fears, hopes, passions and expressions revealed in the 
immediate culture of the everyday world” (1994, 97). 
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in more advanced industrialized democracies. In order to account for the 
apparent complacency of western workers, Gramsci modified the term of 
“hegemony.” As Raymond Williams explains, “The traditional definition 
of ‘hegemony’ is political rule or domination, especially in relations 
between states. Marxism extended the definition to rule or domination 
between social classes, and especially to definitions of a ruling class” 
(1977, 109). Gramsci modifies the term yet again, defining it as a type of 
consensual fiction serving the ruling class but perpetuated by all society. 
Primarily, this occurs when values that primarily benefit the elites come 
to be seen as universal norms thought to benefit everyone. The concept of 
hegemony explains how dominant groups retain political, economic and 
ideological power with the consent of the majority (Gramsci 1935). 
While this definition of “hegemony” is the one generally accepted 
by Cultural Studies, many theorists have pointed out that Gramsci was far 
from consistent in his use of the word (Comaroff 2006; Williams 1978; 
Gitlin 1979). This has led to some instances of oversimplification. As 
Raymond Williams explains, “A static hegemony, of the kind that is 
indicated by abstract totalizing definitions of a dominant ‘ideology’ or 
‘worldview,’ can ignore or isolate alternatives and opposition” (1977, 
113). By emphasizing the idea that hegemony is an active process, rather 
than a “social fact,” Williams offers a more ecological view of the term. 
He allows that its practices are “reciprocally confirming,” serving the 
interests of the ruling class, but also, to a lesser—but nonetheless 
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significant—degree, those who adopt postures of subordination. He also 
allows for the emergence of “alternative” and “oppositional hegemonies” 
(110-3). 
Additional modifications of the term appear in the work of 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Their book Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy, presumes the necessity of social innovation. In fact, they define 
“hegemony” as an open and chaotic system and emphasize its “unsutured 
character.”39 
Laclau and Mouffe describe themselves as “post-Marxists.” They 
object to classical Marxist theory as it points toward a post-political state 
of perfect equality via perfect consensus that strikes them as neither 
attainable nor desirable for creatures as complex and contradictory as 
human beings.  
Yet many theorists are reluctant to break with Marx entirely. The 
19th century economic metaphor is clearly reductive, but it is also an 
effective means of critiquing issues of class conflict and cultural 
oppression. To a certain degree, money does make the world go around, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Laclau and Mouffe define hegemony as, “a form of politics which is 
founded not upon dogmatic postulation of any ‘essence of the social,’ but, 
on the contrary, on affirmation on the contingency and ambiguity of every 
essence, and on the constitutive character of social division and 
antagonism”…“an ‘order’ which exists only as a partial limiting of 
disorder; of a ‘meaning’ which is constructed only as excess and paradox 
in the face of meaninglessness—in other words, the field of the political as 
the space for a game which is never ‘zero-sum,’ because the rules and the 
players are never fully explicit. This game, which eludes the concept, does 
at least have a name: hegemony” (1985, 193). 
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yet it is hardly the only motivating force one can associate with human 
behavior. This is why it is problematic to conflate issues of “race,” 
“gender” or “sexuality” with the concept of an economic class. For 
instance, in 1969, the concept of “class” was invoked in a founding text 
of Second Wave Feminism, the “Redstocking Manifesto.” It reads:  
 
Women are an oppressed class. Our oppression is total, 
affecting every facet of our lives. We are exploited as sex 
objects, breeders, domestic servants, and cheap labor. We 
are considered inferior beings, whose only purpose is to 
enhance men’s lives. Our humanity is denied. Our 
prescribed behavior is enforced by the threat of physical 
violence (1969, 223).  
 
This polemic draws attention to the manner in which women are 
unfairly exploited in the workplace and the domestic sphere, but it proves 
problematic in other respects. As Raymond Williams warns, “It is 
misleading as a general method, to reduce all political and cultural 
initiatives and contributions to the terms of the hegemony…The specific 
functions of ‘the hegemonic,’ ‘the dominant,’ have always to be stressed, 
but not in ways which suggest any a priori totality” (1977, 113). 
Totalizing statements presume that resistance is futile, yet clearly it is 
not, women have made great strides since the early seventies. As Holland 
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et al. point out, “Even within grossly asymmetrical power relations, the 
powerful participants rarely control the weaker so completely that the 
latter’s ability to improvise resistance becomes irrelevant” (1998, 277). 
What’s more, every individual is a multiplicity of identities existing in a 
multiplicity of social contexts simultaneously, so oppression is almost 
never total.  
 
Distinction. 
The constructivist theories of Pierre Bourdieu draw attention to 
alternative modes of socio-cultural empowerment, and yet retain a 
primarily Marxist outlook. Bourdieu focuses on stockpiling markers of 
class distinction, what he calls “cultural,” “social” and “symbolic capital” 
(1972, 1984, 1994).40 However, the economic metaphor is strained when 
we considered that distinctions are not merely acquired from without (as 
with music trivia, business contacts, and college degrees); they are also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 When defining markers of distinction, Bourdieu repeatedly emphasizes 
the economic basis of his conception: “Because they are acquired in social 
fields which are also markets in which they receive their price, cultural 
competences are dependent on these markets, and all struggles over 
culture are aimed at creating the market most favorable to the products 
which are marked, in their manners, by a particular class of conditions of 
acquisition, i.e. a particular market” (96). He allows that what is called the 
“counter-culture” may be the “product” of an endeavor to create a sort of 
alternative market “with its own consecrating agencies” (96). Yet while 
this appears to allow for a measure of cultural innovation, human motives 
remain narrowly constrained by his acquisitive scheme. According to this 
way of thinking, the only reason for bucking the system is to create a new 
system more advantageous to one’s ability to accumulate wealth and 
power. 
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cultivated from within (as with talent, charm and temperament) and 
physically embodied (as with visual appearance and vocal tone).41 As 
Bourdieu suggests, certain dominant economies of distinction do exist; 
yet I argue that in the age of globalization and the Internet, they under 
tremendous stress and becoming increasingly destabilized. What’s more, 
we never exist in a single economy at any one time. A person in a 
corporate board meeting is being pulled in multiple directions by multiple 
modes of identification. When he speaks, he speaks as a businessperson, 
but also as a member of a particular ethnic group, a particular gender, a 
particular class, a particular sexual orientation, etc. A statement that 
counts as “cultural capital” within one of these ecologies may signal a 
loss of status in another. Thus, he is engaged in a constant negotiation 
between competing ecologies defined by competing modes of 
identification. Like all Marxist-inflected critiques, Bourdieu’s theory of 
“distinction” focuses on the transaction of standardized currency. He 
writes: “Practice never ceases to conform to economic calculation even 
when it gives every appearance of disinterestedness by departing from the 
logic of interested calculation (in the narrow sense) and playing for stakes 
that are non-material and not easily quantified” (1972, 177). Here, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Ellen Seiter says, “Critics of Bourdieu have suggested that his model is 
functionalist, overly pessimistic and deterministic, and puts forward the 
dominant ideology as an all-powerful and universally accepted standard” 
(1999, 27). John Hall points out that Bourdieu assumes that everyone 
recognizes the legitimacy of distinctions handed down ‘from above’: ‘To 
describe any one social group’s calculus as the effective one is to confer 
legitimacy to a calculus that, as Bourdieu recognizes, remains in play with 
others…’ (Hall 1992, 279). 
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Bourdieu draws our attention to the value of non-material practices, but 
maintains the Logocentric view that symbolic resources are merely 
cultural products to be kept at arms length rather than affordances, 
inviting the formation and contestation of various modes of identification.  
Additionally, Bourdieu has theorized the interplay of determined 
norms and emergent circumstances in terms of a collection of 
“dispositions” largely prefabricated by social forces. He writes, “Each 
agent, wittingly or unwittingly, willy nilly, is a producer and reproducer 
of a modus operandi of which he is not the producer and has no conscious 
mastery, they contain an ‘objective intention,’ as the Scholastics put it, 
which always outruns his conscious intentions. The schemes of thought 
and expression he has acquired are the basis of the intentionless invention 
[his emphasis] of regulated improvisation” (79). 
According to this view, emergent circumstances present the 
individual with a particular challenge, and he reflexively deploys a 
disposition that is, hopefully, appropriate. Contra Bourdieu, I argue that 
we are not behavioral jukeboxes preprogrammed to play specific “tunes” 
when the occasion demands.42 In many respects, we are just as complex 
as the world around us. Thus our identities are not merely a selection of 
prefabricated dispositions conforming to the pursuit of institutional 
distinction. Our motives are many and our various personality traits are in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 David Gauntlett finds Bourdieu’s perspective too restrictive and states, 
“It is not clear whether putting the notion of self-reflexivity (which 
highlights agency) within the frame of the habitus (which is mostly an 
outline of constraint) can really work” (2007, 66-69).  
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constant dialogue with the environment, serving to shape it even as it 
shapes us. As Anthony Giddens argues, the self is never an accomplished 
thing. Instead, it is an ongoing project, “something that has to be 
routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities of the 
individual” (1991, 52). 
The media prosumer is not chiefly an economic actor, because he 
is not exclusively or even primarily motivated by economic gain. 
Marshall McLuhan considered media technologies “the extensions of 
man” (1964), but media practices are the site of identification itself (or 
perhaps “its selves”). They are where the ongoing construction, 
destruction and reconstruction of multiple forms of “selfhood” occur. 
Standardized systems of cultural, social and symbolic status presuppose a 
“standardized humanity.” If forms of “symbolic capital” can be ranked on 
a standardized scale—i.e. an expensive home is always more impressive 
than an advanced degree—then all cultural contexts and modes of 
interaction must be roughly equivalent, but this is simply not true. What 
counts as legitimacy among entrepreneurs is quite different than what 
counts as legitimacy among academics. In some instances, entire values 
systems may be inverted, so that a quality stigmatized in one context is 
prized in another. Cultural environments are complex and so are the 
people who comprise them. A particular environment or individual can 
only successfully symbolize certain ideals and not others. 
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In his later work, Bourdieu expands his definition of “symbolic 
capital” to account for physical appearance, writing: “One of the 
dimensions of symbolic capital, in differentiated societies, is ethnic 
identity, which, with names or skin color, is a percipi, a being-perceived, 
functioning as positive or negative symbolic capital” (1994, 104). By 
allowing that people can physically embody symbolic value, this 
modification both elaborates and undermines his initial scheme. After all, 
how can something truly function as capital if it cannot be freely 
exchanged? Mediums model identities that others may emulate in order 
to feel symbolically empowered, but this is not an exchange of goods, it 
is a conjuring of collective memory, a communal rite. The transaction 
that occurs is not between bargaining individuals; it is between the tribal 
members and their shared sense of identity.  
The notion of “symbolic capital” presumes a cultural coherence 
that is at best, highly provisional in people’s day-to-day lives. Even 
within a single context, different modes of identification invoke different 
types of authority. A Hispanic male, a black woman and a white woman 
all walk into the same room. Before they speak, much of their perceived 
authority is apparent. This is related to who else is in the room and how 
those people view the world, but it is also tied to the physical appearance 
of the three aforementioned individuals. Picturing the Hispanic male, the 
black woman and the white woman, one might ask, who can speak most 
authoritatively about issues of gender? Who do can speak most 
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authoritatively about issues of race? Such preconceptions may ultimately 
prove false. But they nonetheless exist. Thus they are culturally relevant 
and frequently exploited by medium’s summoning the right to speak as a 
particular type of individual. 
We do not only speak for a cause, after all, we also speak as a 
cause. And based on our perceived identity, we all find it easier to speak 
“as” certain causes than others. We cultivate particular types of identity 
in order to claim particular types of authority. This does not mean we can 
entirely control how others see us. But it does mean we can, in some 
respects, utilize the ways in which we are seen in order to leverage 
meaningful cultural change. 
 
Emerging Ecologies. 
Because new media discourses afford ritual participation at the 
global scale, people from all walks of life can interact. So rather than 
defining community in terms of local norms, new media rites offer highly 
complex modes of identification and dissociation, hence the value of the 
ecological perspective, which allows theorists to conceptualize the 
complexity of multiple overlapping and interpenetrating discourses. 
Following the fluctuations of these interrelated but often clashing 
ecologies is a bit like tracking shifting weather patterns. It requires a 
theoretical approach that can acknowledge complexity without becoming 
overwhelmed by it. In an effort to address such challenges, media 
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theorists have increasingly dispensed with deterministic schemes and the 
whole notion of “media effects,” hence the recent influx of terminology 
from the field of ecological psychology and its related fields: systems 
theory, chaos theory, connectionism, biosemiotics, situated learning, 
Actor Network Theory (ANT), speech acts, pragmatism, radical 
empiricism and cognitive anthropology.  
Words such as “ecology,” “ecosystem,” “complex system,” 
“emergent behavior,” “meme” and one of the most fashionable 
buzzwords of all, “affordance,” have begun to infuse the lexicon of media 
studies, but there is a problem. These terms were originally used to 
describe phenomenon in the physical environment and nothing more. 
Media studies, on the other hand, is interested in how human beings 
mediate between the perceived environment and the conceived 
environment, between raw sensory experiences and the cultural 
significance we glean from them, between the territory and the map. 
Because of this, ecological terms and popular conceptions of media 
phenomena are not perfectly compatible. Certainly the need for a new 
theoretical paradigm is pressing, and the ecological perspective is 
promising in many respects. It tantalizes with the prospect of potentially 
theorizing complex interactive discourses. But because the map can never 
actually be the territory, it seems that some recalibration is in order. In 
the pages that follow, I attempt to bring ecological theory and media 
studies into closer accord. To clarify: this work does not argue against 
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the use of ecological terms in media studies, nor does it praise such 
efforts uncritically. Instead, it focuses on the ways in which ecological 
theory and media studies are both compatible in some respects and 
seemingly incompatible in others. Concepts from ecological theory 
cannot be effectively imported into media studies unless we first modify 
engrained perspectives regarding how these two fields do and do not 
relate to one another.  
The ecological perspective has informed many different fields, 
including anthropology (Bateson 1972), economics (Martinez-Alier & 
Schlupmann 1993), philosophy (Guattari 2000), politics (Bennett 2009) 
and theology (McFague 1993). In the age of the Internet, the mass media 
is often referred to as a vast “ecology,” but the characteristics of this 
complex adaptive system are very much in dispute. Business leaders 
focus chiefly on the institutional applications of information exchange 
(Davenport & Prusak 1997). The disciples of Marshall McLuhan and the 
Toronto School emphasize the formal dimensions of media technologies 
(Altheide 1995; Biersack 1999; Lum 2006; Strate 2006). And some 
literary theorists have begun to examine the relationship between 
semiotics, technology and culture (Hayles 2002; Kittler 1999). So far, 
however, no dominant conception of what constitutes a media ecosystem 
has emerged. Perhaps this is because theorists are wary of defining 
complexity too narrowly. After all, a perspective that defines media 
ecologies and affordances primarily in terms of technological hardware 
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(McLuhan 1964)43 is not truly complex. By the same token, a perspective 
that asserts the primacy of cultural influence (Williams 1974) is also 
incomplete.44 The analysis of complexity is not a zero sum game. Any 
perspective that seeks to claim complexity for its camp by denying it to 
others is ultimately self-limiting. To define ‘media complexity’ strictly in 
terms of one mode of influence (textual, technological, institutional or 
performative) is to confine oneself to a perspective too narrow to 
conceptualize how the interplay of all of these contributing factors works 
to afford both emergent and determined influence.  
Fortunately, increasingly inclusive notions of complexity are 
gaining acceptance. Matthew Fuller, for instance, has surveyed the above 
perspectives while refusing to provide a neat Hegelian synthesis (2007). 
Also, Bruno Latour has posited “political ecology,” a way of defining 
complexity in terms of ideological agonism, as opposed to perfect 
homeostatic equilibrium (2004). While Latour’s view is a bit challenging 
to conceptualize, it possesses the virtue of being truly complex. What’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Marshall McLuhan spoke of media complexity as early as The 
Guttenberg Galaxy (1962). The title of that work referred to a type of 
media ecosystem. In later interviews, he explicitly discussed “media 
ecologies” (2005) and his followers continue to advocate an ecological 
perspective that emphasizes the ways in which technological complexity 
influences culture (Strate 2006). These theorists tend to downplay or 
overlook the significance local and historic cultural influence. 
 
44 Though an advocate of the ecological metaphor, Raymond Williams 
tends to focus on cultural phenomena such as “societies, languages and 
institutions” rather than technologies (1983). In fact, he calls Marshall 
McLuhan a “technological determinist and argues that culture, not 
technology, is the primary influence on media discourse (1974).  
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more, it works to unsettle the contrived distinction between nature and 
culture that has haunted humanity since the days when the first ritualists 
sought communion with increasingly estranged animistic spirits.45 
 
Cultivating Identity. 
 Perhaps the most unnerving thing about new mediums is that, 
despite our apparent self-absorption, we are not exclusively motivated by 
the acquisition of material wealth and institutional status. In fact, we tend 
to reject metaphors that equate all acts of cultural engagement with forms 
of economic gain.  Overall, new mediums make far less money and 
receive far less acclaim for producing and distributing media than their 
predecessors did, and yet we continue to freely create and share texts on 
an unprecedented scale. It appears, therefore, that the new mediums may 
not be exclusively, or even primarily, economic actors. We may actually 
cares less about the acquisition of institutionally sanctioned status than 
the cultivation of identity. Certainly, we crave fame and fortune, but when 
they are not immediately forthcoming, we continues our mediation rites 
undaunted, accepting that there are as many different measures of success 
as there are human motives and that there are many ways of assuming 
ritual authority in relation to them. We can adopt a superior posture, 
make a pathetic appeal, or battle injustice. We can claim to be detached 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
45 The burgeoning field of “biosemiotics” views culture as an organic 
outgrowth of nature (Wheeler 2006, 35). 
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and objective, or ironically debunk received wisdom. We can even affirm 
a shared worldview by playing the role of victim or villain. Because each 
of these postures requires specific aptitudes and frames the medium in a 
particular light, our primary concern is having some say regarding the 
roles we eventually attempt to play.  
When becoming the medium we don't just submit to authority, we 
claim it. After all, the root of authority is “author.” And authorship is 
merely the formalized version of mediumship. Becoming the medium 
means claiming the authority to participate in the process of authoring 
our own lives. This is what primarily interests ritual actors, a desire for 
some semblance of self-determination, however, compromised and 
constrained. If mediums were merely interested in social status, we would 
be easy to control, but we are forever envisioning something beyond our 
immediate circumstances. This can leave us vulnerable to attack, but it 
can also inspire others to follow our lead. This is what compels our 
restless striving, not some external marker of distinction, but an internal 
longing to become visible, to be seen in a particular way at a particular 
moment in time. After all, even when we seek the approval of the chief, 
we remain, first and foremost, a shaman. 
 
Next. 
The following chapter examines the ways in which competing 
cultural niches vie to influence larger media ecologies. In order to explore 
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such dynamics in depth, I focus on a single case study related to footage 
of a young Iranian woman, Neda Agha Soltan. Soltan is shown dying on 
camera after being shot during her country’s post-election protests in the 
summer of 2009. This powerful and disturbing viral video has become a 
compelling media affordance for groups seeking to advance different 
ideological agendas by conflating Neda’s death with concepts related to 
their most heartfelt beliefs.  
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Figure 19. Niche Cloud 
 
When the social world is in disarray, we are especially 
persuadable, but the manner in which we are persuaded always speaks to 
our preferred modes of self-definition. When a group of animals 
gravitates to a particular “ecological niche,” they are self-organizing 
according to collective needs, but also individual abilities and interests. 
Some prefer high plateaus, some lush lowlands. All preferences involve 
some degree of strategic choices. The animals take stock of various 
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alternatives before selecting the paths that appear most congenial to their 
aptitudes and desires (Gibson 1979, 128-30).46  
The same thing occurs within and among cultural ecologies. 
Whereas the inhabitants of physical niches are defined by physiological 
traits, the inhabitants of cultural niches are defined by ideological 
dispositions, specifically, a particular mode of identification that 
members of the niche are attempting to adopt. Usually, these groups are 
clustered around a central conflation that insists someone or something 
they relate to must be consubstantial with a concept deserving of utmost 
respect. 
By joining a particular niche, ritualists are seeking out what 
psychologists called the “halo effect,” a sort of “sanctification by 
association, a burnishing of their personal “brand” (Rosenzweig 2009). 
Joining a cultural niche often means basking in the reflected radiance of a 
famous medium, celebrating their ritual role, while perhaps evading its 
more stringent requirements. If we are somewhat reluctant to follow in 
the exact footsteps of those who commit entirely to a cause, we are happy 
to cheer them from the periphery. And even if we are unwilling to risk as 
much as they do, our identities are still linked to them. By framing these 
individuals in a particular light, we are building a case for how we want 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 “In ecology a niche is a setting of environmental features that are 
suitable for an animal, into which it fits metaphorically”(Gibson 1979, 
129).  
	  	   107	  
to be seen, the particular type of ritual authority we wish to claim and 
thus, the type of cultural influence we hope to wield.  
This chapter focuses on the cultural niches that have formed in 
relation to a bit of cell phone footage revealing the death of a young 
Iranian woman, Neda Agha Soltan. Soltan was shot and killed during 
Iran’s post-election protests in the summer of 2009. The pages that follow 
are a mix of digital ethnography, rhetorical analysis and ritual analysis 
examining the complex practices related to circulating, analyzing and 
remediating the “Neda footage.” In addition to drawing on a wide variety 
of news sources, magazines, documentaries, websites, blogs and viral 
videos, I refer to the work of political analysts (Diane Singerman 2004; 
Beeman 2005; Chesters & Welsh 2006; Hamedani 2009), rhetoricians 
(Crowley 2006) and social commentators (Sontag 2006). 
 
Neda. 
There wasn’t much time. The bullet had hit her chest. She was 
already on the ground, bleeding, in shock, losing consciousness. When 
she saw the cell-phone-camera did she realize it was capturing her last 
moments? Or was she just staring at it out of habit, the ways she had 
looked into the camera when her recent portraits had been taken? Is there 
a glimmer of consciousness in the face staring at us as we witness the 
tragic spectacle of her life irretrievably draining away? The power of that 
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gaze has been subsequently, distorted, suppressed, exaggerated and 
denied, but it cannot be dismissed.  
 
Figure 20. Neda 
Human beings have to make sense of our highly chaotic world. 
Our minds are not blank slates, waiting to be constructed by external 
stimuli. What matters to us are the things that resonate with views we are 
already firmly clinging to, or desperately attempting to grasp. The world 
around us is rife with emergent trends looking for opportunities to spread. 
Media affordances that resonate with these phenomena operate as strange 
attractors, drawing us toward them, creating discursive patterns out of the 
confused welter of everyday life. Images that captured the Death of 
Saddam Hussein, the abuses of Abu Ghraib and the 9/11 attacks all 
possessed a particular type of significance for those who recorded and 
distributed them, but they immediately took on countless new meanings 
for people who viewed them in different locations and from different 
ideological perspectives around the world.  
In a similar sense, footage of Neda Agha Soltan, a young woman 
killed during Iran’s post-election protests in the summer of 2009, has 
inspired the creation of many competing discursive patterns, compelling 
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to different groups for different reasons. These cultural niches are all 
vying to define the ideological significance of her death. 
Immediately after Neda was shot, she was buried without an 
autopsy. The Iranian government ordered all of the mosques in Tehran to 
close so there would be no official funeral. A few people attempted to 
gather at the site of her death, but were dispersed by militia members. 
Flowers were left on the site, but witnesses say a garbage truck came by 
and dumped trash on them (BBC 6/25/09).  
As with a gang member crossing out the tag of a rival crew, 
gestures like this are a form of symbolic violence, a way of fighting ritual 
with ritual. In the aftermath of Neda’s death, such discursive aggression 
has been quite common. Cultural niches from around the globe have 
engaged in rhetorical warfare, effacing and defacing the influence of rival 
groups, while staking out and defending their own ideological terrain.  
Often this involves tagging images of Neda in various ways. Ritual 
mediums have sought to define her, and, by extension, themselves, 
according to long held and newly emergent beliefs. Interacting via 
YouTube videos, social media sites, and mainstream news outlets, they 
conflate her identity with positive and negative imagery in order to 
associate and dissociate it with their own identities.  
 
Figure 21. Neda Tag 
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As polarized as the various “Neda niches” appear, at the scale of 
the larger Neda ecology, they do agree on certain common features. They 
all acknowledge the existence of cell phone footage of a young woman 
who appears to have been shot and appears to be dying amid protests on 
the streets of Iran. However, when it comes to interpreting who this 
woman is, who shot her, why she died, and in fact, whether she actually 
died or not, they are in sharp disagreement. At the scale of the general 
Neda ecology, we can recognize certain common features, yet at the scale 
of smaller Neda niches, striking differences begin to emerge.  
Notions of “scale” are a key aspect of ecological theory. This is 
because an ecological perspective defines difference in terms of relative 
perceptions rather than absolute conceptions. In other words, rather than 
insisting that Neda was absolutely a martyr, a rebel or a hoax, it allows 
that, from different perspectives, she can been seen as all these things. 
This does not, however, mean that all Neda’s are created equal. 
The logical mind illuminates by identifying accurate causes (Neda 
was killed by a bullet) and deludes by suggesting misleading causes (the 
bullet was fired by a fellow protestor or the CIA or a British journalist). 
The analogical mind illuminates by identifying accurate correlations 
(Neda resembles religious martyrs of the past) and deludes by identifying 
misleading correlations (Like other Iranian martyrs, Neda was killed by 
enemies of the Iranian government). Because we do not merely decode 
information, we also move around inside of it, we engage with media 
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maps in multiple ways, often at the same time. This fluidity of motion 
allows us to more readily recognize media affordances that may or may 
not be based on accurate causation and correlation. Fortunately, flawed 
logical and analogical assumptions are often easier to detect at the scale 
of more expansive ecologies, levels of generalization that carefully 
counterbalance multiple contesting maps. For instance, at the scale of the 
entire media ecology related to Neda Agha Soltan, we discover that little 
empirical evidence has been produced to support the claim that Neda’s 
death was a hoax whereas much evidence has been produced to indicate 
she was a real person killed by a member of the Basij militia, a 
paramilitary force whose members had been attacking and murdering 
protestors for several days.  
This is a key feature of the ecological perspective; James 
Gibson’s insistence that affordances can be directly perceived as 
objective features in the world, rather than sensory stimuli trapped inside 
our individual psyches.47 Although we can never determine definitively 
what Neda’s death should mean for all time and all people, we can at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 “An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are 
in a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which 
are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But, 
actually, an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective 
property; or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy 
of subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is 
equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both physical 
and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the 
environment and to the observer” (Gibson 1979, 129).  
 
	  	   112	  
least have some basis for forming general opinions about who she was 
and how she died. 
Many of the people who have sought to define the meaning of the 
Neda footage live outside of Iran and are not of Iranian dissent. Their 
connection to the circumstances surrounding Neda’s death are based 
primarily on ideology rather than direct ethnic or geographic affiliation. 
Most of them have never been to Iran, or the Middle East and do not have 
close contact with anyone from that region. Nonetheless, many of them 
have participated in impassioned protests on behalf of Neda and the 
Iranian people.  
In their book Complexity and Social Movements: Multitudes at 
the Edge of Chaos, Graeme Chesters and Ian Welsh make the counter-
intuitive claim that such “weak ties” are becoming an increasingly 
important aspect of social activism. As it turns out, weak ties, rather than 
direct affiliations and strong friendships are a more important means of 
launching new projects, organizing protests and accessing news. “This is 
because weak ties are crucial for being able to communicate beyond 
one’s immediate social (or activist) worlds” (2006, 105).48 Chesters and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Terrorism draws attention to political issues by inflicting victimage. 
Passive resistance accomplishes the same thing by enduring victimage. In 
both cases, the significance of the act is tied to the fact that it is to be 
witnessed by others outside of the immediate cultural milieu. Innovative 
activists such as Mohandas K. Gandhi and Martin Luther King realized the 
value of exposing instances of political injustice to outside observers, who 
might pressure their foes to behave in a more humane manner. As Bernard 
Giesen explains, “Rituals of collective identity are no longer a matter of 
just two parties, the insiders and the excluded and offended outsiders. 
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Welsh discuss the concept of “bridge worlds,” which are defined as 
“spaces wherein diverse movements [can] be made.” In such ecological 
niches, weak ties function as “social bridges” and serve to facilitate 
communication and provide access to resources (105). Because they are 
widely dispersed, flexible and adaptive, weak ties are a highly effective 
means of mobilizing social movements and spreading emergent 
behaviors. They “activate new channels of information and maximize 
potential for agency”(105). Examples of weak tie connections include: 
emails, social networking, blogging and file sharing. Ecological niches 
defined largely by weak ties are characterized by structural resilience, 
rapid communication, collective intelligence and decentralized patterns of 
bottom-up self-organization. They are highly effective at information 
management, material and symbolic contestation and mobilization at both 
the local and global levels. To some extent, the weaker the ties, the 
greater the complexity. The fact that many niche-alliances emerge online 
obviates traditional barriers to participation. While members of the 
ecological niche are well aware of traditional hierarchies of class, culture, 
age, gender, and race, they are less constrained by them than activists in 
the street. As Diane Singerman explains in her essay “The Networked 
World of Islamist Social Movements,” informal transnational activist 
networks are “key transmission belts of collective identity, drawing the 
ideas, sensibilities, reflexivity of people together while crisscrossing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Instead, they are constantly monitored and morally evaluated by a large 
third part, that is, the international public” (2004, 152). 
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social, economic, and political hierarchies” (2004, 144). The ties that are 
cultivated by these networks forge identities that challenge the boundary 
between institutionalized and non-institutionalized politics. According to 
Singerman, such activism subverts institutional politics by employing 
innovative collective action. Collective action is defined as innovative if 
it “incorporates claims, selects objects of claims, includes collective self-
representations, and/or adopts means that are either unprecedented or 
forbidden within the regime in question” (150). 
As participatory media discourses rearticulate the boundary 
between the public and the private, traditional institutional structures are 
undercut by the strategic mobilization of competing ideological visions. 
These discourses rely on loose, informal, personal networks and religious 
and cultural affiliations. Because they are loosely aggregated, they are 
challenging to combat. There is no central command to neutralize, no 
organizational hierarchy to subvert, no coherent strategy to counter. Their 
influence spans multiple social and political fields, intentionally and 
unintentionally shaping discourse in multiple ways by mediums invoking 
multiple types of ritual authority. The ritualists in question include 
“religious and intellectual authorities, poets, essayists, journalists, 
cartoonists, and even movie producers” (152). Focusing on the issue of 
Islamic activism, Singerman adds, “Given sets of rituals, practices, and 
cultural artifacts can themselves be ‘evidence’ of commitment to the 
Islamic movement and signs of shared beliefs that resonate among fellow 
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travelers. Identifying movement adherents by these processes of 
signification”(152). 
The discourses surrounding Middle Eastern politics are highly 
ritualized for a number of reasons. The cultures involved are deeply 
religious, new media technologies allow them to publicly proselytize, and 
because they live under the rule of repressive regimes, more conventional 
modes of dissent are often illegal.49  Strong commitments and weak ties 
enable strategic reflection and practical invention, retaining diversity 
whilst exerting social and political force.  
In weak tie niches, little things mean a lot. The minor player may 
exert significant influence by altering environmental conditions in a 
meaningful way. Thus, unpredictable and frequently spectacular 
outcomes are the result of seemingly peripheral activities (Chesters & 
Welsh 2006, 101-8).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Writing in 2004, Diane Singerman explained, “The Middle East, as a 
region, is characterized by political exclusion and extremely limited 
practices of citizenship. Monarchy, dynastic rule, and the military 
dominate political life, plain and simple. Families, with hereditary right to 
rule, govern 14 Middle Eastern states outright (144). With the political 
revolutions that have recently occurred in the Middle East, Singerman’s 
statistics are in flux. Nonetheless, they reveal how historically oppressed 
the general populace has been. Singerman adds, “Legislative bodies 
remain subject to the pleasure of the monarch and political parties, and 
other groups suffer from legal and extralegal constraints on fund-raising, 
mobilization, and freedom of association” (145). What’s more, “The 
modern state, as such, continues to thrive with little transparency, financial 
accountability, legislative or judicial autonomy, or rule of law” (145). Yet, 
as Singerman also points out, “Particularly in repressive systems, 
symbolic politics and collective identity build movements characterized as 
‘discursive communities’” (152). 
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Figures 22 & 23. Direct Identification 
 Some activists directly conflated themselves with Neda. 
 
Figure 24. Indirect Identification 
Other conflations were indirect, with mediums honoring her via 
candlelight vigils, creating shrines and chanting. These rites were highly 
reverential, associating her with saints and martyrs of the past.50 
 
Figure 25. Positive and Negative Conflations 
 Some mediums stressed positive conflations. Some stressed 
negative conflations. Some stressed both.51 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Bernhard Giesen explains that rituals of remembrance “abandon 
traditional modes of constructing collective identity in manifold ways. 
They focus on victims instead of victors, on the past instead of the future, 
on the similar fate of the outsiders instead of the homogeneity of the 
insiders…Cultivating memories by rituals and memorials creates a 
collective identity that is protected against doubts and objections” (2004, 
153-4). 
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Figures 26—28. Protestors in Paris, Los Angeles and Washington D.C. 
Since the advent of suicide bombing in the 1980s, stories of 
middle-eastern “martyrs” willingly dying for their beliefs have become 
an all-too-familiar feature of international news coverage. In some 
respects, Neda’s death resembles these martyrdom operations. She was 
Iranian, taking part in a political protest, and supporters say she willingly 
died for her beliefs. Yet unlike other middle-eastern martyrs, Neda has 
been canonized around the world. This suggests that the act of 
martyrdom, which western commentators often equate with outmoded 
superstition, remains emotionally compelling to the supposedly “secular” 
west. Unlike the Iranian martyrs usually discussed in the press, Neda had 
not set out to harm anyone else.  Also, according to popular 
interpretations, she had died for freedom, democracy and feminism. Here 
was a martyr that the west could uncritically celebrate, but how exactly 
did she emerge?  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Psychologist Peter Weinreich defines two types of “aspirational 
identification.” The first involves attempting to emulate a favored agent. 
The second involves attempting to dissociate with a despised agent (2003, 
97). 
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The Protests. 
On June 12, 2009 Iran conducted its presidential election. Shortly 
after the polls closed, there were reports that the incumbent, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, had won a decisive victory. The following day, Iran’s 
Supreme Leader, Ali Hoseyni Khamenei officially announced the 
election results in favor of Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad’s opponent, Mir-
Hossein Mousavi, immediately questioned the validity of the vote and 
demanded either a recount, or an entirely new vote. Around this time, the 
ruling regime ordered a media blackout to limit communications coming 
in or out of the country. Also Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic 
Guidance banned foreign journalists from the streets of Tehran and began 
detaining those who challenged this edict. To some Iranians, these 
precautions seemed excessive, as on the day that the election results were 
announced, the protests were mostly silent, a solemn show of solidarity 
with Mousavi and his call for a recount.52 However, in the days that 
followed, the protests would grow larger and the protestors would grow 
more vocal.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Rather than directly opposing authorities, the protestors initially sought 
to peacefully align themselves with sympathetic figures in the 
government. As Hjorleifur Jonsson explains, subcultures can effectively 
gain insider status by redefining their collective identity in a manner 
amenable to state power via the performance of public rites demonstrating 
allegiance and deference (2005, 109).  
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Figure 29. Azadi square (6/15/09) 
On June 15th, Mir-Hossein Mousavi first appeared among the 
growing crowds. Standing atop his SUV he used a megaphone to address 
hundreds of thousands of people gathered in Tehran’s Azadi (Freedom) 
Square, who cheered him on and shouted words of support. That day, 
seven people were reportedly killed in clashes on the fringes of the 
massive rally. (Aljazeera 6/16/09). 
 
Figures 30. Valiasr Square (6/16/09) 
The media blackout was expanded. The government began 
shutting down communication services operating within Iran’s borders in 
order to inhibit the ability of protestors to organize. At the same time, 
government officials organized a counter-demonstration in Valiasr 
Square with thousands of Iranians condemning the protests. Images of 
this rally were featured on state-run television. Despite such measures, 
the election protests continued to grow. Protestors used social networking 
sites such as Twitter and Facebook to organize their activities and to 
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contact supporters outside the country, spreading news of their ongoing 
struggle.53 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 In December of 2010, an unemployed Tunisia man desperate to feed his 
family became a high profile martyr by setting himself on fire. This act of 
self-immolation instigating protests, which lead to the ouster of Tunisia’s 
strong-arm president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (CBS News 1/14/11). As 
the Tunisian regime was crumbling, pro-democracy protests spread 
throughout the Arab World, presenting both challenges and opportunities 
for western powers such as the United States. Soon hundreds of thousands 
of protestors were demanding regime changes in Egypt and Yemen. Social 
media sites such as Facebook and Twitter helped protestors organize and 
sent word of the protests around the world (AP 1/28/11). Protests then 
spread to other countries including Jordan, the Sudan and Syria (Los 
Angeles Times 2/2/11). As the violence in Egypt escalated, U.S. 
intelligence agencies came under fire from congressional critics who said 
there should have been much more warning because the demonstrators 
were using the Internet and social media to organize. The chairman of the 
House Intelligence Committee, Mike Rogers replied, “We’ve got to be 
realistic about [the CIA’s] limits, especially regarding the complex and 
interactive behavior of millions of people” (AP 2/5/11).  
Egypt’s president Hosni Mubarak stepped down on February 12th. 
Countries across the mid-east, including Israel, applauded the move 
toward democracy, though not without trepidation. The Obama 
administration praised the move, while striving to conflate its pro-
democracy rhetoric with the protestors even though the U.S. has often 
supported kings and dictators in order to ensure access to the region’s rich 
petroleum supplies. At the same time, anti-western powers were eager to 
manage the emergent chaos by practicing modes of mediumship favoring 
their own ideologies. Iran sought to portray the events as a replay of its 
1979 revolution. In an effort to determine the significance of this emergent 
change, Iranian President Ahmadinejad gave a speech in which he stated, 
“Despite all the (West’s) complicated and satanic designs…a new Middle 
East is emerging without the Zionist regime and U.S. interference, a place 
where the arrogant powers will have no place.” These words were 
delivered to a crowed filling Tehran’s Azadi, or “Freedom Square,” site of 
the largest protests against his regime in the summer of 2009 (AP 
2/12/11).  
The day after Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak stepped down, 
10,000 Algerians battled police in order to demand democratic reforms for 
their country (AP 2/13/11). The next day, protestors in Yemeni clashed 
with police, seeking the ouster of their U.S.-backed president. Additional 
protests soon emerged in Bahrain, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Sudan. 
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Figure 31. Social Media Revolution 
Because three-quarters of Iran’s population of approximately 70 
million was born during or after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, most 
Iranians are under the age of thirty. Younger people tend to be familiar 
with Internet and social media technologies. Thus a large portion of 
Iran’s populace is very media savvy. During the post-election protests, 
they became self-organizing citizen-reporters, utilizing mobile media and 
the Internet to interact with each other and the outside world.  
Over the next few days, there were more clashes with the militia 
members now patrolling the streets in increasing numbers. Then, on June 
19th, while conducting a Friday Prayer broadcast, Iran’s Supreme Leader, 
the cleric Ali Khamenei, demanded an end to the protests and cautioned 
that those who continued to agitate would be met with fierce opposition. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Meanwhile, the U.S. State Department began sending Twitter messages in 
Farsi in the hope of reaching social media users in Iran. They accused the 
Iranian government of illegalizing dissent while praising Egyptian 
protestors for the same activities (AP 2/14/11). The next day, protests 
flared in Iran. Tens of thousands of protestors assembled in the streets of 
Tehran, conflating the names of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei 
and Egypt’s deposed president Hosni Mubarak by chanting, “Bin Ali, 
Mubarak, it’s Seyed Ali’s turn!” Government forces fired on the protestors 
with tear gas, rubber bullets and birdshot. A pro-government news agency 
reported that one bystander was killed by gunfire. (AP 2/15/11).  
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This announcement discouraged many from protesting over the following 
days and those who did continue to demand a recount were increasingly 
endangered. As clashes between the militia and the protestors grew more 
violent, reports of new fatalities began to leak out of the country. These 
were accompanied by shocking images shot on cell phones and digital 
cameras of protestors shot or beaten to death in the streets (Hamedani 
2009, 11). 
       
Figures 32—34 Protestors injured and killed (6/20-21/09) 
While attempting to quell this dissent, Iran’s ruling regime 
expanded the media blackout further still. They shut down entire 
broadcast technologies, including Twitter, western television signals and 
Internet access. They even shut down cell phone nodes that were 
allowing protestors to organize. To justify these actions, Ahmadinejad 
accused the international media of launching a “psychological war” 
against his country. Reporters, foreign and domestic, were banned from 
the streets. (AP 6/15/2009). This anti-western bluster provided a 
convenient—if suspect—smoke screen as the Iranian president attempted 
to deflect attention from the fact that his government was struggling to 
silence the highly mediated interactions of its own people. Yet despite 
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such efforts, footage of the protests continued flooding from the country, 
generating an international uproar.54  
In the west, media coverage of the protests was largely cobbled 
together from masses of photographs and footage distributed 
internationally via the Internet by unknown sources. Since western 
reporters had been banned from the streets of Tehran, news organizations 
were obliged to acknowledge that they could not confirm the validity of 
the shocking images they were uploading to their broadcast screens.55 
This created many blind spots and undermined traditional journalistic 
codes, signaling a shift of emphasis from well informed first hand 
observation, to largely uninformed, second hand interpretation. U.S. 
anchors could not even verify that the images they were broadcasting had 
actually been posted from inside Iran. As a result, the attendant reportage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 The Iranian government is not the only oppressive social institution 
unsettled by the new media revolution. In 2008, the Chinese government 
was caught off guard when—in the wake of a devastating earthquake—
hundreds of citizens began reporting the incident on Twitter and placing 
images of the devastation recorded by cell-phone-cameras online. 
Hundreds of students had been killed when poorly constructing buildings 
collapsed. Their parents began protesting this injustice and these images 
also appeared online and were seen around the world, deeply embarrassing 
the Chinese government (NBC 5/22/2008). 
 
55 In 2009, the still unknown person who shot the Neda footage was 
honored with the George Polk Award for excellence in journalism. This 
was the first time the prize had been bestowed on a citizen reporter, let 
alone an anonymous individual. 
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often reflected as much about U.S. social norms as it did about the 
Iranian protests.56 
In the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Nina Hamedani 
states that mainstream U.S. media outlets have made little attempt to 
conceal their biases against Ahmadinejad and the Islamic Republic and 
have been “quick to jump on the election fraud bandwagon.” She finds 
their supposedly ‘factual’ coverage almost entirely one-sided in favor of 
the challenger (13).  She also points out that the U.S. press has frequently 
displayed a lack of knowledge about the nuances of Iranian society. For 
instance it was widely reported that Ahmadinejad’s rival, Mir-Hossein 
Mousavi was a left-leaning candidate with a history of championing 
political reforms, but there was less attention paid to what types of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 The long-standing tensions between Iran and the United States date 
back to 1953 when a CIA backed a coup d’état deposed the democratically 
elected government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq and 
replaced him with an all-powerful monarch, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, 
AKA, the “Shah of Iran,” who ruled for the next 26 years until he was 
overthrown in 1979. After the deposition of the Shah and the ensuing 
Iranian hostage crisis, the United States severed all diplomatic ties with 
Iran. In 2003, the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iran’s old rival, Iraq 
both threatened and emboldened the Iranian government, which began to 
actively undermine the U.S. military operation. Resentment surrounding 
the U.S. invasion of Iraq helped to bring hard line leader Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad in to power. Soon his regime expanded the country’s nuclear 
capabilities, purportedly in pursuit of peaceful, economic advantages. Yet 
fears of a nuclear-armed Iran have motivated many western countries, led 
by the U.S., to enforce more stringent economic sanctions in order to force 
Iran to conform with international policies regarding nonproliferation. The 
Iranian election crisis heightened western hopes that a more moderate 
leader would defeat Ahmadinejad, placing the U.S. in a more 
advantageous bargaining position.  
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reforms he had supported.57 For instance, in the 1970s, he was jailed for 
organizing street protests challenging Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's 
modernization policies. Later, he helped form the Islamic Republican 
Party with the explicit purpose of overthrowing the monarchy and 
replacing it with an Islamic Republic. Mousavi rose to his most 
prominent political position during the Iraq-Iran war, serving as prime 
minister for eight years. During this time, he tolerated no public 
demonstrations opposing government policies.58  
In 2009, Mousavi campaigned as a conservative moderate with 
the slogan “Return to Stability, Return to Rationality.” At campaign 
rallies, he proved a somewhat bland, soft-spoken figure. Nonetheless, his 
supporters’ expert use of new media and the Internet, and the fact that he 
was the only presidential candidate to campaign in the company of his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Another fact commonly overlooked by the U.S. media: the only 
accurate foreign pre-election poll—one conducted by the BBC and ABC 
news, through the New America Foundation (NAF), about a week before 
the election—predicted an 89 percent voter turnout and a 2-to-1 advantage 
for Ahmadinejad nationwide. Its findings seem to have been confirmed 
when, on June 13, Ahmadinejad was declared the landslide winner of the 
election in which 24.5 million votes were cast by an historic 85 percent of 
eligible voters (Hamedani, 14). 
 
58 Additionally, in the U.S. media, the protests were commonly 
characterized as the first significant protests in the Islamic Republic's 30-
year history. This is not true. Through the years, there have been 
numerous demonstrations in Iran, the most violent occurring in 1999 when 
students protested the closing of liberal newspapers by then president 
Seyed Mohamma Khatami. The chief political advisor to Khatami during 
his two terms in office was 2009’s “reform” candidate Mir-Hossein 
Mousavi (Hamedani, 14). 
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wife, appealed to young voters and Iran's urban middle class. Thus, he 
eventually came to be known as “the reform candidate.”  
In some respects, Mousavi deserves the title. His platform 
promised to disband state TV and eradicate the morality police, and his 
popular and politically savvy wife, Zahra Rahnavard, pledged equal 
rights for women. Still, throughout the election and subsequent protests, 
many Iranians wondered whether a 1979 Islamic revolutionary could 
actually transform himself into a 2009 reformer (12). 
              
Figures 35 & 36. The “Great Satan” & the “Mad Mullah 
In his book, The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: How the 
United States and Iran Demonize Each Other, William O. Beeman argues 
that the ongoing dispute between the U.S. and Iran is “a true postmodern 
culture conflict.” This clash of cultures centers on symbolic discourse: 
“forces in both the United States and in the Middle East [have] 
constructed a mythological image that [serves] to ‘demonize’ the other 
parties in vivid terms, calculated to be immediately understood by the 
man on the street” (2005, 4). Iran caricaturizes the U.S. as a den of 
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iniquity, AKA “The Great Satan,” and the U.S. caricatures Iran as a 
haven of crazed holy men, AKA “Mad Mullahs.” 
In addition to these crude stereotypes, the conflict centers on 
different theories about how the two country’s social structures should be 
conceptualized. Beeman explains, “the United States largely assumes 
egalitarian communication structures within [their own] communities, 
and hierarchical structures between the two communities,” whereas, “the 
Iranian model [is] precisely the opposite. They assume hierarchical 
structures within their own community and egalitarian structures between 
the two communities” (43). The tension between the two countries is not 
merely a clash of ideologies; it is a clash of ideological frames. The 
United States and Iran cannot approach consensus because they cannot 
even agree on how to argue. This type of tropic disconnect is the 
antithesis of the rhetorical concept of “stasis,” the possibility of framing 
an argument in a manner amenable to all parties and thereby affording the 
possibility of meaningful exchange (Crowley 2006, 30). Beeman adds, 
“Clearly, the Iranian and the U.S. assumptions about the context of 
communication cannot coexist in the same discourse sphere with ease, 
and indeed they do not” (44).59  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The maintenance of conflicting perceptual frames perpetuates political 
discord, but also serves an ideological purpose. Simon Harrison points out 
that in the 19th century, communities of Pacific Islanders were known to 
consciously emphasize difference as a means of retaining a sense of 
political sovereignty and cultural singularity. “Each group treated its 
emblematic practices as precious monopolies it jealously had to safeguard 
from outsiders; and it sought constantly, not just to preserve, but to 
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Western powers have long questioned the Iranian government’s 
legitimacy and status as a true democracy. In the eyes of many, the 
election protests appeared to reinforce the view that the state of Iran is an 
unjust totalitarian regime. To challenge these views, media savvy Iranian 
officials crafted arguments that depicted their tactics as fundamentally 
fair and objective. For instance, soon after the protests began, Iran's 
PressTV Channel began uploading short segments on YouTube and other 
sites. In a weekly summary piece titled “Reality Check,” they examined 
what was described as “biased Western coverage” on such networks as 
CNN and Fox News and repeatedly cited a poll done by an organization 
called Terror-free Tomorrow that predicted a 2:1 victory for 
Ahmadinejad before the election took place (CitizenTube. 6/22/09). 
These actions served to construct counter-narratives that some Iranians 
found convincing. Nonetheless, a new story was about to emerge from 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
accentuate, its distinctiveness. Paradoxical though it may seem, these 
cultures were unified above all by a shared concern with maintaining 
differences” 2006, 17). Defining the hazards of “mimetic conflict,” René 
Girard explains, “Man cannot respond to that universal injunction, ‘Imitate 
me!’ without almost immediately encountering an inexplicable counter-
order: ‘Don’t imitate me!’ (Which really means, ‘Do not appropriate my 
object’). This second command fills man with despair and turns him into 
the slave of an involuntary tyrant. Man and his desires thus perpetually 
transmit contradictory signals to one another” (1972, 147). 
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Sacrifice. 
On the 23rd of June, as the government crackdown was growing 
increasingly violent, 26-year-old Neda Agha Soltan was shot and fatally 
wounded on the streets of Tehran. Witnesses said the gunman appeared to 
be a member of the Iran’s paramilitary militia, the Basij. The death of 
“Neda”—as she is now, familiarly called by activists worldwide—was 
filmed by a cell-phone-camera and within hours, that disturbing 36 
second piece of footage was being broadcast internationally via the 
Internet and various news channels, and inside of Iran via Bluetooth. The 
emergence of these images sparked additional protests. Activists around 
the globe donned green armbands (in support of the Iran’s reformist 
“green party”) and held up signs identifying themselves with Neda and 
honoring her sacrifice (AP 6/23/09). 
         
Figures 37—39. Neda Merchandising 
Within days of her death, Neda became a cottage industry as T-
shirt, buttons and even coffee mugs with her likeness were produced and 
consumed. Yet when people acquired this merchandizing, what exactly 
were they buying?  
Neda’s on-camera sacrifice transformed her into a ritual actor, 
recorded in a moment of victimage that resonated with the value systems 
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of people throughout the world. The BBC, HBO and PBS all produced 
documentaries, each framing her in somewhat different light. Viewers 
were introduced to Neda the political firebrand, Neda the apostle of 
peace, Neda the women’s rights activist, and Neda the spiritual prophet. 
Meanwhile, the Iranian government fought back by launching three 
simultaneous disinformation campaigns, utilizing both mainstream and 
social media: one claimed the event was a ruse perpetuated with the help 
of British reporters (New York Times 1/7/10), another asserted it was a 
CIA assassination meant to foment political dissent (AP 6/25/09). Still 
another argued she had been killed by her fellow protestors (AP 6/26/09). 
In order to construct convincing “Neda mythologies,” social 
media producers needed to identify who Agha Soltan was in life as well 
as death, so the grisly footage was usually accompanied by one of two 
recent photographs of her. In the more stoic version, she is dressed in a 
traditional black scarf, which is wrapped around head and neck. As in the 
cell-camera footage, her eyes stare directly at us. Her expression is 
somber but not stern. She is quite beautiful and despite the orthodox 
attire, there are also certain western embellishments: plucked eyebrows, 
lipstick, mascara and a bit of blush. 
The second photo—the one more commonly seen in the west—
features Neda in a more informal pose. She is dressed in a flowered shirt 
that opens at the collar to reveal a small gold necklace. Her head is tilted 
to the left and her dark shoulder-length hair is draped in that direction 
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with a few strands slightly obscuring her right eye. Once again, she is 
looking directly at us, but this time with a relaxed smile. There is a 
warmth and openness about this portrait. 
            
Figures 40 & 41. Nedas 
It is perhaps unsurprising that a mediascape so often bitterly 
divided by cultural and religious differences was offered two different 
Nedas to choose from. In the first shot, she is a pious martyr, perhaps a 
bit too “exotic” for some westerners to identify with, but earnest and 
traditional enough to merit the respect of Shiites. In the second shot, she 
seems sweet and approachable with westernized clothing, a look informal 
enough to elicit the identification of non-Muslims. 
 
Figure 42. Neda the Pawn 
In many ways, victimage made Neda Agha Soltan a pawn in a 
high stakes political game. In terms of her own personal safety, she had 
been in the wrong place at the wrong time. Yet she was an ideal 
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candidate for martyrdom: young, pretty and female. Not only had she 
died on camera, she had done so without uttering a word, becoming a 
blank screen that viewers could project all sorts of ideological 
preconceptions onto. Yet, if we listen closely, Neda still has some things 
to say about the ritual roles that have been posthumously ascribed to her. 
These identities generally seek to conceal her complexity, papering over 
the ambivalence she felt toward her homeland and her fellow Iranians. 
Neda’s actions never perfectly align with the roles that have been 
posthumously foisted on her by people with both noble and self-serving 
intentions. The closer we look, the more complex the portrait becomes, 
and the more we are required to acknowledge that her feelings regarding 
the historic circumstances that claimed her life were quite complicated 
and in many respects, contradictory.  
 
Bystander Niche. 
Neda had not actually been protesting when she was shot. She and 
her music teacher, Hamid Panahi, were stuck in traffic on Karegar Street, 
east of Tehran's Azadi (Freedom) Square, on their way to a larger 
demonstration. It was just after 6:30 p.m. After sitting inside a Peugeot 
206—a subcompact with a poorly working air conditioner—for over an 
hour, they decided to get out of the car for some fresh air. Panahi later 
told the press that the two of them were merely standing across the street 
from some protestors and observing when a bullet fired from a 
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government militia member hit her in the chest, apparently severing a 
main artery and puncturing her lung (BBC News 6/25/09). 
Two days after Neda’s death, her fiancé Caspian Makan was 
quoted on BBC Persian, a Web site run by the BBC in Farsi (Iran’s 
national language). He claimed that she had been politically neutral and 
that her goal was not to support reform leader Mir-Hossein Mousavi or 
conservative president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. “She was just in love 
with her country.”  
Many of the initial accounts of Neda’s death emphasized her 
political ambivalence and suggested she was merely a hapless bystander 
who had not been actively participating in the protests. A group of her 
close friends told the press she was fundamentally apolitical (Los 
Angeles Times, 6/22/09). Her mother, Hajar Rostami, stressed that she 
was not a political activist. “It was all about being young and feeling 
passionate about freedom. She wasn't political. She didn't belong to any 
party or group. She didn't support any faction. Every other young Iranian 
was there, and she was one of them (Muslims Debate 31 Jul 2009). The 
fact that Neda did not vote in the election would appear to lend credence 
to this perspective. 
In subsequent interviews, however, friends and relations have 
described her as far more politically active and socially idealistic and thus 
more willing to risk her life for the post-election protests. Her sister, 
Hoda, told the BBC that Neda only resisted voting because of reported 
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fraud at the polling stations (Garnsey 2009). Nonetheless, those who 
knew Neda best initially characterized her as apolitical. Why?  
In the days following Neda’s death, Iran’s political climate was 
extremely tense and volatile. The few Iranians who were willing to speak 
to the press at that point insisted on disguising their identities with false 
names. Under such conditions, associating oneself with a political 
agitator would have been a very risky proposition. Eventually, however, 
Neda’s sacrifice gained mythical status. When this occurred, those 
directly associated with her discovered that they were able to speak much 
more openly about political matters than ordinary Iranians could. After 
all, any attempt to persecute them, would only confirm the impression 
that the government had unfairly persecuted Neda in the first place.  
Then there is the issue of “ritual relevance.” Willed action—or at 
least the appearance of it—is the key to making ritual victimage 
meaningful. If those mourning Neda did not ascribe some higher 
significance to her passing, it would seem less meaningful than it 
otherwise might. She would have died in vain. 
Given these pressures and incentives, it is not surprising that Neda 
was initially characterized as a passive bystander and then increasingly 
described as a political and religious firebrand. But none of these ritual 
roles has proven a perfect fit. In terms of the bystander persona, we must 
allow that Neda was not entirely apolitical. After all, she would have 
been much safer had she merely stayed at home. Then there was her 
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placement in the environment. When she and her music instructor parked 
their car and stepped out for a breath of air, they chose to stand near the 
protestors. If she had kept her distance from the group, it seems unlikely 
that she would have been shot. Finally, at the moment of her death, she 
chose to look directly into the camera. Whether or not this last act was a 
conscious choice or a fairly automatic reflex, it would prove the most 
rhetorically significant gesture to emerge from Iran’s post-election 
turmoil. 
 
Figure 43. Open Eyes 
Hoax Niche. 
After the footage of Neda’s death created an international furor, 
Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told the head of Iran's 
judiciary, Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi, to probe the incident and make 
the results of his investigations public. “The massive propaganda of the 
foreign media, as well as other evidence, proves the interference of the 
enemies of the Iranian nation who want to take political advantage and 
darken the pure face of the Islamic republic,” he said in a letter to 
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Shahroudi. Ahmadinejad also stated, “I didn't see who shot who,” adding, 
“The whole scene looked suspicious to me” (CNN 6/29/09). 
The outrage over Neda’s death was certainly a boon to powerful 
western forces such as the U.S. government who would prefer to see 
Iran’s theocratic regime toppled. The footage of Neda’s death has proved 
to be such a powerful piece of anti-Ahmadinejad propaganda many 
Iranian officials have felt compelled to dismiss it as a hoax. Their voices 
have been joined by some unlikely allies, western conspiracy theorists 
who are generally sympathetic to the protestors but, nonetheless, deeply 
suspicious of western powers.  
In the blog American Everyman, Scott Creighton writes: “The 
Neda killing in Iran was a staged attempt to ferment indignation in Iran 
and the rest of the world against the ruling party that had just won the 
election. It was yet another example of an attempt to overthrow a regime 
that was unfriendly to U.S. corporations and bankers probably devised by 
the CIA like so many in the past” (4/13/10). 
Libertarian pundit Gary Trieste states, “I don't want to bust 
anyone's bubble, but there seems to be too many ‘just right’ elements to 
this story…The mass media, starving for news, and implicitly 
antipathetic toward the Iranian regime for their actions, snatched up this 
story and ran with it. It was just too good not to be true” (Nolan Chart 
6/24, 2009).  
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A posting on AboveTopSecret.com features a shot-by-shot break 
down of the video and comments such as  “A gunshot wound to the chest 
would have killed her or left her unconscious. Yet she keeps looking, not 
at the people she ‘knows.’ She looks at the cameraman” (10-2-2010). 
Because Neda makes eye contact with the viewer, media 
discourses seeking to define the footage as a hoax are compelled to take a 
stand in relation to her unblinking gaze. As cinematographer Seven D. 
Katz explains, in film, the viewer identifies with the camera and this 
creates a strong sense of emotional connection (1991, 240-1).   
  
Figure 44. Eye Contact 
Neda’s gaze is a powerful media affordance that savvy ritualists 
can capitalize on order to positively conflate her death with martyrdom. 
On the other hand, if they wish to deny the ritual significance of Neda’s 
death, they must reject the power of that look, defining it as manipulative 
stagecraft, as in the image above. 
 
Figures 45 & 46. Blood 
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 The blood that spilled from Neda’s mouth and nose at the moment 
of her death is also rhetorically significant. Here are two stills taken from 
the Neda footage and captions questioning the placement of the blood 
and suggesting that Neda’s death was a fabrication. According to 
AboveTopSecret.com, one of the figures leaning over Neda is seen 
placing some fake blood in her nose. “Shortly thereafter blood appears to 
pour out her right nostril . . . Looking carefully in the video, it appears 
that both the mouth and nostril bleeding occurs right after a hand is seen 
pushing up onto or into them. These flow patterns appear more to be from 
a blood bladder timed for rupture when the camera was in the correct 
position. And the nosebleed appears only after what appears to be a rapid 
slight-of-hand insertion of blood into her nose. (10-2-2010). 
Offering a slightly different perspective, Scott Creighton suggests 
that Neda applied the blood herself, “It’s an obviously staged event. 
She’s got the tube of fake blood in her left hand and you can see her 
apply it to her own face after it squirts out a bit and runs down her hand 
and down her arm” (4/13, 2010).  
Such conspiracy theories are challenged by the fact that the Neda 
footage is shot in a single continuous take.60 Because there are no edits, 
there are fewer opportunities for fooling the audience. Thus, those who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Directors such as Alfred Hitchcock, Stanley Kubrick, Martin Scorsese, 
Paul Thomas Anderson and Mike Leigh have included extended takes in 
their films. While challenging to choreograph, such scenes create dramatic 
tension and heighted verisimilitude as, often for minutes at a time, the 
camera refuses to blink. 
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consider the footage a hoax must indicate seemingly deceptive instances 
of on-camera “blocking.” For instance, Scott Creighton states, “She then 
drops the tube of fake blood and the doctor who helped stage the event 
tries to push it under her so the camera won’t see it”  
 
Figure 47. ID card of Abbas Javid Kargar 
According to those who witnessed Neda’s death, some protestors 
captured the man responsible for shooting her. A video was later posted 
on YouTube depicting the incident. It shows Basij member Abbas Javid 
Kargar being detained by protesters, who undress him and confiscate his 
identity card. Reportedly, Kargar was heard shouting, “I didn't want to 
kill her” (Radio Free Europe 6/20/10). 
In 2010, a documentary titled Crossroads appeared in Iranian 
state television. In line with previous statements by Iranian authorities, 
which have called the Neda footage a pre-planned scenario aimed at 
defaming Iran, it suggests that the opposition Mujahedin Khalq 
Organization (MKO) was behind the incident.  In the documentary, 
Kargar denies ever confessing and says instead that he had shouted that 
he wasn't armed. “If I had a gun, what happened to it?” he asks. 
In the documentary, Kargar first appears on camera wearing a 
green surgical mask similar to those protesters in Tehran and other cities 
have used to wear to protect their identities from security forces. This 
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move rhetorically conflates him with the same protestors he is accused of 
attacking. He says he was forced to move out of his house after his ID 
card and personal information were posted on the Internet and that he 
wears the mask in public in order to protect himself. (BeforeItsNews June 
21, 2010). 
By depicting Kargar as a victim of an anti-Iranian conspiracy, 
Crossroads attempts to exonerate the Iranian government of any 
wrongdoing. While the film places blame on elements outside Iran, it 
does at least acknowledge that a person named Neda Agha Soltan existed, 
that she was shot on the streets of Tehran and that images of her death 
were captured by a cell-phone-camera.  
In contrast, western conspiracy theories often insist that Neda did 
not die on camera. They must, therefore, suggest explanations for why 
she was never seen or heard from again. Scott Creighton of the American 
Everyman blog dismisses the footage of Neda’s death as patently false. 
Meanwhile, he is compelled to imagine a different type of killing. 
“Unfortunately for Neda,” he writes, “she was too young to realize that 
when people like this stage fraudulent ‘events’ in order to try to install 
their neoliberal regime in a country, it doesn’t do to have the martyr of 
the revolution running around, so they probably killed her 
later…apparently by shooting her in the back” (4/13, 2010). 
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Rebel Niche. 
In the eyes of millions, it did not matter that ‘Neda’ was not a 
political activist. Immediately, she became a symbol of political revolt. 
And within hours of her death, Youtube subscribers began posting 
tributes, including a song performed by a young Iranian man titled “The 
Call of My Country,” which featured the lyrics, “I swear on your last 
innocent look, that we will take back your vote from the deceivers, that 
we will always confront oppressors, that we will continue your path for 
all eternity” (Washington Post, 6/23/09). 
 
Figures 48. Poster in Tehran 
It was not until five days after Neda’s death, that a coherent, 
eyewitness account emerged. The BBC News website featured an 
interview with Dr. Arash Hejazi, one of the two men who had been 
leaning over Neda’s body in the tragic footage. Hejazi, who was studying 
at a university in the south of England, had managed to escape Iran after 
the killing. Later, he decided to step forward to describe the incident 
despite the risks involved in doing so.  
 
Figure 49. Dr. Arash Hejazi 
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In the video interview, Hejazi is soft spoken and articulate, a man 
in his mid-thirties with black hair, dressed in a blue oxford cloth shirt, 
frequently peering reflectively over the top of his wire-rimmed glasses. 
The BBC reporter points out the images of Neda's death have become a 
rallying point for protestors around the world, and since he was one of the 
two men shown leaning over the body, he is now connected to that 
footage. She asks how he feels about that? 
Hejazi explains that he is risking his life and his reputation by 
speaking out about Neda's death. He won’t be able to return to Iran for 
the foreseeable future, and the ruling party is likely to smear his 
reputation, yet he is compelled to speak about the event. “I feel 
responsible,” he says. “She died for a cause … She was fighting for basic 
rights, basic human rights. She wanted her vote to be counted. She 
wanted to be free, freedom of assembly.” 
Hejazi makes these statements after explaining that he actually 
did not know Neda and had never spoken to her. And as the cell phone 
footage reveals, she was unable to speak after being shot and died in less 
than a minute. This means that any assumptions he is making about her 
motives are conjecture. Still, he persists: “I don’t want her blood to have 
been shed in vain,” he says. “She died on the street to say something, and 
the image has traveled so fast around the world, it means something. It 
means that there is a message there.” 
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Figure 50. Neda the Rebel? 
Dr. Hejazi was not the first person to define Neda’s death as a 
political act. While Neda’s finance, Caspian Makan, had described her as 
an apolitical person a few days earlier, he, nonetheless, sought to ascribe 
political significance to her sacrifice, saying, “She was a young woman 
but gave a big lesson to everybody … Neda just wanted to have freedom 
for everybody” (Washington Post 6/22/09).61  
Hamid Panahi, the music teacher who accompanied Neda to the 
protests also downplayed her activism initially, but later ascribed political 
motives to her as well, telling reporters she did not fear death and was 
determined to support the protesters and take a stand against “the 
injustice of it all” (Daily News 6/23/09). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Neda’s fiancé Caspian Makan has left Iran. In March of 2010, he visited 
Israel and met with President Shimon Peres. Said Makan, “I come to Israel 
as an ambassador of the Iranian people, a messenger from the camp of 
peace…I have no doubt that Neda's spirit and soul feels the sensitivity and 
warmth I received in this meeting” (Los Angeles Times 3/23/10). In 
response to the move, Neda’s mother Hajar Rostami, told reporters that 
Mr. Makan does not represent the views of Neda or her family. (BBC 
3/26/10) Meanwhile, the Iranian-backed broadcaster, Press TV, published 
a piece on its website calling Makan a “suspect” in Neda’s murder. 
Comments on the site suggested that Mr. Makan was a Mossad agent, who 
killed Neda and then returned to his homeland. The hard-line and pro-
Ahmadinejad Fars News Agency said the meeting between Peres and 
Makan is further evidence that foreign countries were involved in Neda's 
death. (AP 6/21/10). 
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Figures 51 & 52. Silent Protest 
Fearing a government crackdown, green party protestors initially 
wore green scarves, surgical masks and strips of tape over their mouths. 
This served as a reminder that they were to remain calm and quiet, an 
approach that would, hopefully, prove less provocative to the notoriously 
violent Basij militia. After Neda’s death, the facial coverings served to 
disguise the identities of protestors engaging in increasingly violent acts 
of rebellion. After the government crackdown, the protests grew smaller. 
Yet while they were being suppressed and silenced at every turn, those 
who wished to topple the Iranian theocracy were eager to prove that they 
were willing to fight on. For many, Neda’s bloody death became a 
justification for bloody retribution. The most militant protestors in Iran 
were determined to construct Neda as a rebel, representing their own 
desire for vengeance and revolt. 
           
Figures 53—55. Fighting On 
Forty days after Neda was killed, presidential candidate Mir 
Hosein Mousavi made a pilgrimage to her grave. The timing was highly 
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symbolic. Shi'ite Muslims mourn on the 3rd, 7th and 40th days after a 
death. These commemorations are a pivotal part of Iran's history. During 
the Revolution, the pattern of confrontations between the Shah's security 
forces and the revolutionaries often played out in 40-day cycles. (Time 
8/1/09).  
        
Figures 56 & 57. Ahmadinejad & Ali Khamenei Drowning in Neda’s 
Blood 
As Mousavi approached the graveyard, Iranian officials prevented 
him from entering. Almost immediately, a riot ensued. Police fired tear 
gas, attacked demonstrators with batons and smashed car windshields. 
But the protesters fought back, battling hand-to-hand with security forces 
in some of the most violent confrontations of the summer. Witnesses 
reported that, in one case, three members of the Basij were beaten with 
their own batons after a group of opposition activists pulled them off their 
motorcycles near a park. The motorcycles were then set on fire. “I saw a 
man throw a brick right in the face of a riot police officer. He fell on the 
ground,” one witness said. At other locations, demonstrators shouted, 
“Our Neda hasn’t died. It’s the government that has died!” (Washington 
Post, 7/31/09) 
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Threat Niche. 
With the exception of the Vatican, the Islamic Republic of Iran is 
the only working theocracy in the world. At the same time, the forces of 
modernization and an explosion in population growth have radically 
destabilized this traditionalist culture. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
television came into the homes of most Iranians, ushering in a profound 
sense of culture shock. William O. Beeman explains, “Iran was plunged 
directly into the age of sound and visual media without every achieving 
literacy for the majority of the population” (2005, 58).  
U.S. “baby boomers” who grew up watching television in the 
1950s would engage in countercultural practices in the 1960s. Likewise, 
after a decade of television viewing, Iranian’s populous began clamoring 
for social change. Yet a largely illiterate culture with increased access to 
the mass media tends to engage in mediation rites tied to more traditional 
ritual practices.62 The ouster of the U.S. backed Shah was led by well 
educated students, some with Marxist leanings, but in the chaos of post-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 In many Middle Eastern cultures poor citizens, and woman in particular, 
are discouraged and even forbidden from attaining literacy. This helps to 
contain dissent. One of the most significant issues pertaining to the current 
political reformation of the Middle East involves the difference between 
oral and literate mediumship. A medium who does not know how to read 
is dependent on institutional authorities to interpret legal statutes and 
sacred texts such as the Qur’an. Thus, she is less likely to deviate from 
accepted protocols. In contrast, the “new medium” or “literate medium” 
can freely reinterpret and remediate any text at her disposal. She is far 
more likely to practice and even prize innovation (normative 
transgression). The relative mix of literate and illiterate mediums in a 
given culture profoundly influences emergent patterns of political 
engagement. 
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Revolution politics, citizens reverted to older cultural values and formed 
the theocratic superstructure that continues to dominate Iranian politics. 
Western opposition has in many respects strengthened the Iranian 
regime, lending credence to claims that the country is under siege from 
corrupt external forces (Beeman 2005, 79). Without the west, a theocracy 
in power for over thirty years could hardly call itself “revolutionary.” 
This apparent celebration of cultural upheaval is counterpoised by a strain 
of deep conservatism. Iran is noted for its reactionary backlashes against 
progressive activism. Nonetheless, instances of activism are on the rise. 
This increase is tied to the country’s predominantly youthful populace 
and their fascination with western culture and mastery of social 
networking technologies. In such a climate, it is hardly surprising that the 
Iranian government should assert that Neda’s supporters are a “threat,” 
undermining traditional Iranian values.   
In many respects, Neda was nontraditional. She was shot while 
wearing westernized clothing (a baseball cap and jeans). And even when 
she photographed in Islamic garb, she wore make-up. She was divorced 
and somewhat worldly, a travel agent who had been to Dubai, Turkey and 
Thailand and wanted to live Istanbul one day. She had a Turkish Fiancé. 
She was student of philosophy and she had arrived at the protests in a 
French car. She was also an aspiring pianist and a singer (BBC 7/30/09 & 
CBS 6/23/09). 
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According the BBC, the Iranian government offered to pay a 
financial reward and to declare Neda an official “Iranian Martyr” if her 
family would claim that foreign agitators had killed her. They refused 
(Garnsey 2009). But while the Iranian regime has sought to aggressively 
discredit the stories circulating around Neda’s death, they have stopped 
short of impugning her character. Dishonoring the memory of a martyr is 
serious offense in any culture, so government officials have carefully 
avoided directly defaming Neda. However, they may have devised a 
means of discrediting her indirectly by conflating her with the western 
forces they blame for instigating the protests. 
             
 
Figures 58 & 59. Clotilde Reiss and Neda Agha Soltan: Foreign Threats? 
 During the first trial of Iranian protestors, the accused were not 
allowed to speak in their defense. This policy was changed during the 
second round of trails, not for any of the Iranian citizens being sentenced, 
but for Clotilde Reiss, a young French woman accused of instigating 
social unrest. By this point, Neda—whose name means “diving calling” 
in Farsi—had been named, “The Voice of Iran.”63 But by letting Reiss 
speak, the Iranian government gave another voice to the protests. 
According to the Islamic Republic News Agency, Reiss confessed in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Neda has also been called, “The Angel of Freedom” and “The Angel of 
Iran” (Telegraph.co.uk, 6/22/09). 
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heavy French accent, “I had personal motives for joining gatherings to 
see what was happening out of curiosity, but I admit that I made a 
mistake and should not have attended.” Reiss had no legal representation. 
Nonetheless, a government prosecutor accused her of attempting to 
engineer a “soft overthrow” of the government (AP 8/8/09). 
Reiss was 24 at the time, just two years younger than Neda. She 
appeared with her dark hair covered by a scarf, as Neda had in the photos 
that were, by then, circulating widely on the Internet. Her delicate 
features and quiet demeanor made her a suitable stand-in for Agha Soltan 
in the counter-narrative of “foreign interference” that the Iranian 
government was carefully constructing. By conflating Neda’s image with 
that of a foreign agitator, Iranian officials could imply a sort of “guilt by 
association,” subtly discrediting Neda and confronting Iranians with a 
new face of counter-revolutionary protest.  
As Michael Taussig explains, we often define ourselves by 
defining who we are not. “Identity formation is engaged in this habitually 
bracing activity in which the issue is not so much staying the same, but 
maintaining sameness through alterity” (1993, 129). This means an 
ongoing interrogation of difference, a constant isolation and even 
quarantining of Otherness. In order to maintain the illusion of cultural 
coherence, opinion leaders frequently fixated on social threats, figures 
clearly and emphatically defined as foreign and thus outside the norm. 
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According to this way of thinking, if we are to be one, we must reject the 
alien and the impure.  
The tropic structures of monotheistic religions favor such rigid 
binaries. If there is only one god, then any perspective that deviates from 
this view must be evil.  The Bible and the Koran are filled with 
condemnations of “sinners” and “infidels.” The ideologies they describe 
are defined in terms of absolute difference, thus monotheists tend to 
strongly dissociate with any figure thought to challenge their worldview. 
As William O. Beeman explains, “In Islamic terms, compromise with 
evil is not only impossible, but blasphemous. In Islam, sincere believers 
must ‘promote the right, and resist the wrong.’ If a force in the world is 
identified as corrupting, it must be opposed” (2005, 5). 
When such a mindset predominates, ideological pluralism is 
unthinkable. One is forced to make a stand and hold to it rigidly, even in 
the face of evidence that appears to strongly refute one’s ideological 
assumptions. As the Neda footage circulated, generating protests around 
the globe, forces inside the Iranian theocracy began contriving all sorts of 
conflicting counter-narratives in order to justify their views. Iran’s 
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei alleged that Neda was shot by a fellow 
protestor (AP 6/26/09), while Iran's ambassador to Mexico, Mohammad 
Hassan Ghadiri, suggested that the CIA could have been involved in the 
killing (AP 6/25/09).  
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Even before Neda’s death, Iranian officials were seeking to 
discredit the protestors. Several days prior to the incident, Iran’s 
intelligence minister, Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei blamed the protest on 
a mix of Iranian militancy and western influence. He said his bureau was 
investigating two categories of people who were seeking to create 
instability, one of them backed from abroad and hoping to achieve its 
goal through “explosions and terror” (reportedly, fifty suspects of this 
type had been arrested and more than twenty explosive devices had been 
discovered). The second category of dissenters, according to Mohseni-
Ejei, was made up of “counter-revolutionary groups” who had penetrated 
the headquarters of the election candidates (twenty-six of these figures 
had, purportedly, been arrested) (Aljazeera 6/16/09).64  
The Iranian government had to determinedly point out foreign 
threats as a means of combating a serious internal threat. Footage of civil 
unrest captured on the streets of Tehran had begun traveling to all parts of 
the globe. Especially damning were images of Basij militia members 
violently attacking protestors. In order to defuse this political minefield, 
the actions of the protestors had to appear violent enough to warrant an 
aggressive counter-response. As cultural analyst, Nina Hamedani 
suggests, creating this impression may have involved escalating violence 
through duplicitous means. During past demonstrations, members of the 
Basij had dressed in ordinary clothes and infiltrated crowds to incite riots 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 “Counter-revolutionary” in an Iranian context means opposed to the 
principles of the Islamic revolution that founded the current government.  
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by instigating fights, or using fires as street barricades. Such actions 
appear to justify a violent response from uniformed militia members. 
Unaware of these tactics, western media tends to assume that all of the 
people wearing plain clothes who have been shown throwing rocks and 




Of the many cultural niches seeking to define the meaning of 
Neda’s death, the biggest by far is “the martyr niche.” It has grown so 
large and complex; it has split into many “sub-niches,” each depicting a 
different type of martyrdom.  
 
Figure 60. Iranian Martyr? 
Before Neda’s death, the Iranian leadership believed it had a 
highly effective strategy for challenging the global primacy of the west, a 
mix of ancient ritual practice and high-tech media dissemination.65 
Martyrdom operations such as a suicide bombings could generate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Shiites have a long history of martyrdom. The first Shiite martyr was 
Imam Hussein, the Prophet Muhammad's grandson. He believed it was 
better to die fighting injustice than to live with injustice under illegitimate 
rule. 
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international press and radically destabilize Iran’s foes with none of the 
long-term financial risk of full-scale military campaigns. What’s more, 
martyrdom served as a form of conceptual camouflage helping to justify 
the murder of anonymous civilians, as the attack was—in the eyes of the 
faithful—an act of pious self-sacrifice. The practice had been perfected 
during the country’s long and brutal war with Iraq and has since been 
used in Israel and against western targets. 
In 2005, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated, “a 
nation with martyrdom knows no captivity” (Nissimov & Savyon 2008, 
1), but at the time, he failed to consider that the act of self-sacrifice can 
be motivated by any number of ideologies, including those deeply 
inimical to his own views.66 He went on to declare, “Today, more than 
ever, we must inculcate in the younger generation the culture of shahada 
[martyrdom]. This is a mission of supreme ideological importance ... One 
who treads the path of martyrdom and brings himself to this extreme 
attains the pinnacle of human achievement.” The irony of these 
statements deepens when we consider that the Basij, the paramilitary 
militia group Ahmadinejad was addressing, would soon be implicated in 
the country’s most infamous act of martyrdom in decades, not by 
becoming martyrs themselves, but by creating a new type of Iranian 
martyr.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The death of various martyrs played a decisive role when the populous 
deposed the Shah of Iran during 1979 Islamic revolution. 
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A few months later, in a May 2008 speech to families of shahids 
[martyrs], Iran’s Supreme Leader, the Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei characterized martyrdom as “a source of pride” and as 
“sacrifice in the path of God,” which “gladdens [the heart of] God.” In an 
attempt to achieve what it believed were ideological victories against the 
west, the Iranian leadership was actively cultivating what Ahmadinejad 
called, “a culture of martyrdom.”67 The mistake that he, Ali Khamenei 
and other Iranian leaders made was assuming that they—or any group—
could somehow lay claim to the most socially disruptive ritual act 
possible. There can be no “culture of martyrdom” because the practice of 
martyrdom is counter-cultural. It is an inherently radical act.68 Its chief 
aim is the rejection of traditional cultural structures. These unflinching 
advocates of shahada were, unwittingly, setting the stage for a new type 
of sacrifice.  
     
Figures 61 & 62. Feminist Martyr? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Iranian director Morteza Avini makes propaganda films to “incite 
martyrdom.” He says that martyrs learn “that there is no fear, because one 
cannot fear that which they want, to be closer to God.” According to 
Avini, belief is not a theoretical but a practical knowledge. “You need to 
transcend worldly qualities; like fear; it’s a practical matter that should be 
experienced in practice” (Varzi 2006, 82). 
 
68 The etymology of “radical” leads back to the Latin radix meaning 
“root.” Being “radical,” means tearing something up by the roots. 
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In 2007, the leaders of Iran’s martyrdom movement began a new 
publicity campaign. For years, they had been successfully recruiting male 
martyrs. Now they began targeting women. In an effort to promote 
female martyrdom, leaders of the group stated that because martyrdom 
was a “religious duty,” women did not require the permission of their 
fathers, their husbands, or “even of the ruling jurisprudent.” Inspired by 
such speeches, some 20,000 women signed up for martyrdom operations 
(Nissimov 2008, 1). 
Editors of the Iranian women’s magazine Zanan were deeply 
troubled by this trend. They published an investigative article 
condemning the recruitment campaign. This spawned an act of retaliation 
by the Iranian government. In late January of 2008, the Media 
Supervision Committee of Iran's Ministry of Culture and Islamic 
Guidance ordered the closure of the magazine, which was accused of 
“breaking the law and defaming military and revolutionary institutions.” 
By publishing reports that served to undermine Iranian society's “spiritual 
security, morale, and ideological strength,” the editors of Zanan had, 
purportedly, created a sense of “insecurity in society” and discredited the 
“status of women in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” 
It is no small irony that, a year and a half later, the world would 
witness, what many believe to be Iran’s first “feminist martyrdom.” Here 
was an Iranian martyr in many ways similar to the 20,000 other women 
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recruited by the government. Except that Neda had not died in support of 
the Iranian regime. She had died in opposition to it.  
Liberal progressives within Iran and around the globe could not 
help but feel deeply conflicted. Surely, any praise of martyrdom would 
only serve to perpetuate a violent and primitive practice. On the other 
hand, Neda had apparently sacrificed herself as a champion of women’s 
rights, issuing a strong challenge to Iran’s patriarchal regime.  
It is probably an overstatement to describe Neda as a “feminist,” 
yet, like many young Iranian woman, she often wore western attire even 
when it might have been more prudent to dress in traditional Islamic 
garb. The HBO documentary For Neda (2010) views Agha Soltan’s 
sacrifice primarily as a challenge to Iranian patriarchy. Neda is depicted 
as a young woman who defied Iranian custom at her own peril. In one 
scene, the narrator, an older Iranian woman, Shohreh Aghdashloo, 
explains how, not long before her death, the wives of some Basij 
members approached Neda on the street. The women warned her to cover 
her face before appearing in public. They were concerned that her 
appearance might prove threatening to Basij members, who would be 
intimidated by her beauty. Based on the images of Neda’s death, we 
know she did not heed these warnings. In fact, on the day she was shot, 
her face was entirely exposed. This may or may not be why she was 
targeted, but it is certainly related to the emotional impact of the footage. 
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Figures 63 & 64. Freedom Martyr? 
 
In addition to feminism, Neda’s martyrdom has ascribed to many 
other causes. Conflating her image the Statue of Liberty and calling her 
Iran’s “Angel of Freedom” suggests she died for freedom.  
 
Figures 65 & 66. Peace Martyr? 
 
Conflating Neda’s image with a peace sign suggests she died for 
peace.  
              
 
Figures 67 & 68. Progressive Martyr? 
 
 Conflating Neda’s image with Barack Obama suggests she died for 
progress.  
                       
Figures 69—71. Love Martyr? 
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Conflating Neda’s name with broken targeted, or shattered heart 
suggests she died for the love of her country. In a eulogy for her late 
sister Hoda Agha Soltan stated, “My sister died because she was not 
allowed to live like a human being; my sister died because injustice 
would not end; my sister died because she loved life so much, and my 
sister died because she cared lovingly for her fellow humans’ well-being” 
(LiveLeak.com 6/22/09). 
       
Figures 72 & 73. Islamic Martyr? 
Conflating Neda’s image or name with God or angels suggests 
she died for Islam. Neda’s mother, Hajer Rostami Motlagh, says her 
daughter was deeply religious. “Philosophy and theology were her 
favorite subjects … She was a spiritual person. She believed in God” 
(BBC News 7/30/09).  
According to some accounts, Neda had premonitions of her death, 
evidence many interpret as a type of divine revelation. The night before 
she was killed she had a dream. “There was a war going on,” she told her 
mother the next morning, “and I was in the front.” Upon hearing this, 
Hajer Rostami urged her daughter to stay away from Saturday’s march, 
but Neda refused to listen (CNN 11/5/09). 
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A close friend also warned her to stay away, but she reportedly 
replied, “Don't worry. It's just one bullet and its over” (Los Angeles 
Times 6/23/09). 
After Neda’s death, protestors were able to draw on a tradition 
dating back to the Iranian revolution of 1979. Every night for several 
weeks, people stood on rooftops around Tehran and shouted the 
traditional Shiite protest, “Allahu akbar!” which translates as, “God is 
great!” (AP 6/27/09). 
           
Figures 74 & 75. Christian Martyr? 
In July of 2009, some western websites began suggesting that 
Neda might be a Christian (The New Testament News 7/3/09). A well-
known photo of Agha Soltan accompanied these articles. An area below 
her neck was circled and enlarged, drawing attention to what appeared to 
be a crucifix. Christians who accepted this theory could view Neda’s 
death as another episode in a long-standing feud between Muslims and 
Christians, underscoring key ideological differences, including opposing 
views of martyrdom. 69 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 As Keith Lewinstein explains, Christian and Islamic martyrdom have 
different characteristics related to their historic origins. “Martyrdom 
achieved its religious significance for Christians in the period before the 
faith had enjoyed any political success … Islam, by contrast, had more 
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Some typical responses to the “Christian rumor” include the 
following blog posts: “I wouldn’t be surprised if she was targeted by the 
Basiji thug because of her cross necklace” (Nice Deb Blog 7/5/09) And 
“In fact, if she is a Christian, that could create greater support for 
religious freedom in Iran” (GetReligion.org 7/6/09). 
 To date, no credible evidence has surfaced that would suggest 
Neda actually was a Christian. The pendant around her neck is most 
likely a farvahar, one of the best-known symbols of Zoroastrianism and 
the Iranian nation. 
 
Neda Complex. 






Figure 76—80. Neda Flags 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
success from the beginning; it emerged not as a persecuted sect, but in the 
course of military conquest and political victory. (2002, 79). Carole Straw 
adds, “A Christian gloried in suffering for its own sake, for this sacrifice 
imitated the passion of Christ, which had redeemed humanity from the 
dreadful damnation of hell. Passivity itself became the ideal” (2002, 41). 
In contrast, “What struck the Muslims more naturally was the Prophet’s 
call for active struggle against injustice and idolatry” (Lewinstein 2002, 
80).  
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In the months after her death, photographs, drawings and 
paintings of Neda were combined with images the Iranian flags and 
maps. These “complex conflations” reflect the deep ambivalence many 
Iranians feel toward their country.  
The father of modern semiotics, Ferdinand de Saussure made a 
distinction between the spoken and the written word. He believed that 
spoken language is always in flux, but textual signs are relatively stable 
and autonomous. He asserted, “[Writing] is a self-contained whole and a 
principle of classification. Once we give it first place among the facts of 
speech, we introduce a natural order into an assemblage that is amenable 
to no other classification” (1922, 25). M.M. Bakhtin would later refute 
this idea, writing about the “polyphonic” dimensions of all language both 
spoken and written (1973, 198-99). If we relate this approach to the 
conflations centering on Neda Agha Soltan’s death, we see that a single 
act of victimage is never a monophonic mode of rhetorical invention; 
instead, it is the occasion of a high stakes debate. One man’s saint is 
another man’s infidel. Is Che Guevara a martyr or a monster? How about 
Malcolm X? Or Lenny Bruce? Victimage not only creates consensus, it 
also allows for contention. And if we can allow that a single act of 
victimage many be variously interpreted, we can move from a didactic to 
a polyphonic mode of interpretation.  
Of course, even if Saussure is wrong and the symbolic order is not 
stable and autonomous, human beings often proceed as if it is, conceiving 
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of linguistic signs as fixed and eternal. Language, in this sense, is not an 
anchor stabilizing social relations; it is a bid for something above and 
beyond social life altogether. To “become a symbol” in this sense is to 
transcend mundane every day existence. One of the best ways of 
achieving such a transformation has always been via that ultimate 
measure of cultural value: victimage. Human beings become symbols 
when they are thought to willingly die for a particular cause. Still, 
transforming a living breathing person into a linguistic sign necessarily 
involves limiting their complexity. This is a reductive process, a 
distillation, a refinement bent on filtering away ambiguity, which can 
only be seen—according to this worldview—as noxious and impure. Of 
course, if linguistic signs are never entirely stable and autonomous, 
human beings—living or dead—certainly can’t be either, so at best this is 
a deeply flawed, if not outright delusional enterprise, hence the need for 








Figure 81—86. Neda Maps 
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Pierre Bourdieu defines “symbolic violence” as the manner in 
which some forms of discourse serve to tacitly perpetuate discrimination 
against particular social groups  (1972, 191). I expand this usage to 
account for the symbolic violence done to individuals, as well. 
Specifically, I call attention to the way that language participates in the 
reduction of a complex human being into monological sign. Symbolic 
violence, in this sense, is often related to real violence.  
A polyvalent analysis of the media texts swirling around Neda’s 
death reveals that many people find it meaningful for many different 
reasons. Does this bring us any closer to understanding her “true 
motives” for being on the street that day? Perhaps not, but it may help us 
expose the ongoing symbolic violence militating against a more complex 
understanding of her identity. This matters because if we are to look past 
the ideological struggles that create division and disharmony, we must 
resist turning human beings into symbols and find way to actually 
empathize with them, to recognize that they are just as multifaceted and 
contradictory as we are. 
Symbolic violence is highly seductive, because it tempts us with 
transcendence, the possibility that—by aligning ourselves with the lives 
of immortal saints or dissociating from purely evil demons—we might 
actually be able to conceive of a realm beyond earthly experience. 
Different “human-symbols” are thought to represent different cultural 
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values (or their contraries). If Neda is the “Angel of Freedom” then 
Ahmadinejad must be the devil.   
Neda, can no longer speak for herself, thus we now feel 
compelled to speak for her. From a rhetorical standpoint, this is one of 
the chief advantages of sacrificial victimage; it entirely silences the very 
person whose deepest commitments it claims to represent. And because 
symbols feel fixed and definitive, they can serve as ideological fulcrums 
they can be utilized in order to leverage social change. Therefore, the 
ongoing attempts to transform Neda into a symbol are not merely 
sentimental gestures, or casual refutations. They are calls to action. Those 
most interested in Neda need her to become a particular sort of idea in 
order to further a particular cause. This why they must diminish her 
complexity, attempting to make of her a captivating, if necessarily two-
dimensional icon.  
 
Figure 87. Pick a Cause 
In Regarding the Pain of Others, Susan Sontag describes the 
many fascinations related to photographic images of suffering. These 
	  	   165	  
include sentimentality, self-absolution, sadism, prurience, sympathy, 
exploitation and morbid fixation (2006). Even when people arrive at 
similar conclusions after viewing the Neda footage, they may find it 
interesting for quite different reasons. One person might want to believe 
Neda is a progressive martyr because he wants Iran to become a liberal 
democracy, while another person might want to believe Neda is a 
progressive martyr so he can justify opening up financial trade routes. 
Cultural niches are collections of individuals employing similar 
media affordances in similar ways, but often for quite different reasons. 
After all, niches are not uniform entities defined by a singular worldview. 
They are complex systems nested within other complex systems and thus 
subject to a diverse and unstable array of internal and external influences. 
They are patterns of influence resonating between the cultural 
environment and the individual.  
In order to share the Neda footage with a friend, I must compose 
an email in which I summarize the subject matter, explain why it is worth 
sharing and why they might be interested. I also need to include a link 
and finally press, “send.” Each one of these acts influences how the 
footage will be received on the other end, and the complexity doesn’t end 
there. My ritual of remediation has become a media affordance. Any 
person who reads my email and views the linked footage is free to 
capitalize on the potentials they offer for the performance of further ritual 
acts. These rites may differ substantially from mine, as the person who 
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received my email will infer new and different meanings from both my 
message and from the Neda footage. Contained within each are an array 
of smaller potential affordances, which may, or may not, align with my 
original intentions. What color are Neda’s eyes? Where are they looking? 
Does she resemble other martyrs? Does she know what’s happening? 
What matters here is perception, not truth. A media affordance becomes 
viable when it can convincingly conjure the meanings we favor most. 
 
Figure 88. Neda Shrine 
Next. 
The chapter to come examines ritual roles. It explores how new mediums 
work to actively cultivate and conform to particular “personal brands,” to 
reframe social contexts and to claim specific types of “ritual authority” so 
they can wield as much cultural influence as possible. 




      ethics of invention  new medium logos ethos 
          Jon & Kate + Ei8ht     cultivating identity  emulation 
    distancing lifestyle politics    media rituals ritual authority 
            enhancement  personal branding  shaman  
     difference  agency role recombinant selves 
 Erving Goffman centering invisibility/visibility symbolic violence 
       Martyr  role mixing role melding   Keith Richard blackout   
James Fry designer logo  role antithesis   dabbling 
          Role alterity    embracement    intent  
 
Figure 89. Role Cloud 
 
Achaikos has brought suit against his stepfather Elpis for 
committing the crime of “hubris.” Elpis, a former slave, has married 
Achaikos’ mother bringing shame upon their family name, a serious 
transgression according to the Athenian legal system. As the jury of two 
hundred citizens listens, Demosthenes, the gifted orator Achaikos has 
hired to represent him, makes his case. He explains that Achaikos is 
clearly superior to Elpis in every way. He speaks of Achaikos’ noble 
birth, his wealth, his power and his civic service. Then explains that 
Elpis’s mother was a prostitute and that his father earned a living though 
servile and dishonorable means. He reveals that Elpis himself was a slave 
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for several years and had no formal education. He portrays Elpis as a 
shameless social climber, who has seduced a naive widow. He demands 
that the marriage be dissolved and that Elpis be found guilty of 
committing an act of shameless effrontery. Elpis is clearly not the equal 
of Achaikos and should be punished for his scurrilous attack on the 
reputation of an important public figure of high birth. 
In his book, Law, Violence, and Community in Classical Athens, 
David Cohen explains that in an agonistic society such as Ancient 
Greece, “a basic principle of honor provides that one does not compete 
with inferiors, one merely despises or disposes of them. Thus, when an 
inferior contends with a superior the appropriate response is indignation” 
(1995, 69). On the other hand, ordinary Athenians might resent the 
arrogance of the powerful ‘hubristai’70 who felt that their power and 
station entitled them to license and privilege (70).71 In a case such as this, 
a skilled orator would appeal to the jury’s “resentment against the rich” 
(97). Witnesses in the Athenian courts were expected to address issues of 
character more often than the empirical facts of the case. Indeed, it was 
understood that they might lie in order to praise one of the litigants, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Another form of “hubris” was committing adultery, a crime for which, 
the punishment was often a form of public sexual humiliation that would 
avenge the damaged honor of the cuckold. A typical punishment involved 
the insertion of a large white radish into the anus of the adulterer (Cohen 
1995, 148). 
 
71 Cohen describes the case of a ruler who flew into a rage when a fellow 
citizen complimented his concubine. He had the man castrated and forced 
him to eat his own testicles, but was later put on trial for this “over-
reaction” (148). 
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this was seen as a way of acknowledging the social status of the litigant 
in question. As Cohen explains, “They speak to tell (and embellish) the 
truth, but to lie without hesitation if they must.” (110). In fact, an 
effective character witness might barely know the litigant he was 
supporting. It was more important that he was ill disposed to the litigant’s 
rival. This meant that he would be willing to lavish the litigant with 
praise, while condemning his opponent. Such testimony may seem less 
than credible by today’s standards, but in an Athenian court, it proved 
that the litigant was well supported in the enmity he felt toward his rival 
(110). 
 
Figure 90. Phryne in Court 
In another well-known trial, the Greek courtesan Phryne stood 
accused of profaning the Eleusinian Mysteries. The trial was going 
poorly, until her orator, Hypereides, tore open her robe, displaying her 
naked body. Highly impressed with her beauty, the members of the jury 
promptly acquitted her. Clearly, Athenian courts viewed the concept of 
“evidence” differently than modern courts. In one of the cases that Cohen 
cites, the orator Isaeus suggests that the court should give more weight to 
circumstantial evidence than eyewitness testimony. The case in question 
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involved a dispute over inheritance, and Isaeus argued that witnesses 
might be compelled to lie, so the court should consider probabilistic 
assumptions more valid than direct testimony that was likely to be 
prejudicial (170). Such practices may sound absurd to modern readers. 
However, in a culture like ancient Greece just emerging from an oral 
tradition and steeped in ritual protocols, “ethos” was often privileged 
over “logos.” Thus in court, an ethical appeal trumped logical 
argumentation. But what type of ethics were these? Why should a former 
slave be punished for striving to be seen as a social equal and a wealthy 
elite punished for thinking himself superior? Where was the single 
universally applicable standard, applying to all people in all contexts? 
And why should the character of the litigants seem more important than 
the facts of the case? 
 With the advent of literacy, the ancient Greeks were able to codify 
laws and create a functioning civic justice system. This helped bring an 
end to some of the feuding and factionalism plaguing their culture. As the 
law grew more formalized, ethical standards became more clearly 
defined. In theory, the Greeks were growing more logical and civilized, 
yet in practice, they were still deeply influenced by rhetorical appeals that 
had little do with rational analysis or empirical observation.72 In fact, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 In many eras throughout history, empirical proofs have been devalued. 
For instance, in the middle ages, monks held that there was a hierarchy of 
truth. At the highest level was scriptural conjecture about the fate of the 
universe. Next came moral truth, then allegorical truth. Finally, at the 
bottom, the least important, was literal truth, which was considered empty 
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David Cohen argues that the Greek courts afforded wealthy elites the 
means to protect their interests and pursue private grudges, dominating, 
attacking and even declaring war on others with state approval. As he 
explains, “Feud is never entirely suppressed, though, it may assume 
different forms” (1995, 19). Therefore in classical antiquity, “the 
increasing development of centralized bureaucratic power induced the 
wealthier members of the elite to abandon blood feuding and compete in 
the political arena” (20). 
Because Institutional authorities (chiefs) are able to mandate what 
counts as “logic,” they tend to favor “logical” appeals.  In contrast, ritual 
authorities (shamans) favor analogical appeals, privileging intuitive 
pattern recognition over deductive analysis. For instance, if a well-
respected family has engaged in consistently valued behaviors over time, 
proving themselves reliable, honorable, and trustworthy, they have an 
established reputation. What’s more, if an individual is dependably 
charming, attractive, sympathetic, or amusing, he need only emphasize 
such behavioral patterns to invoke a particular brand of ritual authority. 
 As mediation practices grow increasingly participatory, and thus 
more ritualistic, the type of ethical pattern recognition that underwrites 
ritual authority is exerting increased cultural influence, hence a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of meaning and irrelevant. Justifying the veneration of divine revelation 
over empirical observation, a fourteenth-century writing manual explains, 
“Whether it is truth of history or fiction doesn't matter, because the 
example is not supplied for its own sake but for its signification” (Kovach 
and Rosenstiel 2007, 37). 
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heightened emphasis on emergent trends, online customer reviews, viral 
marketing, lifestyle politics and positive word of mouth. In such an 
environment, institutional authority is increasingly undermined and 
business as usual is no longer an option. 
This chapter examines the ways in which new mediums invoke 
particular types of ritual authority in order to achieve particular ends. I 
consider the ethical implications of this behavior and discuss such topics 
as “role playing,” “personal branding” and “ritual complexity.” While 
considering how ritual roles both constrain behavior and afford a degree 
of cultural innovation, I draw on the work of sociologists (Durkheim 
1972; Goffman 1997), social movement theorists (Melucci 1996; Tilly 
2004; Chesters & Welsh 2006; Warnke 2007) and media analysts (Mehl 
2005).  
 
Role Playing.  
In the age of the new medium, hegemonic ethics are being 
unsettled by the “ethics of invention,” an emergent trend that privileges 
ritual authority over institutional control. By adopting a particular 
persona, the new medium claims the authority to author experience in a 
particular manner. Speaking for one’s self begins with claiming the “self” 
we intend to speak through…or at least attempting to do so.  
We never speak from a neutral or generic position, so 
mediumship necessarily involves getting in character and channeling a 
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particular identity.73 The medium may choose to portray “a girl scout 
leader,” “a doctor,” or “a rapper.” Each of these personae affords a 
different mode of social empowerment and each requires a different set 
of cultural aptitudes (few people would be convincing as both the girl 
scout leader and the rapper). Although these roles are multivocal, variable 
and interactive, each demands capitulation to specific ritual protocols. 
Thus even if mediums are well suited to the roles they willingly adopt, 
they are never completely in control. At the same time, they may be able 
to improvise within the constraints of their roles thus influencing the 
environment around them including other ritual actors.  
As James Gee explains, adapting to a particular mode of discourse 
is like acquiring an “‘identity kit,’ which comes complete with the 
appropriate costume and instructions on how to act and talk so as to take 
on a particular role that others will recognize” (2001, 1). Being the 
medium involves looking the part and playing by the rules, but also 
exploiting specific modes of identification in the service of a more 
expansive sense of self. Above all, it means grappling with the 
implications of perceived difference. In contrast to neo-liberal politics, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 The forefather of “method acting,” Constantin Stanislavski compared 
memorizing and performing a theatrical role with the relationship between 
grammar and poetry, arguing, “you can speak for your character in your 
own person. This is of utmost importance as you develop your work 
systematically and in detail. Everything that you add from an inner source 
will find its rightful place. Therefore, you should bring yourself to the 
point of taking hold of a new role concretely, as if it were your own life. 
When you sense that real kinship to your part, you will be able to pour 
feelings into your inner creative state, which borders on the subconscious, 
and boldly begin the study of the play and its main theme” (1936, 289). 
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which seek to elide difference in pursuit of social equality, ritual politics 
both emphasize and deemphasize difference in pursuit of a wide range of 
social goals including emancipation, contestation, dominance, 
submission, rejection, subversion, exploitation and revolution. According 
to this view, difference is not inherently empowering or disempowering. 
Too much or too little perceived difference can limit social mobility. One 
needs to strike an effective balance, to be seen as unique, but not too 
unique, partly autonomous, but still part of the community. We need to 
keep up with the Jonses, but we also need to be different than the Jonses. 
Mediation puts us on the map by foregrounding what makes us unique, 
either by enhancing what is immediately apparently, or revealing what is 
not. With considerable effort we might strive to alter our skin color or 
gender. We might don a toupee, wear lifts, affect an English accent and 
go to finishing school, but there is a limit to how much we can 
convincingly alter our perceived selves. Ultimately, we are obliged to 
grapple with the hand that nature has dealt us. Those who do so most 
effectively can be credited with mastering the art of invoking ritual 
authority. 
 
Figure 91. Emulation 
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Emulation involves invoking authority not immediately apparent. 
This means imitating others, adopting behaviors, demeanors, clothing, 
hairstyles, facial expressions, etc. It is an attempt to fit in with a group 
one is not automatically associated with and to stand out from groups one 
is automatically associated with. Ritual performance allows us to enhance 
what is immediately apparent and to conjure what is not. The middle 
class white teenager who rebels against parental authority by listening to 
gangsta rap, the political conservative who dresses in drag, the bored 
housewife obsessed with romance novels are all mediums actively 
constructing alternatives identities for themselves in order to emulate a 
particular type of ritual authority. Because emulation involves 
challenging comfortable preconceptions, it is not always successful. Yet 
by breaking with convention, it can—in some instances—lead to startling 
cultural innovations. 
 
Figure 92. Enhancement 
Enhancement invokes authority by accentuating what is already 
apparent. This means playing up or making over inherent traits including 
physical appearance, talents, knowledge, and skill sets. A judge donning 
his robe, a scientist speaking in carefully measured tones, a homeless 
	  	   176	  
man holding up a sign that draws attention to his pitiable condition, are 
all enhancing immediately apparent ritual roles.  
Sometimes we are oblivious to the ritual roles we are performing, 
but others seldom are. The people we interact with on a daily basis cannot 
directly access our private psychological states, so there is no way they 
can see us as complexly as we see ourselves. Hopefully, our closest 
friends and relations afford us some degree of complexity and attempt to 
empathize with our concerns. Yet even they view us as particular “types” 
of communicators, conveying particular types of messages inflected by 
the sounds of our voices, the contours of our bodies, the memories we are 
able to access and the skills we are able to deploy. If we are unaware of 
how these media affordances are rhetorically encoded, our intentions are 
likely to be profoundly misunderstood. And if we are oblivious to the 
formal and normative requirements of the ritual personae we adopt, we 
are likely to grossly underestimate their influence upon us.  
 Cultivating identities involves capitalizing on various types of 
media affordances, some related to one’s physique or social station and 
some existing primarily in the collective imagination. Throughout our 
lives, we commit to any number of roles, some more slavishly than 
others. Even when a single role threatens to define us once and for all, 
there is always a different mode identity waiting in the wings. Erving 
Goffman explains, “While manifestly participating in one system of 
roles, the individual will have some capacity to hold in abeyance his 
	  	   177	  
involvement in other patterns, thus sustaining one or more dormant roles 
that are enacted on other occasions” (Goffman 1997, 36). But why do we 
choose to adopt some modes of identification and not others? 
 
Personal Branding. 
According to a 2008 study, we are each subjected to 3,000 to 
10,000 brand exposures every day (Dixit & Huston 2008). Logos are 
everywhere, in television commercials, on billboards, bumper stickers, T-
shirts and coffee mugs. Ironically, logos often defy logic. They are 
actually an analogical means of invoking ritual authority. Mediums 
deploy them to conjure meanings that, in many respects, conflict with 
empirical evidence. A poor person sports a designer hat in an attempt to 
look more affluent, an uneducated person wears designer glasses to look 
more intelligent, and a frail man dons a leather jacket to look tougher.  
We may assume that logos cause people to see us in a particular way, but 
logos actually operate via correlation. Logos are patterns of associations 
that we analogically associate with specific modes of identification. This 
can influence how others see us and how we see ourselves. It can also 
influence how we act. 
To test how brand logos influence behavior, researchers set up an 
experiment in which subjects saw either the Apple logo or the IBM logo 
subtly displayed. Test subjects were then asked to describe different uses 
for a common brick. The researchers found that—as long as the subjects 
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valued personal creativity to begin with—those who had seen the Apple 
logo came up with more creative answers. The logo did not impose a 
uniform effect, but if the test subject was someone who prized 
innovation, the “brand halo” of the Apple logo actually enhanced his 
capacity to innovate. By merely being in the presence of the logo, he 
became more creative! 
In another experiment, people were exposed to the logo of either 
Disney or the E! Entertainment network. The study found that those who 
valued honesty and saw the Disney logo answered questions more 
honestly, whereas those who saw the E! logo, answered questions more 
dishonestly. 
Study co-author Gavan Fitzsimons, a professor of psychology at 
Duke University explains, "Every brand comes with a set of associations. 
When we're exposed to logos, those associations fire automatically, 
activating our motivational systems and leading us to behave in ways that 
are consistent with the brand image.” Fitzsimons stresses that these 
responses are not automatic. They must relate to our preexisting values. 
Yet those of us who prize innovation and honesty find that associating 
with the Apple brand or the Disney brand can help to bring out these 
qualities in our own behavior (Dixit & Huston 2008). Thus affiliating 
oneself with a brand logo is not just about conspicuous consumption; it’s 
about cultivating a specific identity and thus invoking a particular type of 
ritual authority.  
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Since the 1980s, designer fashions have become a staple of 
popular culture. Often the designer logo is more valued than the product 
it is attached to, hence the rampant proliferation of designer counterfeits 
made of inferior quality materials. When someone in a poor urban milieu 
affiliates themselves with designer fashions, they are aspiring to be seen a 
certain way, to become a particular type of ritual actor and challenge the 
notion that their social mobility is limited by “performing affluence.” 
Personal branding allows us to either enhance what is apparent or to 
emulate what is not. Such posturing, we hope, will challenge others to see 
us in a manner that allows us to achieve particular social goals, i.e. 
attaining greater acceptance, admiration, wealth, power, or fame.  
 
Figure 93. Personal Branding 
The notion of maintaining a “personal brand” is actually quite 
ancient. It harks back to the idea of a medium cultivating a particular 
ritual role. It might involve adopting a particular hairstyle, sporting 
certain clothes, or body markings, or it might entail developing specific 
talents, acquiring specialized knowledge, or engaging in advantageous 
behaviors. This role, or “brand” is a type of social pattern, existing in 
concert with other complex roles being enacted by other ritualists 
comprising the cultural environment.  
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Ritual Complexity. 
Until recently worldwide visibility was the jealously guarded 
privilege of an elite few. Now it is potentially available to a large 
percentage of our planet’s populous. In the space of a decade, the velvet 
rope separating the visible from the invisible has vanished. With this 
barrier gone, it is easier than ever for a ritual medium to be seen. It is 
easier than ever for her rival mediums to be seen as well. Attracting 
notice in such an environment requires clever innovation and/or 
shameless exhibitionism. Yet try as we might, we can only make 
particular glimpses of our selves visible in particular ways for particular 
audiences. The roles we assume, act as perceptual filters, foreclosing 
other possible modes of identification. 
When we preface a remark by saying, “speaking as a woman,” “a 
man,” “a parent,” “a teacher,” or “a Muslim,” we are not merely stating 
the obvious; we are becoming a particular type of communication device, 
formalizing the message in a manner just as specific as a radio or a 
television signal might. And when we array our bodies with tattoos, 
earrings, designer perfumes, hats and sunglasses, we are addressing the 
world with scripts as explicit and as meaningful as any novel or poem. 
Certainly, we can upload knowledge and upgrade abilities as a computer 
might, but we are not filling an empty hard drive with prefabricated 
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dispositions, we are collaborating with an existing ecology in a particular 
way. 
If a white liberal inhabits a cultural ecology that privileges 
whiteness, she cannot stop being white, and she cannot pretend that she 
does not benefit from white privilege. On the other hand, in a black 
activist subculture actively critiquing the oppressive practices of white 
culture, the same person will, in some respects, lack perceived authority, 
as she can only argue from a historically privileged subject position and 
cannot claim direct knowledge of the type of discrimination experienced 
by her black colleagues. The ecological perspective allows us to consider 
the tension between the multiple cultural milieus we simultaneously 
inhabit in relation to the particular roles we are able to enact, i.e. the 
white liberal existing in the white dominated society and the black 
activist subculture at the same instant.  
While most ritual practices merely perpetuate the status quo, ritual 
does have the potential to affect significant cultural change. As Holland 
et al argue, “People’s lives take shape among the identifications, figured 
and relational, that are arranged within the space of their activity … 
These social forms, these discourses and practices, are not simply the 
context but the content of inner life, albeit in some way transformed. The 
interpersonal becomes the intrapersonal in a literal way; the forms of 
speaking and interacting inhabit us to make ‘inner’ speech and ‘inner’ 
action. They are the mediating devices of our thinking, feeling, and 
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willing” (1998, 235). In the politics of everyday life, ritual roles exert 
significant influence, and as public and private ecologies continue to 
shade into one another, ritual authority becomes an increasingly viable 
means of orchestrating large-scale social change. In the current 
mediascape, bids for authority that were once viewed as unconventional 
and even unethical are increasing becoming moral universes unto 
themselves with their own modes of empowerment and obligation, their 




One of the best ways of discerning the type of ritual authority a 
person is attempting to invoke involves examining the type of culture 
they are working to create. Certain types of ritualists strive to create 
certain types of cultural contexts. At the same time, certain cultural 
contexts promote certain types of ritual behavior. What we believe is, to 
some extent, influenced by how we are believable. We are invested in 
seeing the world in a way that allows the world to see us in an especially 
empowered light. Attractive people may or may not flirt with authority 
figures in an attempt to achieve social mobility, and authority figures may 
or may not be swayed by such flattering. But this mode of empowerment 
is only available to a select group of people. Those who can potentially 
invoke this type of authority may resist doing so, choosing to earn their 
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advancement according to traditional institutional requirements, yet the 
potential remains, and some may, on occasion, choose to capitalize on it.  
The waitress serving cocktails at the high society ball may know 
more about opera and fine art than the hostess who hired her, but in this 
context, such “cultural capital” may have less cache than the hostess’ 
flawless skin and flirtatious charm. Such markers of distinction may seem 
superficial, but their cultural resonance runs deep, as they afford certain 
modes of empowerment and rigidly constrain others, allowing ambitious 
ritualists a degree of upward mobility, while undermining their credibility 
in other respects.  
Mediums have a gift for reciprocity. They are adept at “playing to 
the crowd” and “working the room.” Yet this skill can also leave them 
open to charges of pandering and self-serving manipulation. The ability 
to effectively embody a socially sanctioned role invests a medium with a 
particular type of authority, but it also limits his or her ability to 
effectively maneuver in social contexts less sensitive to her favored mode 
or authority. Mediumship, therefore, involves cultivating identities, while 
being cultivated by identities and creating contexts while being created by 
contexts.    
 
Recombinant Selves.  
Splicing together genetic material produces recombinant DNA. In 
a similar sense, recombining familiar cultural behaviors creates a ritual 
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role. A ritual role is a type of fractal pattern comprised of both 
determined and emergent features, familiar scripts embellished with 
spontaneous improvisations, thus exhibiting both persisting and variant 
features in each of its multiple iterations. 
Because society is always in flux, roles must be in flux as well. It 
is misleading to speak of timeless archetypes and the immutable laws of 
“human nature.” On the other hand, some patterns of behavior are 
incredible durable, taking on different inflections in each new historic 
context while maintaining a degree of cogency over time, a pattern that 
can be traced and studied. 
When we view the self-immolating behaviors of a reality TV star, 
we are not witnessing an exact replication of primitive scapegoating rites. 
Much has changed, but some things have carried over, and as long as 
some of the central dynamics remain recognizable, the comparison is 
worth drawing. Because ritual roles are permeable patterns, rather than 
fixed structures, they are always inflected by the local and historic 
particulars of the circumstances that have occasioned their recurrence. 
Nonetheless, they are at least partly familiar, and modes of identification 
that resonate deeply within the cultural memory of likeminded ritualists 
carry real social force.  
The politics of representation is also a politics of identification. 
This is what the materialist perspective leaves out. We go to work to 
acquire wealth, but we produce and consume media to make sense of our 
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constantly evolving selves in relation to our constantly evolving historic 
circumstances. This process of continual reevaluation would be 
unnecessary if human nature was an accomplished thing, handed down 
unchanged throughout the ages. Fortunately, this is not the case. Life is 
never entirely predictable, and media rituals are meaningful precisely 
because they are both familiar and strange. They act as a bridge between 
the world as it has always been and the world as it is rapidly becoming. 
This simultaneous sense of consistency and variance is what makes them 
so compelling and so culturally productive. 
 
Figure 94. Keith Richards 
 In his autobiography, Life (2010), Rolling Stones guitarist Keith 
Richards muses on the “rebel” persona that has attached itself to him and 
that he has, in turn, exploited and modeled in various ways, during his 
fifty plus years as a public figure. This description provides a sense of the 
reciprocal “dance” between individual intent and cultural expectation that 
constitutes the ritual role. He says: 
 
I can’t untie the threads of how much I played up to the part 
that was written for me. I mean the skull ring and the broken 
tooth and the kohl. Is it half and half? I think in a way your 
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persona, your image, as it used to be known, is like a ball 
and chain. People think I’m still a goddamn junkie. It’s 30 
years since I gave up the dope! Image is like a long shadow. 
Even when the sun goes down, you can see it … There	  is	  something	  inside	  me	  that	  just	  wants	  to	  excite	  that	  thing	  in	  other	  people,	  because	  I	  know	  it’s	  there	  in	  everybody.	  There’s	  a	  demon	  in	  me,	  and	  there’s	  a	  demon	  in	  everybody	  else.	  I	  get	  a	  uniquely	  ridiculous	  response—the	  skulls	  flow	  in	  by	  the	  truckload,	  sent	  by	  well-­‐wishers.	  People	  love	  that	  image.	  They	  imagined	  me.	  They	  made	  me.	  The	  folks	  out	  there	  created	  this	  folk	  hero.	  Bless	  their	  hearts.	  And	  I’ll	  do	  the	  best	  I	  can	  to	  fulfill	  their	  needs	  (364-­‐5). 
 
The items that Richards lists—the skull ring, the broken tooth and 
the kohl—are all media affordances that resonate with the larger cultural 
field. His band, the Rolling Stones, were early proponents of the idea that 
there is no such thing as bad press, but there is also no such thing as a 
purely rebellious, self-determined identity. Richards has long cultivated a 
menacing, rough and tumble, counterculture image. The long hair, the 
drugs, the slurred speech, the cigarettes, the loud music, all challenge 
cultural norms, but Richards is also defined by media affordances that 
resonate with more typical markers of cultural distinction. His whiteness 
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and his Englishness are an equally important part of his ritual persona, 
enhancing its salience by affirming the same normative expectations his 
other mode of identification appear to flout. Thus, while few white 
American teens related to the black bluesmen that Richards modeled his 




The 1973 PBS series An American Family was the prototype for 
the countless reality shows to follow. It was publicized as a “slice of life” 
examination of the Loud family of Santa Barbara, California, an 
unblinking look at the day-to-day existence of a more or less typical, 
middle class, American clan. The program proved controversial, 
however, when twenty two year old Lance Loud was shown rejecting the 
heteronormative lifestyle of his parents and siblings, becoming one of the 
first openly gay “characters” on television.   
 
Figure 95. The Loud Family: 1973 
While Lance was certainly a stand out, the climax of the series 
occurred when matriarch Pat Loud confronted her husband, Bill, about 
the latest in a string of marital infidelities and, while the camera’s rolled, 
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asked him for a divorce. This first instance of a marriage breaking up on 
camera foreshadowed a future trend that infotainment reporters would 
eventually come to label, “the reality TV curse.” In time, other purported 
victims would include: Danny and Gretchen Bonaduce, Hulk and Linda 
Hogan, Travis and Moakler Barker, David Navarro and Carmen Electra, 
Nick Lachey and Jessica Simpson, Bobby Brown and Whitney Houston, 
Britney Spears and Kevin Federline, and Jon and Kate Gosselin. All of 
this domestic fallout begs the question is there something inherently 
corrosive about video taping the day-to-day challenges of married life?  
In her autobiography, “Pat Loud: A Woman’s Story,” Pat Loud 
sheds some light on the matter: “We were living a story that had to be 
told, and the story was building to a climax. It was just as Craig [producer 
Craig Gilbert] had said: The truths that were lurking under the surface 
were now ready to explode into view.” She continues, “I just knew that 
now there was a stronger force pushing me to end the whole miserable 
mess than there had ever been before” (1974, 113).  
 When we adopt a ritual role we are no longer just one person. We 
assume a persona tied into a mode of collective identification defined by 
the cultural requirements of that subject position. Submitting to such an 
identity means seeing ones self as a particular type of social actor 
engaged in a particular type of performance. Pat Loud writes: “After 
you’ve played the same old marriage game for as long as we had, with 
both of you hitting the same foul balls and stealing the same old bases, 
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your tolerance for the same performance dwindles down to nothing.” She 
adds, “I was so tired of goading and being goaded back, it was as though 
my whole being had been reduced to suspicion and hurting self-hatred 
and weary forced participation in this lousy play that should have closed 
long ago” (112). 
While Pat repeatedly describes herself as “too old for women’s 
lib,” (118),74 she was clearly aware of the burgeoning feminist movement 
and her newfound role as a public representative of her gender. For 
twenty years, “Pat the housewife” had resisted confronting her husband 
about his infidelities, but “Pat the public figure,” the heroine of “a 
Woman’s Story,” felt a growing obligation to a larger sense of identity. 
She adds, “Couldn’t it be that since circumstances and fate had put me in 
a position to rip away the curtain of hypocrisy, that maybe, just maybe, 
we could help other families face their own problems more honestly?” 
(119). Thus, despite numerous misgivings, Pat—along with producer 
Craig Gilbert—arranged to confront Bill Loud on camera. She says, 
“there was the usual flurry over doing this scene” [my italics]. And 
admits, “I thought it was ratty.” But then adds, “If I had decided to 
divorce during the filming, I must be honest enough to do it openly and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 In An American Family: A Televised Life, Jeffrey Ruoff argues that 
while Pat Loud never overtly identifies as a feminist, her “character” in 
the documentary “was widely used as a foil to discuss general issues 
related to the woman’s movement” (2002, 127). In fact, “during the 
promotional tour, she claimed to speak for the anonymous American wife 
and mother: ‘Every housewife I know has a story they are dying to tell but 
never do’” (123). 
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Not all ritualists are willing or able to meet the requirements of a 
specific role. Some grow too timid. Others lose interest. Still others 
attempt to cheat the audience, feigning commitment, but secretly cutting 
corners. When they are caught doing this, they stand accused of a “role 
violation.” 
For instance, everyone has what it takes to become a ritual 
scapegoat, yet few people are willing to pay the price. The scapegoat 
needs no special talent, no beauty, charm, intelligence, or wit. In some 
respects, he is better off without them. This is because he is obliged to 
portray the shameful part of ourselves that is most unworthy, yet most 
desirous of acclaim. For this, he is made to suffer. The scapegoat 
confirms the value of our most noble traits by embodying their antithesis 
and being punished for it. This is the source of his ritual authority. If he 
wishes to be rewarded with money and media visibility, he needs to 
become the abject. If he fails to do so convincingly, his credibility will be 
undermined, inviting even greater moral indignation and public rebuke. 
For instance, in 2006, the Smoking Gun website reported that 
author James Fry’s confessional bestseller A Million Little Pieces 
contained fabricated plot points. This triggered a media backlash, 
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culminating in Fry being publicly excoriated by Oprah Winfrey who had 
initially endorsed the book and helped to make it a popular success. 
Media pundits who seized on the story either condemned or defended 
Fry’s actions, but generally failed to consider what cultural forces may 
have influenced them. Oddly enough, the best selling author was guilty of 
fabricating lies in order to appear less law abiding and well adjusted than 
he actually was. He stood accused of being covertly respectable! 
 
Figure 96. James Fry and Oprah Winfrey 
Robert Merton’s theory of “social anomie” suggests that capitalist 
societies place unrealistic emphasis on achieving fame and fortune. 
Initially, social actors strive to grasp the brass ring via legitimate means, 
but because society provides extremely limited opportunities for social 
mobility, this usually fails. As a result, they turn to illegitimate means, 
cheating and stealing to get ahead. This breakdown of social norms 
derives from Emile Durkheim’s concept of “anomie” (1972), the notion 
that inadequate means result in anti-social ends. The Fry case is 
intriguing because anomie was not merely an effect of social striving; it 
was an affordance, that is, an actual means of attaining media visibility. 
By performing anomie, Fry made himself worthy of media visibility. In 
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fact, if we allow that he was doing more than reacting to norms imposed 
by cultural discourses, we may detect a degree of strategic thought.  
In an era in which tell-all memoirs become best sellers, 
fabricating shameful deeds to confess makes good business sense. 
Publicizing a work that details such “secrets” amounts to an extended act 
of public contrition, but for an aspiring novelist, the potential payback is 
significant.75 As Dominque Mehl explains, in a confessional culture, the 
act of witnessing trauma upstages the old emphasis on “expert testimony” 
(2005, 78-80). Audiences increasingly privilege first hand descriptions or 
even direct depictions (as with reality TV) of traumatic events to the 
dispassionate analysis of supposedly impartial institutional authorities. 
This celebration of trauma for its own sake tends to conjure both 
monsters and victims, those who inflict abuse and those who are willing 
to describe how abuse has been inflicted on them. No one escapes this 
process unscathed, as the monsters necessarily become victims 
themselves when they are subjected to public scorn and must endure the 
scapegoating process. 
Cultures have always required ritual scapegoats, figures who 
affirm the validity of our beliefs by paying a price for flouting them. 
James Fry offered himself up as such a figure and was both punished and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 The confessional act can function as a form of self-exoneration. Erving 
Goffman explains, “Apologies represent a splitting of the self into a 
blameworthy part and a part that stands back and sympathizes with the 
blame giving, and, by implication, is worthy of being brought back into 
the fold” (1997, 122). 
	  	   193	  
richly rewarded in return. The story behind his falsified story is not 
merely a tale of imposed cultural norms, it is also an example of how an 
ambitious individual can set aside scruples and attain social 
empowerment by placing himself at odds with normative structures in a 
particularly intriguing way.   
When today’s’ tabloid stars aren’t shattering into “a million little 
pieces,” they are busy pulling themselves back together. The resulting up 
and down rollercoaster ride has less to do with submitting to any 
dominant set of cultural norms than with meeting the requirements of a 
specific ritual role. In an increasingly ritualized media environment, the 
ability to fall apart on cue in public is highly valued. Thus, the “reliably 
unreliable” are richly rewarded for their high profile transgressions.  
The fallout from the Fry scandal is particularly telling in this 
regard. We see that Oprah Winfrey, a popular purveyor of trauma culture, 
took the author to task. She harshly criticized him—not for engaging in 
the criminal behavior depicted in the book—but for failing to meet the 
requirements of his chosen role. He had doctored his resume, writing the 
type of confessional, tell-all memoir that the Oprah Winfrey Show was 
known to eagerly endorse without actually having all of his scapegoat 
credentials in order. He was guilty of the ethical lapse of being too ethical 
(at least by traditional standards). Adding irony to irony, the scandal was 
precisely the type of high profile disgrace that finally allowed Fry to 
claim the status of a true tabloid star, one whose most shameful secret 
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(not having enough shameful secrets) had been revealed for all the world 
to see. After Oprah lambasted him, A Million Little Pieces attracted even 
more readers. It has since been published in twenty-nine languages and 
has sold over 5 million copies.  
 By allowing himself to be publically chastised, James Fry 
eventually fulfilled his scapegoat role and redeemed himself in the eyes 
of his fellow ritualists. Yet the fact that he originally attempted to 
capitalize on the benefits of penning a confessional memoir by 
exaggerating scandalous details of his personal life suggests some 
interesting things about both his personal ethos and the enticements that 
confessional culture dangles before innovators willing to trade shame for 
fame (or at least, high profile infamy). 
 Scapegoats are not the only figures occasionally guilty of role 
violation. Ritualists who claim to be heroic are especially susceptible. 
Those who trade on their physical attractiveness also tread a tenuous 
tightrope (one that slackens with each passing year). And those ritualists 
celebrated for their wit and intelligence can only command attention as 
long as they can offer plenty of laughter and insights. In fact, the ways in 
which ritual mediums fail to meet specific requirements often says more 
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Role Types. 
There are countless ritual roles. In this section, I touch on a few. 
All of these roles can be inflected and intermingled in countless ways. 
 
Figure 97. Comic Type 
Authority: ability to challenge hypocrisy and corruption. 
Appeal: opportunity to unsettle the status quo and get laughs. 
Context: most effective when subverting “serious” discussion. 
Requirement: must be humorous and insightful. 
Violation: cannot be predictable, dull or serious. 
 
Figure 98. Genial Type 
Authority: able to command respect and loyalty. 
Appeal: winning the approval of others, belonging. 
Context: most effective when overcoming mutual mistrust. 
Requirement: easy-going, approachable, down to earth demeanor. 
Violation: appearing haughty, egotistical or aloof. 
 
Figure 99. Sophisticated Type 
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Authority: ability to influence how others look and behave. 
Appeal: chance to be style leader, trendsetter. 
Context: most effective when transcending the crass and banal. 
Requirement: strong fashion sense, elegance, poise.  
Violation: appearing unkempt or unpolished in any way. 
 
Figure 100. Radical Type 
Authority: rejection of dominant norms. 
Appeal: opportunity to dramatically change culture. 
Context: most effective when rebelling against injustice. 
Requirement: total commitment to a revolutionary cause. 
Violation: placing personal ambition before the greater good. 
 
Figure 101. Assertive Type 
Authority: the persuasive force of raw conviction. 
Appeal: the appearance of self-determination. 
Context: most effective when combating chaos. 
Requirement: unilateral decision-making, strong-arm tactics. 
Violation: appearing indecisive. 
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Figure 102. Analytic Type 
Authority: compelling analysis of complex issues. 
Appeal: ability to soberly evaluate emotionally charged topics. 
Context: most effective when challenging dogma and myopia. 
Requirement: intelligence, research and thoughtful analysis 
Violation: careless speculation or emotionalism. 
 
Figure 103. Empathic Type 
 Authority: association with other person or group. 
Appeal: vicarious sense of achievement.  
Context: most effective when combating indifference. 
Requirement: absolute devotion to ritual target. 
Violation: apathy, dissociation. 
 
Figure 104. Pathetic Type 
Authority: eliciting the sympathy of supporters. 
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Appeal: means of avoiding greater consequences.  
Context: most effective when submitting to climate of shame. 
Requirement: publically pleading for forgiveness or understanding. 
Violation: appearing merely self-serving or manipulative. 
 
Embracement, Centering, Dabbling & Distancing. 
Mediums engage with different roles in different ways for 
different reasons. Because we exist in multiple cultural contexts 
simultaneously, we are largely defined by the identities we chose to 
embrace, centralize, dabble in or disown, but no one role can sum up the 
totality of who we are. What’s more, roles often attach themselves to us 
whether we like it or not. We cannot always successfully cultivate, shed 
or modify particular modes of identification. Yet despite such challenges, 
we do have a degree of choice regarding how others perceive us and how 
we generally perceive our selves.  
 
Figure 105. Role Embracement 
Ervin Goffman explains, “To embrace the role is to be embraced 
by it” (1997, 36). Role embracement involves committing wholly to a 
particular persona. This type of ritual engagement creates a tight 
feedback loop between individual and environment with little room for 
improvisation. It occurs when a role attaches itself to us, and we willingly 
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accept it. There are many advantages to such a maneuver. Allowing 
others to see us as they want to means confirming the validity of familiar 
cultural norms. When we do this, we are able to avail ourselves of modes 
of empowerment readily available to people who conform to a familiar 
social “type.”  
Role embracement is less about the roles we pick than the roles 
that pick us. When a young man who is 6’5” agrees to try out for the 
basketball team, he is embracing a role that others want him to fulfill. In 
so doing, he is earning the approval of friends and teammates. Embracing 
this type of role is like swimming with the tide. It can feel effortless and 
perhaps a bit too easy. A petite woman may find she can readily persuade 
others by being sweet and nonthreatening, whereas she may have greater 
difficulty commanding authority by being firm and decisive.   
The downside of embracement is that it can rigidly constrain 
one’s ability to innovate. By definition, it disallows deviation from the 
established norm. So the ritualist becomes more of a tactician than an 
innovator, navigating well-worn paths, rather than blazing new trails. 
Role embracement is about playing to our perceived strengths, rather than 
branching out and taking on new challenges. It seduces us with easy 
empowerment. By calling attention to his physical strength, a 
hypermasculine male may intimidate others who then submit to his will. 
By playing up her looks, a hyperfeminine woman may receive special 
treatment. Yet these roles often constrain as much as they empower, 
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limiting our ability to be seen or to see ourselves in more than 
stereotypical ways. Describing the uncritical role embracement 
characteristic of many housewives in the 1950s, Betty Freidan writes, 
“There was a strange discrepancy between the reality of our lives as 
women and the image to which we were trying to conform, the image that 
I came to call the feminine mystique” (1963, 50).  
Because the roles one is most impelled to embrace are related to 
what is immediately apparent—sex, race, age, weight, height, skin color, 
hair color, etc.—role embracement encourages us to “live on the 
surface,” that is, to define ourselves primarily in terms of what is visible 
to the outside world. When the medium consents to this bargain, her 
source of ritual authority becomes largely external and often superficial. 
Rather than struggling to cultivate talents that are not immediately 
apparent, role embracers cut corners and fall back on the overly familiar. 
They celebrate biological “givens” as a source of “pride,” but their 
primary modes of empowerment are more inherited than achieved. 
Gaining easy approval by meeting obvious expectations, they limit their 
capacity to be seen in other ways.  
By locating ritual authority in what is immediately apparent, role 
embracement may delude the medium into believing she has 
accomplished more she actually has. Often this mode of “empowerment” 
is ephemeral. It atrophies over time as external markers of prestige lose 
their power to persuade. When this occurs, the role embracer may find 
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she is clinging to an outmoded form of identification with little inherent 
substance. The body builder who gains a few extra pounds may appear to 
lose all credibility. And the supermodel that turns fifty may be surprised 
to find people are less interested in what she has to say.  
 
Figures 106. Role Centering 
Role centering is distinct from role embracement as it involves 
actively singling out a particular mode of identification and privileging it 
above all others. At best, it is a form of consciousness-raising, a chance to 
achieve solidarity, to rally around a particular cause. If a medium belongs 
to a group that has been singled out for discrimination, he or she may 
consciously choose to foreground the identity related to that niche as a 
means of resistance. In such instances, the role in question may come to 
eclipse all other modes of identification. This type of radical break with 
convention is a necessary step in any move toward social emancipation. It 
is also the most effective means challenging institutional hierarchies. 
Powerful modes of collective identification can actively subvert 
oppressive politics and expose exploitative practices.  
On the other hand, role centering may involve clinging to 
convention, attempting to capitalize on an ability to exploit modes of 
ritual authority that neatly align with traditional norms. In such instances, 
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difference is also emphasized, but in a manner that plays into hegemonic 
schemes rather than opposing them. Those who seek this mode of social 
empowerment are prone to self-stereotype by exaggerating normative 
roles. Muscle-bound hypermasculine males, and silicon-enhanced 
hyperfeminine females fall into this category. When such roles become 
grossly exaggerated, normative centering takes on an ironic “anti-
normative” status, and these figures join those who have chosen to 
centralized non-normative roles in the margins of mainstream culture. 
Whether role centering involves challenging or embracing 
convention, it is always a bid for some form of acceptance, as well as a 
rejection of some type of perceived difference. Those centering dominant 
modes of identification must “perform self-determination” to prove that 
they have not been brainwashed by the system. And those centering 
unconventional modes of identification must “perform authenticity” to 
legitimate their inclusion into an embattled collective presenting a united 
front against injustice.  
As a short-term strategy, role centering is often highly effective. 
In some instances, it may even trump institutional authority. It 
foregrounds difference with such vehemence, it is hard to dismiss. In the 
case of a person rejecting a social stigma, it can call attention to 
entrenched inequity. In the case of someone embracing convention, it 
might mean working the system to get ahead. 
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Deploying a role-centering tactic in a particular context in pursuit 
of a particular end need not limit one’s ability to identify in other ways in 
other contexts. Yet because role centering is such an effective strategy, it 
may tempt a medium to privilege one mode of identification in all social 
contexts. Role-centering as an all-inclusive way of life, as opposed to a 
short-term strategy, takes on a pathological dimension. If we are to 
identify as the same type of person at all times, we must flee complexity 
(the source of cultural innovation), denying any characteristics that don’t 
align with our chosen role and viewing alternate perspectives as entirely 
illegitimate. This sort of ideological trap frames all arguments according 
to a particular conceptual divide. In political science, this is known as 
“boundary activation.” As Charles Tilly explains, it involves “making 
one of several previously existing divisions among social locations so 
salient that it suppresses other divisions and organizes most political 
interaction around (and across) that division alone” (2004 xi).  
Boundary activation occurs in social movements around the 
world. It emerges in divisions related to race, gender, language, national 
origin, business and labor. When we strive to identify primarily in one 
way, we assume others view us just as narrowly, and a polarizing 
worldview emerges. Such “us/them” thinking can promote progress but it 
can also lead to violent conflict. Because human beings are inherently 
complex, “centered identities” can be easily undermined. Just one 
exception disproves the rule. Thus, other forms of difference must be 
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guarded against. The very commitments that render a centered role 
distinct often render ritualists intolerant of other forms of diversity. Role-
centering subjects tend to obsess over what does and does not count as 
legitimate behavior within their favored ecology. A centered role requires 
far more maintenance than a more loosely aggregated constellation of 
identities. When confronted by exceptions to preconceived rules, the role-
centering ritualist may struggle to square his ideological perceptions with 
observed reality.  
Black activist Malcolm X describes how some of his entrenched 
views were challenged when he encountered Moslems of many different 
ethnicities on a pilgrimage to Mecca: “My pilgrimage broadened my 
scope. It blessed me with a new insight. In two weeks in the Holy Land, I 
saw what I had never seen in thirty-nine years here in America. I saw all 
races, all colors—blue-eyed blonds to black-skinned Africans—in true 
brotherhood! In unity! Living as one!” He adds, “In the past, yes, I have 
made sweeping indictments of all white people. I never will be guilty of 
that again—as I know now that some white people are sincere, that some 
truly are capable of being brotherly toward a black man” (1965, 369). Yet 
within a few paragraphs, X reverts to the polarizing rhetoric characteristic 
of role centering: “The white man can’t separate himself from the stigma 
that he automatically feels about anyone, no matter who, who is not his 
color. And the non-white peoples of the world are sick of the 
condescending white man!” (370).  
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Role-centering ritualists necessarily gravitate toward polarizing 
black and white arguments. This charges their words with unflinching 
conviction, but because human beings are naturally complex and 
inconsistent, such figures are prone to ideological lapses. The role-
centering ritualist strives to embody a singular self-image, hoping to 
remain ideologically pure, this necessarily entails stigmatizing and 
caricaturizing opposing groups. If one’s own group is seen as 
fundamentally positive, then the opposing group must be viewed as 
fundamentally negative. Thus, one sign of role centering is a tendency to 
claim legitimacy for one’s own group while negatively stereotyping those 
with opposing perspectives. Ironically, this can lead to a form of “self-
stereotyping.” By denying complexity to those we disagree with, we 
necessarily narrow and restrict our own worldview and self-image. If 
they are entirely evil, then we must be entirely good. Yet empathy 
demands complexity, so foregrounding a single mode of identification 
can invite others to either uncritically champion or reflexively condemn a 
particular ritual “type” without gleaning any real understanding of the 
person behind it.  
When a role-centering ritualist fixates on a particular mode of 
identification, he may assume that others do as well. Thus, role centering 
may influence him to locate the source of any disagreement in the role 
being enacted. If someone challenges him, he may reflexively conclude 
that they are being intolerant of his dominant mode of identification. This 
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self-protective move creates ideological blind spots that frame even small 
personality disputes as elements of a larger socio-political struggle. 
Because the dominant social norms of contemporary societies too 
often perpetuate racist, sexist, classist and homophobic oppression, we 
must not naively accept that life is a level playing field and that all groups 
have similar social advantages and disadvantages. However, as Stuart 
Hall points out when describing what he calls “politics without 
guarantees,” there is a danger to uncritically valorizing any group 
(1997).76  
The concept of hegemony acknowledges that oppressed groups 
are complicit in their own oppression, yet the nature of this complicity is 
generally left untheorized. To avoid “blaming the victim for the crime,” 
activist discourses often divide oppressed groups into heroes (who 
challenge oppression) and victims (who fall prey to it). This leads to an 
uncritical valorization of minority voices, leading Alberto Melucci to ask, 
“Are contemporary movements capable of bringing about social and 
political change or are they simply reducing collective action to 
expressive and ‘narcissistic’ celebration of the particularism of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Hall states, “In order to fight a politics, which is effective in ending the 
oppression of black people, you have to ask what is the right politics to do. 
You can’t depend on the fact that it’s blacks doing it; that this will 
guarantee in heaven that you’re doing the right thing. So I want blacks to 
enter into what I think they’ve been reserved in doing … having 
arguments with their own fellows, men and women who are black, about 
it. And that’s a difficult thing because in a way you have to mobilize 
effectively, you can’t depend on just the race to take you to your political 
objective.” (5). 
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identities?” (1996, 185). Discrimination traps the oppressed in an iron 
cage of negative stereotyping, whereas identity politics traps the 
oppressed in a golden cage of uncritical valorization. Because there are 
many of these cages and they are competing for the same resources and 
the attention of the same “general public,” only the most deserving 
parties, those who have been subjected to the most egregious injustices, 
can hope to merit increased social empowerment. Ironically, this often 
means accentuating marginalization, exaggerating difference and, most 
unfortunately, transforming complex identities into fixed “types.” 
Chesters and Welsh make a distinction between “identity 
politics,” which they find problematic, and “collective identity,” which 
they consider a more constructive means of vying for increased social 
justice, stating: “For the purposes of clarity, we define ‘identity politics’ 
as the pursuit of political recognition for aspects of the social cultural 
specificity arising from his or her particularist identity based upon 
gender, sexuality, ethnicity, disability, age and so on.” On the other hand, 
“Collective identity is the process of constructing an action system. This 
identity is neither static nor fixed, but remains continuously in motion, 
requiring active identity-work even where it crystallizes into semi-
permanent institutional forms” (2006, 131-2).77 The “identity-work” that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Breaking with the identity politics tradition, Georgia Warnke strives to 
envision a theoretical scheme in which racial difference is acknowledged 
yet not automatically centralized. “These conditions of understanding 
require the same recognition of the limits of our understandings of one 
another in racial terms. We must acknowledge the conditions of their 
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Chesters and Welsh are describing involves acts of ongoing mediation 
between the ritualist and various cultural ecologies. As they explain, the 
concept of collective identity, “presumes the self-reflexive capacity of 
social actors to recognize themselves and the field of opportunities and 
constraints (environment) in which they are situated” (132).  
 
Figure 107. Role Dabbling 
The role dabbler is a dilettante who capitalizes on one mode of 
identification while acquiring the advantages of another. This type of 
ritualist is particularly susceptible to “false mastery,” the misguided 
belief that she has perfected talents or skills she has little understanding 
of. A role dabbler such as the reality TV star Paris Hilton trades on 
secondary modes of authority. She has done some acting, has recorded 
songs and appeared in music videos, but she is primarily famous for 
being famous. In general, she trades on a well-known name, wealthy 
relations, physical beauty and self-exposure—while making little attempt 
to cultivate any discernable talent. For this reason, she attracts both the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
possibility in a particular history; we must take them to be no less partial 
and no more fundamental accounts of who people are than accounts of 
people as Red Sox fans or siblings, and we must allow for numerous other 
possibilities of identity and identification” (2007, 119). While I share 
Warnke’s contention that different cultural contexts merit different modes 
of identification, I caution that in a high stakes context such as a job 
interview, a person’s racial status is likely to be more significant than their 
favorite sports team.  
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contempt and fascination of many ritualists, who express disdain for her 
lack of mastery and apparent narcissism and desire for her wealth, fame 
and sex appeal. 
 
Figure 108. Role Distancing 
 The term “role distancing” comes from Ervin Goffman, who 
defines it as “skittish behavior” that is “intentional or unintentional, 
sincere or affected.” It constitutes “a wedge between the individual and 
his role” (1997, 37). Whereas role centering involves shamelessly 
embracing a role, role distancing involves shamefully eschewing one. 
The role distancer fears looking like a phony, a sell out, or a manipulator. 
At the same time, he seeks the advantages of a particular role. This 
creates a sense of inner-tension. 
Early in his career, John Lennon eagerly embraced the role of pop 
star. Later, he attempted to distance himself from the appearance of 
pandering to fans, while at the same time, continuing to court fame. As 
Lennon became a political activist, he engaged in a different form of role 
distancing. Extremists often target advocates of peace and tolerance, so 
he may have sensed the danger of assuming this mode of identification. 
Unsuccessfully attempting to distance himself from this role, he made the 
following statements in his last interview: “What am I supposed to be, 
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some kind of martyr that’s not supposed to be rich? ... These critics with 
the illusions they’ve created about artist’s—it’s like idol worship … 
What they want is dead heroes, like Sid Vicious and James Dean. I’m not 
interested in being a dead fucking hero…So forget ‘em, forget ‘em.” 
(Cott 2010, 96).78 Ironically, a few days after this interview, Lennon was 
shot to death by a mentally disturbed fan. 
Role distancing is not available to all people on equal terms. 
When members of a dominant social group distance themselves from a 
normative role, they are often viewed as innovators, but when members 
of an oppressed group distance themselves from a normative role, they 
risk being seen as sell outs, attempting to conform to the standards of the 
dominant group. In general, it is less problematic for a member of a 
subordinate group to centralize their oppressed identity than to 
deemphasize it. This, unfortunately, limits their ability to be seen 
complexly. Role distancers are interested in self-invention and wish to 
convey true mastery of talents and skills that they have consciously 
cultivated. Yet role distancing itself can become yet another ritual role 
with its own set of requirements, allurements and modes of 
empowerment. For instance, the role distancer is obliged to be somewhat 
taciturn and remote, in particular, when he is engaged in activities that 
afford him the advantages of the role he is apparently rejecting. He 
cannot appear too eager to please, too quick to laugh, or too interested in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 “The way things are going, they’re gonna crucify me.” - The Ballad of 
John and Yoko. 
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courting the favor of others. He must seem cool and detached especially 
when this aloof demeanor is belied by his willing submission to self-
serving rites.  
 
Mixing, Melding, Antithesis & Alterity. 
Erving Goffman allows that ritualists have the capacity to 
manipulate aspects of identity, creating different types of hybrid roles. He 
states, “The image that emerges of the individual is that of a juggler and 
synthesizer, an accommodator and appeaser, who fulfils one function 
while he is apparently engaging in another” (1997, 40). In this section, I 
examine the ways that ritual roles can be combined, synthesized, 
juxtaposed and subverted. 
       
Figures 109 & 110. Role Mixing 
 Role mixing involves deliberately confounding expectations by 
embracing two or more seemingly conflicting roles. This move invites 
both controversy and fascination as it unsettles familiar modes of 
identification. It may be viewed as a cheat—a way of “having it both 
ways,” submitting to an exploitive practice, while insisting on inherent 
complexity. On the other hand, it may be considered an emancipatory 
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gesture—a way of breaking with convention and creating new spaces for 
social empowerment.  
 Often role mixers play familiar roles against one another as a 
means of both challenging and exploiting entrenched dichotomies. By 
intermingling the sacred and the profane, they simultaneously titillate and 
offend. This creates a particularly compelling, if volatile form or ritual 
authority.  
In 2009, adult film actress Sasha Grey made a bid of mainstream 
stardom portraying a call girl in Oscar winner Stephen Soderberg’s The 
Girlfriend Experience.  While promoting the project, she spoke to 
Michael Mooney of the Palm Beach New Times. In an article in which 
Grey references obscure philosophers and sex researcher Dr. Alfred 
Kinsey she, in many respects belies the image of a traditional sex worker. 
At one point she states, “I'm a feminist because I believe in sexually 
empowering women” (5/11/09). This unconventional bit of role mixing 
elicited some extremely polarized responses from online readers. One 
anonymous reaction states: “I believe that her making sexual choices in 
her private life would be empowering, however making them on camera 
only feeds into the self perpetuating system of objectification.” An 
opposing perspective from another anonymous source reads, “For me, as 
a young woman, Sasha Grey truly is an empowering female figure. She's 
not the only one, of course, I admire plenty of other women that are 
slightly more excepted [sic] in our society, but seriously, how many 
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women really are thought highly of in our society? Free your minds and 
express yourselves. SLUT POWER!!” 
Almost any ritual role can be sexualized in a manner that invites 
fascination.79 This is the most common form of role mixing. For woman, 
the virgin/whore dichotomy is chiefly exploited. Feminine “fetish roles” 
mix heightened sexuality with socially sanctioned propriety, inviting 
fantasies related to institutional authority (the sexy doctor, dominatrix, or 
cop) or ritual authority (the sexy soccer mom, school girl, or nun).  
In terms of masculine sexuality, role mixing often involves a 
conflation of the traditional macho/gay dichotomy. Longhaired and 
otherwise feminized male rock stars play up gender ambiguity in a 
manner that many fans—female and male—find captivating.  
Role mixing involves more than sexuality, however. A person 
might combine traditional and counter-cultural tropes to interesting 
effect. They might strive to juxtapose characteristics of two or more 
ethnic cultures, academic disciplines, political parties, fashion eras, sub-
cultures, age groups or ideologies. Role mixing is about more than 
creating exotic hybrids. At its most subversive, it is about leveraging 
hegemony against counter-hegemony to impel cultural change, and 
because it is often highly corrosive to cultural norms, it can be deeply 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Sex can sell anything, but some types of roll mixing are an easier sell 
than others. For instance, comedy subverts traditional power relations, so 
its perceived influence is somewhat unpredictable. A sense of humor is 
certainly charming, but a comedic appearance tends to undercut libidinal 
appeal. Thus, the “sexy clown” costume may never be a Halloween staple.  
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upsetting to non-mixers. It may even invert norms, first stripping an 
emergent phenomenon of its stigma and then sanctifying it. 
The most successful role mixers learn to surf the zeitgeist, pairing 
a determined norm with a newly emergent trend. For instance, in the 
1950s, some mainstream white radio stations discovered that their 
listeners enjoyed music recorded by black artists. As this trend gained 
momentum, Sun Records signed several white artists adept at singing 
black music, launching the careers of Elvis Presley, Jerry Lee Lewis and 
Carl Perkins. The determined norm of whiteness with the emergent 
popularity of black music proved an irresistible combination for white 
music lovers around the world. Incipient fears of “race mixing” related to 
this “role mixing” only fueled interest in the nascent trend. As with all 
countercultural phenomena, the unleashed taboo (black music) was partly 
sanctified via association with the accepted norm (whiteness) and a 
fascinating cultural hybrid was born. 
Often cultural innovators are mediums that discover successful 
ways to, at least ostensibly, sanctify emergent trends. Thus exhibitionism 
becomes emancipation, trauma becomes “reality” and murder becomes 
martyrdom. All are granted the imprimatur of culturally valid enterprises, 
deserving our attention and possibly, our emulation.  
            
Figures 111 & 112. Role Melding 
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 Ritualist aspiring to be all things to all people, or perhaps seeking 
to permanently distance themselves from a role they find overly 
constraining or shameful, may engage in role melding. This is what 
happens when roles blur together and become deeply ambiguous. 
Whereas the role mixer delights in playing up contrasts, the role melder 
strives to seamlessly synthesize competing modes of identification, or to 
escape one role by melding into another.  Male and female, black and 




Figures 113—115. Role Antithesis 
Ritual authority is sometimes thought to be “above the law,” but it 
is always constrained by ethical entailments. Even self-described 
“criminals” and “anarchists” are obliged to obey certain codes of conduct 
if they wish to convincingly maintain their ritual roles. There is no such 
thing a pure “non-conformity.” In fact, what is commonly referred to as 
“nonconformity,” is generally “anti-conformity,” deliberately antithetical 
behavior. The word “nonconformity” implies a degree of choice. A 
nonconformist may or may not choose to conform. In contrast, an anti-
conformist or antithetical ritualists is obliged to reject mainstream culture 
in a narrowly constrained and carefully proscribed manner. In fact, the 
“uniforms of anti-conformity” are often far more constraining than 
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ordinary attire. In generally, fitting in with mainstream culture requires 
little effort, yet existing “outside the norm” has become a daunting 
challenge. 
In the 1950s, people could become outsiders by merely combing 
their hair in a particular way. But since that time, the notion of being an 
“outsider” has taken on an increasingly romantic luster. Meanwhile, 
countless forms of rebellion have been co-opted by mainstream cultural. 
Thus, ritual innovators must now go to great lengths to break with 
cultural convention, permanently altering their bodies and wearing 
clothing and hairstyles that are often extremely difficult to maintain.  
In general, entering the outside involves getting past gatekeepers 
who must be convinced that one’s appearance or behavior is 
conventionally unconventional (no clown shoes and rubber noses, 
please). Each era rigidly polices what counts as “legitimate 
nonconformity,” that is, what is outside the norm in a manner that is 
suitably “in.” In the nineteen twenties, short skirts, bobbed hair and jazz 
music were “in.” In the 1960s, long hair, incense and love beads were 
“in,” and at the start of the new millennium, eyeliner, androgyny and 
dyed black hair are “in.” 
Maintaining outsider status is an ongoing challenge. As tattoos 
and piercings grow increasingly prevalent, one must acquire more tattoos 
and more piercings to stand out from the crowd. Far from being an escape 
from convention, cultivating a “counterculture” persona is a highly 
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demanding business, requiring concerted effort and a scrupulous tracking 
of the latest trends. Truly committing to an antithetic role often means 
making “lifestyle choices” that radically limit ones opportunities for 
social mobility. Businesses willing to hire people with facial tattoos are 
also cultivating outsider status. Thus by limiting social options, certain 
“looks” constrain ritualists to habitats that necessarily resonate with 
values antithetical to mainstream culture. Because the antithetical ritualist 
cannot migrate outside of these antithetical ecologies, he is able to remain 
ideologically “pure.” 
          
Figure 116 & 117. Role Alterity 
While antithesis boldly challenges dominant norms, alterity slyly 
subverts them. Alternative ritualists embrace many qualities of 
mainstream culture, yet also represent forms of ritual authority that 
appear to naturally oppose hegemony. Often the most compelling forms 
of role alterity operate on multiple levels at once. Thus, in a culture 
dominated by white, masculine, heteronormative norms, a ritualist whose 
identity is an alternative in two respects is “doubly oppressed,” but also 
apparently uncompromised in two obvious ways. Audiences cleaving to 
traditional values will tend to stigmatize such figures, yet audiences 
seeking cultural alternatives will be drawn to them. For those in the 
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former category, their alterity will represent a source of attraction, a sign 
of progress and a source of credibility.  
For instance, in many respects Oprah Winfrey and Ellen 
DeGeneres conform to comfortable middle class norms, but they are also 
women leaders in a patriarchal culture. Also, Winfrey is a powerful black 
woman in a society dominated by white values, and Ellen is a powerful 
lesbian in a society dominated by heteronormative values. Thus Oprah 
and Ellen are “double threats” to the status quo and, in the eyes of many, 
doubly heroic for achieving the cultural status they have. 
 
Locating Intent. 
The impact of institutional authority is often immediately 
apparent. A law is passed, a border is closed, a jail sentence is handed 
down. But the impact of ritual authority is much more difficult to 
quantify. Often the influence of a ritual act is not immediately apparent. 
The most unconventional rites tend to exert small-scale influence at first, 
or perhaps none at all, at least initially. Yet because rituals are now 
recordable and repeatable verbatim, that influence may spread overtime 
and eventually become quite significant. It may build and mutate taking 
on surprising and unexpected forms simultaneously in multiple locales 
along parallel but staggered timelines. Praxist theory seeks to track these 
branching permutations, tracing them back to their points of origin and 
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locating at least some of the guiding intentions of the ritualists who set 
them into motion. 
Is a YouTube clip featuring footage of the 9/11 attacks a 
memoriam or a call to jihad? We cannot even begin to decide until we 
consider who posted it and with what aim. The intended meaning is not 
necessarily the meaning that others perceive, but it matters to the 
medium, so it matters to the culture that the medium is a part of. 
Inevitably, much of the medium’s intent will be lost in translation, but not 
all of it. Otherwise, there can be no basis for social cooperation. Human 
beings are both persuasive and persuadable. This is how culture is created 
and sustained. If we are to move from an analysis of interpretation to an 
analysis of practice, we must shift focus from the site of interpretation to 
the site of mediation, from decoding signs to becoming mediums. We 
must allow that intent matters. 
Ritual mediums sense that issues of intent are important, so they 
often take steps to clarify their aims. When posting images and videos 
online, they usually add textual explanations to provide context. The form 
of expression, the content, the style of performance, are all clues as to the 
mode of identification the medium is aiming for. An individual may not 
possess the self-awareness to accurately express her most significant 
motives, or she may deliberately mask them. Nonetheless, the purported 
aims of the ritual medium are always worthy of careful consideration. 
They are where any search for intent must begin. 
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Fictional narratives provide insights into identity by exploring 
how specific characters behave under pressure. In a similar sense, 
praxism is an examination of how mediums attempt to leverage particular 
identities in order to achieve particular ends. It focuses on dramatic 
choices, moments when the medium apparently meets or resists the 
requirements of a familiar role. These moments provide a glimpse at the 
figure behind the performance and provide productive comparisons and 
contrasts between her and other ritualists in other cultural contexts. 
Cultural logic is not causal logic. It has more to do with pattern 
recognition than deductive proofs. Intent cannot be proven, but it may be 
convincingly suggested. Locating intent is about alignment and 
nonalignment with a particular role, considering how far the medium will 
or will not go in order to achieve a specific end.  
A deconstructive analysis reveals what a text downplays or 
occludes. It assumes that what is left unsaid is more revealing than what 
is overtly stated. In contrast, praxism places equal emphasis on the 
chosen mediation practice (ritual role) and the revealing ellipses where 
the media either fails or refuses to meet specific requirements. Rather 
than an excavation of suppressed meaning, it is an intuitive recognition of 
action and inaction, viewing both as highly significant. 
In short, praxism emphasizes the importance of the ritual mask as 
well as the flashes of daylight that appear between it and the ritual 
medium. These revealing ellipses may not be the exact contours of any 
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coherent singular self. Nonetheless, they are telling glimpses of the 
tenuous negotiations between the individual and the cultural 
environment. During these moments of slippage, the medium may 
migrate from one role to another, or mix or meld roles as well. Taking 
stock of these instances, as well as moments when the mask and the 
medium appear to perfectly align is not rhetorical analysis in the classic 
sense. It is more like cataloguing rhetorical failures and successes in an 
attempt to discern between avowed and actual intent, while striving to 
glimpse the complex medium partly obscured and partly revealed by the 
ritual mask. 
 
Figure 118. Mask 
Next. 
The subsequent chapter defines the term “media affordance” as a 
type of potential ritual practice. In contrast to “media effects,” which are 
supposedly imposed on relatively passive audience members, media 
affordances are opportunities to engage with the cultural environment in 
various appealing ways. 
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Figure 119. Affordance Cloud 
 
Plato was the first media scholar. Not only was he wary of written 
composition (ironically, he was a prolific author), he also took issue with 
its sister discipline, theatrical production. The latter modified ritual in a 
number of ways, creating “the theatrical stage” (a demystified ritual 
space), “the text” (codified ritual), “the author” (a literate shaman) and 
“the actor” (a faux scapegoat). It also introduced an entirely new concept: 
“the audience.” There are no spectators in ritual, only participants. It is 
designed to be a communal experience, so one cannot witness it from a 
detached perspective. In contrast, the advent of the audience encouraged 
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the general public to remain passively receptive. Thus, for the first time, 
it became possible to speak of “media effects.” The effects model served 
to promote the notion of the artistic genius, working in isolation, cut off 
from society, issuing proclamations from on high that would impose 
influence on the impressionable masses. This perspective was perfectly 
plausible as long as the production chain remained distended far enough 
that no large scale, real time interaction could occur and a clear, 
unidirectional sequence of “media effects” seemed apparent (Jeffres 
1997). 
Plato wrote of  “mimetic effects,” warning that some audience 
members were likely to imitate the actions of actors on stage (1956, 
394C-396B). His student, Aristotle, would later counter that the theater, 
and tragedy in particular, had a “cathartic effect,” purging audience 
members of negative emotions by allowing them to break with any sense 
of vicarious identification at the moment of the tragic hero’s downfall 
(1996, 4.1). This dispute inaugurated the “effects debate” which has been 
central to media studies ever since. 
 
Figure 120. Plato and Aristotle 
While the mimetic and cathartic arguments attribute opposing 
effects to media texts and technologies, they have at least this much in 
common: they both deprive the audience of agency. Such overly causal 
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schemes tend to genericise humanity, rendering all audience members 
more or less interchangeable and equally passive. In contrast to ritual 
action, in which all participants consciously or unconsciously adopt a 
particular role to achieve a particular end, the advent of the audience was 
accompanied by an utterly dehumanizing view of humanity. 80 The 
masses were demoted from ritual actors to human billiard balls buffeted 
about by the intentions of an all-powerful author, imposing effects by 
deploying various theatrical mechanisms. Plato did suggest that the poor 
and uneducated were more susceptible to mimetic effects (1956), 
retaining a measure of volition for the upper classes, but he made no 
attempt to individuate members of the common herd. According to these 
early, unsubtle effects-arguments, the media exert the same basic type of 
influence on all audience members in all possible contexts. This tends to 
homogenize people, turning them into purely reactive beings and draining 
them of intent. In order to suggest that the media can impose predictable 
effects, such theories locate it “out there,” entirely external to human 
beings. The “media” becomes a text or technology rather than a social 
practice.  
This stimulus-response dynamic implies an antagonistic 
relationship between media products and their audience. The scholar who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Psychologist Albert Bandura draws attention to the dehumanizing 
assumptions underlining such a media effects perspective: “When the 
environment is regarded as an autonomous rather than an influenceable 
determinant of behavior, valuation of dignifying human qualities and 
accomplishments is diminished” (1977, 206-7). 
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theorizes in terms of media effects is the proverbial man with the hammer 
who sees the whole world as a nail. The arguments he wields describe 
how media texts and technologies hammer home specific behaviors and 
mindsets. For this reason, most contemporary media scholars reject the 
idea that any one-to-one correspondence between media consumption and 
media effects can be proved (see Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955). The monkey-
see-monkey-do logic of Plato’s argument is too simplistic. And 
Aristotle’s notion of catharsis is too general. There is no reliable evidence 
that audience members automatically emulate media texts or reflexively 
experience a sense of catharsis when viewing the climax of a tragedy. 
Human beings are complex and do not respond to psychological stimuli 
in predictable ways. Certainly, the media production and social life are 
mutually influential, but this relationship is dynamic. One phenomenon 
does not strictly determine the other. For instance, globalization has been 
influenced by a variety of factors including the Internet, air travel, trade 
agreements, and ideological interventions. One might assume that the 
long crumbling cornerstone of media studies—the outdated media effects 
model—would finally collapse under the weight of all of this 
mushrooming complexity, yet it hasn’t…at least, not entirely. Amid all 
the recent talk of “multi-modality,” “complex adaptive systems,” 
“parallel processing,” “networked multiplicity” and “emergent 
behaviors,” the old deterministic schemes have managed to retain a firm 
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grasp on the popular imagination and even some realms of critical 
discourse. 
These days, Plato’s mimetic argument has taken on a political 
cast, splitting into two polarized perspectives. In one camp, conservative 
pundits speak of the mimetic effects of transgressive media and how they 
trigger criminal behavior (Bennett 2003). 81 In the other camp, liberal 
pundits speak of the mimetic effects of media promoting mindless 
consumerism and conformity by “manufacturing consent” (Chomsky 
2002).82 
Aristotle’s notion of catharsis also continues to thrive, serving as 
the chief defense of media producers who say works that focus on the 
acquisition of wealth and fame offer harmless escapism and their more 
violent creations provide audience members with a healthy sense of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 In The Broken Hearth: Reversing the Moral Collapse of the American 
Family, William Bennett writes: “I would hardly go so far as to draw a 
direct, monocausal connection between what the mass media put out and 
the crack-up of any individual marriage or relationship, anymore than a 
violence-filled movie (or television program or video game) by itself 
causes a viewer to arm himself and go out and kill. But the cumulative 
effect of these things—in connection with others—can and does make 
difference.” He then states, “What is being promoted is an ethic that is 
inimical to marriage and family life. And that ethic is advanced not simply 
by the leftist denizens of Beverly Hills but by Madison Avenue corporate 
executives, many of whom undoubtedly vote Republican and lament the 
reprehensible state of our culture” (1996, 34-35). 
 
82 Noam Chomsky states, “The process of creating and entrenching highly 
selective, reshaped or completely fabricated memories of the past is what 
we call ‘indoctrination’ or ‘propaganda’ when it is conducted by official 
enemies, and ‘education,’ ‘moral instruction’ or ‘character building,’ when 
we do it ourselves. It is a valuable mechanism of control, since it 
effectively blocks any understanding of what is happening in the world” 
(1987, 124). 
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release from day-to-day tensions. For instance an online advertisement 
for the series of violent video games Grand Theft Auto states, “These 
games provide largely harmless, escapist fun … A game like this can 
provide a genuine release and offer challenging gameplay that's 
genuinely absorbing.” 
This chapter breaks with totalizing media effects arguments by 
defining the media affordance as a cultural practice one may or may not 
choose to willingly engage in. The “medium” in this sense is not 
something we construct, or something that constructs us. It is something 
we actively become. A ritual medium in this sense must possess the 
appropriate attunements to be drawn to a particular affordance and must 
also possess the appropriate aptitudes to be able to enact it successfully. 
Given these conditions, any person who meets the formal requirements of 
a particular affordance can deploy such practices to influence culture. In 
an attempt to thoroughly explicate this concept, I draw on the work of 
media scholars (Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955; Kellner 2005; Giroux 2006), 
psychologists (Bandura 1971; Vygotsky 1978; Gibson 1979; McArthur & 
Baron 1983; Reed 1988), cognitive anthropologists and philosophers 
(Shore 1996; Strauss & Quinn 1998; Kaufmann & Clément 2007; 
Chemero 2009) and political scientists (Chwe 2001; Pape 2005; Hafez 
2007; Sageman 2008). 
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Affordances. 
Invoking ecological metaphors is certainly one way of resisting 
reductive deterministic schemes, but unless theorists take great care, such 
complex explanatory models may confuse as well as illuminate. They 
may even promote more deterministic thinking as some theorists reject 
their opacity in favor of the false clarity of reductionism. Because of this 
we need to take a closer look at this conceptual tool. 
 
Figure 121. James J. Gibson 
James Gibson’s defining work The Ecological Approach to Visual 
Perception was published in 1979, the year of his death. He was sixty-
five at the time and had spent his entire career defining and redefining 
theories of human perception. Gibson wanted psychology to reflect how 
we actually encounter the environment and how the environment relates 
to us. In an attempt to achieve this aim, he invented a theoretical school, 
which he called, “ecological psychology.” 
 
It is a new approach to the whole field of psychology, for it 
involves rejecting the stimulus-response formula. This 
notion, borrowed from the so-called hard science of 
physiology, helped to get rid of the doctrine of the soul in 
psychology, but it never really worked. Neither mentalism 
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on the one hand nor conditioned response behaviorism on 
the other is good enough. What psychology needs is the 
kind of thinking that is beginning to be attempted in what is 
loosely called systems theory (Gibson 1979, 2).  
 
In the first pages of his final work, Gibson states that most 
theories of visual perception are flawed because they posit a completely 
immobile subject, staring straight ahead and, therefore, largely oblivious 
to his surroundings (1). This has little to do with how we actually 
encounter the world. Gibson insists that visual perception is “ambient” 
and “ambulatory” (1). We perceive the visual contents of the 
environment, but also co-perceive our selves in relation to the 
environment. This occurs as we move around and acquire a sense of our 
bodies in relation to our surroundings. “The awareness of the world and 
the awareness of the self in the world seem to be concurrent. Both event 
motion in the world and locomotion of the self can be given by vision, 
the former by a local change in the perspective structure and the latter by 
a global change of the perspective structure of the ambient optic array” 
(187). Edward S. Reed elaborates, “Every observer has not simply a point 
of view, but a path of view. These paths overlap and intersect. 
Individuals’ paths of view are continuously changing, but the set of all 
possible paths of view is extremely persistent” (1988, 286-87).  
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This approach constitutes a significant break with most theories of 
perception, which tend to favor purely logical cause and effect schemes at 
the expense of the analogical mind. For instance, the classical theory of 
perception espoused by the ancient Greeks has the environment imposing 
sensory stimuli on the eye, whereas Descartes asserts that space is not 
seen but imagined by an autonomous self that imposes its preconceptions 
on the world (149). Both of these views create a dualism between the 
observer and the environment that presents significant theoretical 
lacunae. As long as the environment is thought to impose perception 
directly onto the observer or visa versa, there is no way of addressing 
how an observer might evaluate the characteristics of his surroundings, 
take stock of his own abilities and desires in relation to them and act 
appropriately. Deterministic schemes also provide little basis for the 
possibility of coordinated action between individuals (287-89).  
Noting that such theories tend to view visual perception from the 
perspective of a detached, third person spectator who sees the individual 
perceiver and the environment as two distinct and dichotomous 
phenomena, Gibson proposes a radical shift of perspective. He does away 
with this God’s eye vantage and locates his view of perception in the spot 
where it actually occurs—at the exact intersection of the external 
environment and the internal world of the individual. According to this 
transactionist perspective, perception is two things at once: the 
subjectivity an individual observer with specific aptitudes and desires, 
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and the objective features of an environment offering specific benefits 
and drawbacks to all organisms capable of perceiving them. In other 
words, perception is a relationship between the subjectivity of the 
individual and the objective features of the environment. It is not merely 
something that happens to us. It is something that we do. What we 
perceive is what we go looking for, what we actively pick up on. Two 
people moving about the same party may notice very different things 
because they are receptive to different types of perceptions. Likewise 
different people navigating video games levels or surfing the Internet are 
liable to pick up on different visual or aural sensations.  
This does not mean that we have unlimited freewill. Our range of 
motion is constrained by the environment, and even if we elect to do a bit 
of off-roading, we are only varying our path within the established 
topography. In order to describe the interface between the individual and 
the environment, Gibson coined a new word: 
 
The affordances of the environment are what it offers the 
animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. 
The verb to afford is found in the dictionary, but the noun 
affordance is not. I have made it up. I mean by it something 
that refers to both the environment and the animal in a way 
that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity 
of the animal and the environment (1979, 127).  
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Gibson positioned himself in opposition to two deterministic 
schemes: behaviorism, which had the environment imposing perceptual 
stimuli on the individual, and Cartesian mentalism, which had the 
individual imposing concepts on the environment. He wanted to focus 
solely on the relationship between the animal and the ecology, so he 
avoided addressing how human beings go about mediating mental 
perceptions in order to create culture. Gibson does consider two types of 
“mediums” both related to perceptual experience. First, there are physical 
mediums such air and water that serve to support organisms and separate 
the surfaces of the environment (16-19). Secondly, there are mediated 
perceptions, also known as “indirect affordances” such as photographs 
and strips of film (294-95).83 Because Gibson is focused strictly on 
sensory perception, he scrupulously avoids discussing the possible 
symbolic significance of mediated objects and merely describes them in 
terms of how they indirectly convey visual information. Thus in Gibson’s 
conception, a photograph is merely a text that can afford us an indirect 
view, via reproduction, of an object initially observed directly by the 
photographer. Because Gibson disregards conceptual thought, he does not 
address what mediated affordances offer in the way of possible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 In regards to indirect affordances, Gibson expresses a dismissive 
attitude toward media analysis. He writes, “Present-day discussions of the 
‘media of communication’ seem to me glib and superficial. I suspect that 
there are many kinds merging into one another, of great complexity” 
(1979 258). Gibson, a staunch anti-determinist, was, most likely, referring 
to longstanding debates regarding media effects. 
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instruction, education and indoctrination. This theoretical ellipsis is why 
the concept of affordances should not be imported into cultural studies 
without substantial modification. 
 
Gibson 2.0. 
Subsequent theorists have modified Gibson’s theory in all sorts of 
interesting ways. Donald Norman discusses the perceived “affordances” 
of design objects. In his parlance, something has “good affordances” if 
we can easily discern how it is meant to function, i.e. a door with a 
clearly graspable handle. Because this usage has become quite popular, 
the word “affordance” is often associated with physical objects. But this 
is needlessly restrictive. Scholars have also associated the term with all 
sorts of social and cultural phenomena, theorizing affordances related to 
physical attractiveness (Anderson 2009), anecdotes of recovering 
alcoholics (Cole 1996), the behavior of flocking pigeons (Klein 2003) 
and even images in bawdy engravings (Kaufmann and Celément 2007). 
Leo Van Lier explains: “In recent years, many proposals have 
been made to extend the notion of affordances in different directions: 
cultural affordances, social affordances, cognitive affordances, and so on. 
Such affordances are indirect, or mediated, whereas the original type of 
affordance in visual perception as researched by Gibson is direct” (2004, 
105). Ecological linguists such as Van Lier apply the concept of 
affordances to culture, society and best of all, mediated texts! But 
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something is still missing. Since they are primarily interested in 
accounting for learned behavior and specifically, how language is 
acquired, they want to know how ideas get from the environment into 
texts and then into our heads. Their object of study, therefore, is an 
existing text that affords learning. For them, the text is the medium. 
Unlike Gibson’s conception, this type of “pre-mediated affordance” is a 
repository of both indirect perceptions and conceptual knowledge. In 
addition to informing the senses, it can also afford advanced cognition. It 
is primarily a conveyer of cultural meaning. The meaning in question is 
certainly open to interpretation, but the text itself is a closed system. 
Unlike new media discourses, it is not a living ecology.84 While this is a 
productive approach for cognitive scientists interested in issues of 
language acquisition, it is theoretically mute about why ongoing media 
discourses are created, maintained and contested in specific ways. 
Therefore, it does little to address the primary research interests of media 
studies. 
In recent years, Martin Oliver has argued that the term 
“affordance” has drifted so far from its original usage and has become so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 The ecological perspective has become entangled in two ongoing 
debates. The first involves hard-core “Gibsonians” and mainstream 
cognitive psychologists. Philippe Rochat explains: “Gibsonians are 
essentially interested in the tight coupling between perception and action 
that allows animals to move and do things adaptively in the environment. 
Cognitive psychologists, on the other hand, are interested in modeling the 
reconstructive process of the mind as it engages in memorizing, thinking, 
or solving problems.”   
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mired in confusion it is no longer a viable theoretical concept (2005, 
402). A less dismissive view of Gibson’s legacy is expressed by Anthony 
Chemero, who acknowledges the difficulty and even obscurity of some of 
Gibson’s ideas, but nonetheless, finds the affordance concept highly 
suggestive for theorizing interaction between individual and the 
environment (2009). In the age of interactive technology, such a dialogic 
perspective has obvious benefits, yet because we are accustomed to 
viewing the media as either products or modes of production, so-called 
“media affordances” are generally defined in terms of one of two 
materialist conceptions: the “media affordance as text” camp or the 
“media affordance as technology” camp. While these views are certainly 
adequate for discussing how information is acquired, conveyed and 
manipulated, when it comes to theorizing how culture actually comes into 
being, they fall short.  
In order to bridge the gap between ecological theory and media 
studies we need to identify a different type of affordance, one that does 
more than pass along information, one that participates in the active 
production of cultural meaning. While searching for such a concept, I 
encountered related quotes from two different fields—the first, from 
psychologist James Gibson. 
 
Although it is true that no two individuals can be at the 
same place at the same time, any individual can stand in the 
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same place at different times. Insofar as the habitat has a 
persisting substantial layout, therefore, all its inhabitants 
have an equal opportunity to explore it. In this sense the 
environment surrounds all observers in the same way that it 
surrounds a single observer (1979, 43).  
 
The second quote comes from Political Scientist Michael Suk-
Young Chwe, who describes the communal nature of cultural production. 
 
Because only so many people can stand in one place; 
common knowledge is extended because each onlooker 
knows that others in the path of progress have seen or will 
see the same thing” (2001, 20.) 
 
Whereas Gibson is describing the persisting features—or 
affordances—of a physical environment, Chwe is referring to a different 
type of affordance, “common knowledge,” a shared set of beliefs that 
allows human beings to form coherent communities. Individuals with 
different temperaments, different backgrounds and different “paths of 
view” are bound to interpret observed phenomena in different ways. 
However, the capacity for cultivating some measure of “common 
knowledge” is the foundation that culture is predicated upon.  
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When we are behind the steering wheel, we assume the drivers 
around us are aware of our position relative to them. We see their 
vehicles as obstacles, avoid crashing into them and assume that they will 
maneuver around us in a similar manner. Without possessing this type of 
common knowledge, we would never risk driving in a car. We would 
consider it far too dangerous.  
Now, let’s say we arrive at a stop sign. It is not an obstacle. We 
could easily race past it, but we don’t. This is because the sign is another 
piece of common knowledge, a bit of the map that has been drawn onto 
the territory. It is there to signify two things. 1. We must stop and look 
both ways before proceeding. 2. Others will do the same (provided they 
are paying attention.) 
 
Figure 122. Common Knowledge 
But how did the stop sign appear in the first place? It was 
produced via cultural mediation, a rite conducted by people interested in 
determining certain formal ‘rules of the road.’ For these rules to be 
effective, everyone had to agree what a red sign with the word “STOP” 
on it meant. It was not enough that we were all aware of the stop sign; we 
all had to understand what it was meant to represent. Chwe explains, 
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“Common knowledge depends not only on me knowing that you receive 
a message but also on the existence of a shared symbolic system which 
allows me to know how you understand it” (7). Chwe’s insistence on the 
significance of common knowledge and shared symbolic vocabularies 
allows us to adopt a different type of ecological perspective. 
 
Media Affordances.  
Media affordances are potential “media practices.” The “praxist” 
perspective reminds us that while texts and technologies are things, 
media affordances are ways of interacting with our surroundings, 
including—but not limited to—social interactions, performed behaviors, 
narrative strategies, physical appearances, technological manipulations, 
stylistic flourishes, and normative protocols. When a particular schema 
appeals to an individual, it becomes an “affordance,” that is, a mode of 
behavior that affords a particular benefit, while requiring specific actions.  
In the language of cognitive anthropology, a collection of cultural 
schema performing a complex function is known as a “cultural model” 
(see Shore 1996). I argue that when an individual deploys a cultural 
model in relation to a media discourse, it becomes a “ritual role.” Media 
affordances, therefore, are the cultural codes that serve to comprise a 
particular type of ritual personae. 
Unlike the textual affordances described by linguists, media 
affordances are bits of common knowledge that afford the generation of 
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more common knowledge. Direct sensory perceptions—such as the 
events recorded by news cameras and reality show crews—can be 
directly mediated. And pre-mediated affordances such as books, films 
and theatrical scripts can be remediated to create new cultural artifacts. 
According to this perspective, the medium is no longer a bloodless 
disembodied text; it is a person who has been afforded an opportunity to 
act in relation to the environment.85 In the age of the prosumer, this 
seems an appropriate way of conceptualizing the interactive and 
participatory nature of new media, how we engage with it and what it 
requires in turn.86  
Chiefly, we find such media affordances meaningful for two 
reasons. 1. They appear to relate to our concerns. 2. They promise to 
accomplish things. Thus, affordances are not the opposite of effects. They 
are effects understood by analogy. Or to put things another way, they 
represent a menu of cause and effect dynamics that we can choose from. 
Of course, we must first find them meaningful and possess the abilities 
necessary to capitalize upon them. Affordances not only allow us to 
capitalize on particular effects; they also allow us to ascribe effects to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Holland et al. speak of “symbolic bootstrapping,” an idea inspired by 
Lev Vygotsky’s notion of “mediating devices.” They argue that certain 
forms of semiotic mediation operate as “tools of agency,” allowing us to 
modify our environments and our behavior (1998, 38).  
 
86 As Bolter and Grusin point out, “A principal cultural attraction of digital 
visual media is that they place point of view under the user’s control” 
(1999, 243). “Although the programmer is not visible in the interface, the 
user as a subject is constantly present, clicking on buttons, choosing menu 
items, and dragging icons to windows” (1999, 33). 
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things that have already occurred. They are opportunities for us to say, 
“This causes that,” which is the essence of storytelling. Media 
affordances are stories we tell ourselves, and others, about how the world 
is supposed to function. 
 Grasping this view means recognizing that even the most abstract 
conceptual notions can, in some sense, be directly perceived, as they exist 
as part of a shared conceptual space that members of a particular 
community are all welcome to access, maintain, modify and challenge. 
Certainly individual perceivers have a storehouse of different memories 
relating to these perceived concepts, but the concepts themselves are not 
locked away in some insular psychic vault. They are potentially available 
to all who encounter them. Again, different people are liable to interpret 
observed phenomena in different ways. Still, common knowledge exists. 
Otherwise, simply driving across town would be impossible.  
The advantage of this perspective is that it retains Gibson’s 
insistence that cognition is predicated on instances of direct perception 
rather than purely abstract conceptual thought. At the same time, it frees 
us to consider the ways in which conceptual schemas can be plucked 
from the environment and manipulated to serve the needs of the 
perceiver. Any observed concept or percept might afford an act of 
mediation. Viewing media in this manner marks a decisive break with the 
tradition of defining culture as somehow separate and distinct from social 
interaction. In fact, the term “social media” begins to sound like a bit of a 
	  	   241	  
redundancy. According to this view, the media is inherently social; a 
point increasingly underscored by the advent of new media practices.  
A ritual role is a dance between the individual and the 
environment, and each step in that dance is “media affordance,” an 
“affording dance” both permitting and requiring certain forms of 
mediation. Because Media affordances are potential practices rather than 
things, they are possibilities for engagement, means of accomplishing 
particular ends. They are the raw materials of mediation, the key relations 
that allow individuals to express agency. Moreover, they are not confined 
to one ecological level. Language, for instance, exists in bodies as well as 
books. We are not merely influenced by linguistic signs; we are linguistic 
signs. We are also technologies, performances, narratives and ideologies. 
Thus media affordances are located everywhere. They may be features of 
the natural environment, characteristics of a particular culture, or 
subculture, or they may reside within the medium herself. They do not 
impose influence in any unilinear way. Instead, they resonate back and 




Because affordances are relationships between the individual and 
the environment, they afford particular types of behavior. A standard 
affordance—such as the design of a ladder—affords a standard 
	  	   242	  
behavior—such as climbing. A media affordance—such as writing a 
blog, photographing a friend, or appearing a reality TV show—affords an 
act of mediation, a type of ritual practice.  
To understand exactly what a ladder affords, we observe another 
person in the environment. We watch how he engages with the ladder, 
placing a hand on a high rung, a foot on a low rung, pulling himself up, 
then placing a different hand on a higher rung and a different foot on a 
higher rung. This is “behavior modeling.”87 
A pioneer in the field of behavior modeling, Albert Bandura, 
developed his “social learning theory” to explain the ways in which 
humans learn by modeling their behavior on the observed behavior of 
others. Bandura breaks with behaviorism by stressing that people only 
copy behavioral models that they find compelling (1971). In this respect, 
his ideas are compatible with James Gibson’s concept of the 
“affordance,” which emphasizes information “pick up,” rather than 
imposed “effects” (1979). Bandura also states that behavioral models are 
“generative.” In other words, they can be used to create and innovate 
other types of behaviors (1971, 38). A pianist who learns a particular 
musical scale is able to improvise upon that sequence of notes in all sorts 
of novel ways. In a similar respect, once we observe what an affordance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Behavior modeling is distinct from “behaviorism.” Behaviorism 
assumes people reflexively respond to environmental stimuli (Pavlov 
1927; Skinner 1971). Behavioral modeling assumes our subjective desires 
influence whether or not we emulate particular behaviors (Bandura 1971, 
1977).  
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affords, we are free to improvise off of this knowledge. We might climb 
the ladder by placing our left hand on it first, rather than our right. We 
might also climb down it, or hang from it, or lean against it, or turn 
around and sit on one of the rungs. The same is true of a media 
affordance. After observing a comedy routine uploaded to YouTube, we 
might be inspired to create a similar sketch, but with our own unique 
variations.  
Bandura states that in cultures that are particularly complex and 
diverse the degree of behavioral improvisation will be much greater (38). 
The current media environment, in which individuals from around the 
globe are engaging as never before, is the most complex and diverse 
culture yet devised, thus a rich breeding ground for behavioral 
innovation. 
Behavior modeling can occur directly or remotely. We might 
emulate the actions of someone standing a few feet away, or we might 
hear someone play a saxophone melody over the radio and wish to 
imitate and elaborate on it. Bandura explains that we also acquire 
complex patterns of behavior from “pictorially presented models” (41). A 
single piece of video footage may afford multiple things. For the aspiring 
director, it affords an opportunity to emulate a particular editing pattern. 
For the aspiring actor, it affords an opportunity to emulate a specific 
performance style. For the aspiring writer, it affords an opportunity to 
emulate a certain mode of dialogue composition.   
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In addition to the behaviors on view all around us, we are 
constantly witnessing rewards and punishments related to those 
behaviors. These perceived behavioral consequences influence which 
affordances we choose to emulate and which we deliberately avoid. As 
Bandura explains, “Imitative behavior is generally increased by observed 
reward and decreased by observed punishment” (48). Even though 
observed behaviors promise particular rewards and threaten particular 
punishments, there are no guarantees. Social life is complex and there are 
many complicated factors at play. Thus, an observer who decides to 
imitate a particular affordance may encounter an unexpected outcome. 
The chair that affords one person a place to sit may collapse under the 
weight of another. The on-camera tantrum that makes one person an 
object of fascination may make another person a pariah.  Bandura 
explains, “diverse outcomes are often due to subtle differences in 
behavior. The same behavior may be rewarded, ignored, or punished 
depending upon the person toward whom it is expressed, the social 




 Although media affordances are predicated on the possibility of 
common knowledge, a single media affordance can be utilized in 
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different ways by different people, or even by the same person on 
different occasions.  
 
Figure 123. Caricature of King Louis XVI as Horned Pig 
When defining that they call “cultural affordances,” Laurence 
Kaufmann and Fabrice Clément refer to engravings of King Louis XVI 
that were part of the public outrage that would culminate in the French 
Revolution. They state, “One understands, therefore, how political chaos 
arises, at the middle of the eighteenth century, through the broad 
diffusion of the kind’s counter-portrait in seditious lampoons and bawdy 
engravings” (2007, 242).  
A single image like the engraving above could afford multiple 
modes of mediation. As Kaufmann & Clément suggest, it served as a type 
of behavioral model, a permission slip for the French people to take on a 
role similar to that of the cartoonist, expressing open contempt for the 
monarchy. It was also a stylistic template for other cartoonists, a comedic 
framework for other satirists, a handy metaphor for political pundits and a 
visual aid for critics to circulate. What’s more, it remains all of these 
things today, resonating in relations between contemporary mediums and 
the cultural ecologies that we inhabit.  
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Affording Power. 
The ecological perspective is an ontological shift, breaking with 
more deterministic paradigms regarding the relationship between the 
individual and the environment. It does not suggest that culture has no 
normative dimension. It merely points out that norms are not rigidly 
imposed in any predictable fashion from any consistent direction. They 
are on offer all around us, and while they do tend to serve the interests of 
the rich and powerful, they do not accomplish this by “constructing” 
behavior. Instead, they tempt social strategists who are on the look out for 
modes of empowerment by holding out the promise of social mobility in 
exchange for a degree of cultural complicity.  
This type of socialization is not overt brainwashing. It is a 
negotiation, a tradeoff. If we submit to the status quo, we can avail 
ourselves of the social advantages currently on offer. The institutional 
powers and social trends dominating any milieu serve to constrain the 
type and number of affordances available—emphasizing some options, 
deemphasizing and completely eliding others—but they do not entirely 
construct social actors, impelling them to behave in particular ways. Even 
when we accept social conditioning and “drink the Kool-Aid,” we still 
have to decide which Kool-Aid to drink. There are many different brands 
vying for our allegiance and none of them are perfectly compatible with 
all of the others.  
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Because affordances operate at the level of perception, they are 
not about what is ultimately true in all contexts. They are about what is 
perceived to be true within particular contexts by particular individuals. 
Although they are comprised of internal cause and effect dynamics, these 
dynamics are viewed in relation to the ecological settings that contain 
them. They are “context sensitive.” 
For example, we might imagine a woman entering a restaurant 
called “Social Mobility.” The year is 1910, the location, New York City. 
The menu in this particular establishment is extremely limited. The 
dishes with the smallest portions have labels such as “governess,” 
“maid,” “secretary” and “teacher.” However, at the top of the menu, in 
prominent gold script are the words, “Marry a millionaire.”  
A hundred years later, another woman enters the same 
establishment. The menu has changed considerably. The “Marry a 
Millionaire” option is still visible, but there are many new and equally 
prominent affordances including, “Become a Doctor,” “Become a 
Lawyer” and “Become a CEO.” The woman might even innovate her 
own novel approach toward social mobility by building off of an existing 
pattern or cutting a path that is fairly unprecedented. Should this 
approach prove successful, it will provide a new positive affordance for 
future innovators. Should it prove unsuccessful, it will become a 
cautionary tale or “negative affordance.” 
According the affordance model, the likelihood of the first woman 
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pursuing social mobility by attempting to marry a wealthy provider is 
greater than the likelihood of the second woman following the same 
course of action because, in the first instance, the affordances regarding 
social mobility are quite limited. This is how affordances influence 
behavior, not by imposing it on perfectly malleable objects but by 
strongly suggesting it to persuadable subjects and simultaneously limiting 
alternate courses of action.  Affordances, in other words, are rhetorical. 
They persuade us by offering specific environmental benefits but always 
at a price.  
 
Anatomy of an Affordance. 
As I’ve said, in the age of participatory media spectacle has 
emerged as a dominant mode of mediation. Yet while each spectacle 
reflects specific characteristics of the culture from which it originates, 
people in diverse cultural milieus tend to perceive it quite differently. 
Douglas Kellner explains, “the politics of spectacle are highly unstable, 
subject to multiple interpretations, and often generate unanticipated 
effects” (2005, 78). 
One of the few predictable things about new media spectacles is 
their propensity to fixate on transgressive displays of sex and violence. 
This has given rise to two new ritual roles: the “sex taper” and the 
“suicide bomber.” In the following section, I draw on key concepts from 
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the field of ecological theory, suggesting for how they might be modified 
in order to examine the media affordances relate to these roles. 
                
Figures 124 & 125. Emergent Media Affordances 
 
Emergent Media Affordance: a potential act of mediation based on an 
evolving cultural pattern. 
 
SEX TAPER 
Other ritualists make sex 
tapes. Sexual mores 
subverted. Home porn 
trend emerges on 
Internet. Censorship laws 
increasingly difficult to 





Global Jihad movement 
expanding. Local 
conditions getting worse.  
Military occupation of 
foreign powers.  
Recruiters contact.
 
An effective medium is a pied piper encouraging others to flock 
toward a particular mode of identification. As more people follow in her 
footsteps, the allure of these emergent behaviors increases. For instance, 
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Jihadi Salafis insist that “suicide bombing is the best tactic to instill fear 
in the hearts of the invaders and demoralize their ranks. Also it deters 
others from cooperating with the occupiers” (Hafez 2007, 134). 
The emergent affordances individuals choose to capitalize on 
reflect their subjective desires as well as the objective opportunities 
provided by a particular cultural ecology. We recognize an increasingly 
impactful behavior model and imitate it. Each time this process is 
repeated, the behavior appears more socially acceptable and thus, for 
some, more appealing. For example, a number of mainstream celebrities 
have appeared in sex tapes including Pam Anderson, Britney Spears, 
Lindsey Lohan, Verne Troyer and Kristin Davis. Reality TV stars 
featured in sex tapes include Paris Hilton, Kim Kardashian, Tila Tequila, 
Danielle Staub, Kendra Wilkinson, Karissa Shannon, Sam Jones, Charm 
Rice, and Taylor Royce.  
              
Figures 126 & 127. Determined Media Affordances 
 
Determined Media Affordance: a potential act of mediation based on an 
established cultural norm. 
 




Gender norms. Notions 
of feminine beauty. The 





Sacred Islamic martyrs. 
History of Crusades. 
Anti-Zionist sentiments. 
Radical interpretation of 
the Qur’an. 
 
“Determined media affordances” are stock symbols and modes of 
identification that can be manipulated to achieve particular cultural ends. 
Psychologist Lev Vygotsky, allows that determined knowledge need not 
rigidly dictate our thought processes. Symbolic artifacts can also function 
as “mediating devices” (1978). For example, “Jihadi Salafis frame 
ambiguous Quranic verses, Prophetic traditions, and historic Islamic 
rulings to justify suicide, killing civilians, and killing fellow Muslims. 
These arguments involve complex historical traditions that are open to 
multiple interpretations, yet jihadists have retrieved and presented them 
as unproblematic justifications for suicide terrorism in Iraq” (Hafez 2007, 
134). Holland et al. refer to this as “symbolic bootstrapping,” the use of 
appropriated symbols for gaining some measure of influence over one’s 
environment. Symbolic bootstrapping in accordance with dominant 
norms can afford a degree of social mobility within a particular cultural 
ecology, but this type of maneuvering is more tactical than strategic. It 
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conforms to the rules of the game rather than redrafting them. However, 
we can also consciously leverage one symbolic universe against another 
as “counterculture” narratives do, thus inviting significant social change. 
             
Figures 128 & 129. Positive Media Affordances
 
Positive Media Affordances: a potential act of mediation promising 
perceived benefit(s).  
 
SEX TAPER 
Media visibility. TV 
Show. Fan club. Money. 
Manager. Film contract. 
Recording contract.  
  
SUICIDE BOMBER 
Publicity for cause. 
Personal renown. 
Revenge. Paradise. 
Family honor. Fearful 
enemy. Military victory. 
  
According to James Gibson a “positive affordance” is a way of 
relating to the physical environment in a manner that appears to offer a 
favorable outcome (1979, 137). The same is true of a “positive media 
affordance,” except that it offers a form of mediation that is perceived to 
be favorable in relation to the cultural environment. If we have no strong 
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feelings regarding a particular ritual role, its falls into the more general 
category of a “cultural schema” (Strauss & Quinn 1998), which may or 
may not have emotional salience for another social actor. 
Unlike cultural schemas, affordances are partly defined by our 
subjectivity. Thus we cannot be indifferent to them. In order for us to 
even recognize the existence of an affordance (positive or negative), we 
must find it inherently meaningful. By definition, an affordance must be 
considered a boon or a bane, a goal attracting action or a threat promoting 
avoidance. The “allurements” associated with positive media affordances 
are always influenced by environmental factors. For instance, in a 
cultural niche where media visibility is prized for its own sake, media 
affordances that offer increased visibility at any cost are also prized.  
After her sex tape surface, aspiring actress and spokesmodel Kim 
Kardashian became world famous. She was signed to appear in a hit 
reality TV series Keeping up with the Kardashians (E! 2007-2011). She 
was also cast in several movies. She launched her own fashion line and 
multiple fragrances. She also competed on ABC's Dancing with the Stars 
(2005-2011), produced an E! reality series, The Spin Crowd (2010). And 
along with her sisters, Kourtney and Khloé, she authored the best selling 
autobiography, Kardashian Konfidential.88  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Kardashian’s sex tape co-star, William Raymond Norwood Jr. AKA, 
Ray J, also benefited from the exposure. He was signed to star in the Vh1 
series For the Love of Ray J. Additionally, he received a recording 
contract and released a music video for the song “Sexy Can I,” featuring 
such lyrics as, “Sexy, can I hit it from the front? Can I hit it from the 
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Along with increased cultural visibility, Media affordances offer 
the “power to persuade” others (and our selves) that our most heartfelt 
beliefs are valid. The mere act of becoming cultural mediators—
regardless of the views we are expressing, or whether or not we actually 
have strong convictions—appears to heighten our cultural significance. 
This is one of the most attractive things about media affordances and a 
key reason why their influence is so difficult to resist or control. 
In many respects, the concept of media affordances is even more 
disquieting than the notion of media effects. Whereas the effects model 
insists that life imitates art, the affordances model allows that life can 
become art. According to the effects view, if we can simply censor 
enough media offerings, we can potentially curb negative behavior, but 
the only way to curtail the influence of media affordances would be to 
censor life itself, ordering news outlets to suppress reports that raise the 
public profile of any person involved in acts of anti-normative behavior 
including sex tapers and suicide bombers, but also politicians, terrorists, 
soldiers, criminals, gang members, etc.  
In 2010, the 19-year-old daughter of Matrix star Laurence 
Fishburne, Montana Fishburne (also known by the stage name “Chippie 
D”) released a sex tape in order to advance her career. She told reporters 
that she was inspired by the success of Kim Kardashian and her highly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
back? It’s a Kodak moment, let me go and get me camera. All I wanna 
know is, sexy, can I?” 
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publicized sex tape, saying, “Even though she got all that negative 
attention for it, she still has all these other ventures going on now. That is 
what I want to emulate: having a tape come out and still being seen as a 
positive person. Not just, ‘She's a porn star’” (Huffington Post 9/3/10). 
In societies with a free press, censoring transgressive media 
affordances cannot, and should not happen. In fact, the opposite trend 
must increasingly predominate. In an overcrowded mediascape, only the 
most shocking stories can stand out (and thus turn a profit), so the market 
place impels reporters to play up the most salacious elements in their 
stories, which in turn, provide alluring behavioral models for aspiring 
public figures seeking increased exposure. Equally troubling is the 
realization that in an era in which media exposure is one of the key 
markers of cultural status, such figures are bound to proliferate at an 
alarming rate. 
                   
 
Figures 130 & 131. Negative Media Affordances 
 
Negative Media Affordances: a potential act of mediation threatening 
perceived drawback(s).  
 
 









or naïve. Appearing 
insane or evil. 
 
 In order to craft a self-justifying persona, ritualists take steps to 
counter “negative media affordances.” In the examples above, an actress 
denies consciously distributing a sex tape in an attempt to avoid seeming 
crass and calculating. In contrast, a suicide bomber records a video 
testimony in order to confirm that he is a willing martyr, deliberately 
going to his death for reasons that he believes are logical and just. (Hafez: 
2006, 56). In terms of rhetorical impact, it doesn’t matter if this testimony 
is staged and scripted by others, as long as the aspiring martyr displays 
some degree of conscious intent. A special emphasis is placed on 
altruistic motives in order to justify the carnage that attends their act of 
sacrifice/murder.  
In his essay, “Dying to be Martyrs” the Symbolic Dimensions of 
Suicide Terrorism,” Mohammed M. Hafez, quotes a statement from a 
Palestinian suicide bomber: “How beautiful for the splinters of my bones 
to be the response that blows up the enemy, not for the love of killing, but 
so we can live as other people live…We do not sing the songs of death, 
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but recite they hymns of life … We die so that future generations may 
live” (2006, 72). Suicide bombers commit acts of both real violence and 
rhetorical violence, the former, by killing innocent civilians, the latter, by 
asserting that their views are more inherently meaningful than those of 
the figures they have forever silenced.  This is because they understand 
the cultural logic of our highly mediated society in which the biggest 
crime is to remain invisible. 
In a stable and coherent ecology, well-defined cultural norms 
demarcate the difference between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. 
However, as cultural standards grow more diverse and destabilized, 
shame itself can become a potent media affordance, drawing attention to 
transgressive behavior in highly provocative, and thus profitable, manner. 
Savvy tabloid reporters maintain interest in otherwise banal reality stars 
by encouraging them to both acknowledge and reject shame in a variety 
of titillating ways. According to Allure magazine, Kim Kardashian was 
upset and humiliated when her 2007 sex tape emerged. In the same 
interview, she said she is proud of her voluptuous physique and is 
working to “change the standards of beauty” (Allure 8/24/10). In another 
interview, Kardashian confesses she used to be ashamed of her big 
breasts (Brave Zeenat 12/8/10). She later declares she is “not ashamed of 
cellulite” (LovetoKnow 1/2/11). She is embarrassed over the release of 
25 never-before-seen nude photographs taken of her in 2007 by Playboy 
Magazine (Radar Online 9/6/10). Nonetheless, she is “not ashamed of her 
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bum” (novafm 20/07/10) and “not ashamed of her past” (uinterview 
08/18/10). 
                     
Figures 132 & 133. Constraints and Demands 
 
Constraints and demands: formal requirements guiding the behavior of 
one adopting a particular ritual role. 
 
SEX TAPER 
Sex act on camera. At 
least partial nudity. Not 
too graphic, but 
somehow unique. Press 
notified. Made widely 
available.       
SUICIDE BOMBER 
Violent death. More 
killed and/or more 
sensitive target than 




“Positive” and “negative” qualities reveal what an affordance 
promises or threatens in relation to a particular medium, whereas 
“constraints” and “demands” reflect what the culture does and does not 
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want in return. They are the edicts the medium must avoid violating and 
the hoops that she must jump through.  
Designer Donald speaks of the “constraints” inherent in material 
affordances. For instance, a doorknob constrains our actions in that we 
can only turn it in one direction (1988, 87-88). In the case of media 
affordances, constraints also involve limitations on ritual action, i.e. a 
rock star must resist behaving in a manner that seems too “mainstream.” 
Also, media discourses can also be viewed as constraints with elaborate 
gate keeping mechanisms and narrowly defined rules regarding what 
counts as legitimate grounds for inclusion and upward mobility. 
Because the mass media is overcrowded the constraints for 
meriting public notice grow higher each day. At the same time, the 
affordances for symbolic bootstrapping have never been more readily 
available. This has created a massive wave of homegrown media 
innovators. Whereas traditional celebrities have dominated media 
discourse in the past, increasingly, grassroots “reality stars” are 
commanding the spotlight. And while terrorist acts were once 
masterminded by al-Qaeda’s central command, in recent years, they have 
become increasingly decentralized and “home grown” (Sageman 2008, 
136).  
Affordances not only constrain us, they also “demand” certain 
behaviors in exchange for perceived benefits. For instance, an individual 
wishing to attain the upward movement afforded by a staircase must stay 
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within the confines of a particular path, but he must also climb stair after 
stair. This notion of demands differs from Gestalt psychology’s concept 
of “demand character” (Reed 1988, 288). Until the individual elects to 
step foot on the first step, the staircase in no way dictates his actions. 
However, once he begins pursuing the affordance, the individual is 
required to act in accordance with certain formal dictates if he wishes to 
avail himself of the benefits on offer. Likewise, when capitalizing on a 
media affordance, one must also capitulate to certain formal demands. 
For instance, “to survive, [global jihad] requires a constant stream of new 
violent actions to hold the interest of potential newcomers to the 
movement, create the impression of visible progress toward a goal, and 
give potential recruits a vicarious experience before they take the 
initiative to engage in their own terrorist activities” (Sageman 2008, 145). 
Palestinian suicide bombers are required to make videos describing their 
motives and thus proving that they are willing martyrs (Pape 2005, 223). 
                  
Figures 134 & 135. Attunement 
 
Attunement: the ecological actor’s interest in a particular affordance.  
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SEX TAPER 
Interest in fame and 
fortune. Desire to appear 
sexually attractive. 
Wanting to shock friends 
and relations. 
SUICIDE BOMBER 
Desire to intimidate and 
frighten. Seeking rewards 
in the afterlife. Interest to 
avenge and honor family.
 
Leslie Z. McArthur and Reuben M. Baron introduced the concept 
of “attunement” to ecological theory, as a means of describing an 
observer’s interest in a particular affordance (1983, 232). In the case of 
media affordances this involves more than physical needs, it also relates 
to ideological values and dispositions, i.e. the belief that garnering media 
visibility is more important than maintaining the appearance of propriety.  
As the name implies, an “attunement” reflects our ability to tune 
into the existence of particular affordance by finding it meaningful. Just 
as some radio signals are strong and some are weak, ritual actors can be 
strongly or weakly attuned to particular media affordances. The relative 
strength of a particular attunement is related to a number of factors, 
including the natural aptitudes of the mediums (see below), the relative 
scarcity or abundance of the affordance, and the amount of viable 
alternatives. Additionally, a single affordance may have multiple 
attunements with different levels of salience. For instance, the sex taper 
may want to be seen as desirable but chiefly long for media visibility. 
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Also a strong attunement may help a medium overcome his or her 
resistance to a perceived negative affordance, i.e. the suicide bomber may 
desire revenge more than he fears death. 
Attunements contain a complex ethical dimension related to the 
many cultural contexts we simultaneously inhabit. For instance, someone 
may have a strong desire to achieve visibility related to the cultural 
ecology of the global mediascape. At the same time, they may be attuned 
to maintaining approval within the ecology of their immediate family. 
Mediums who lack such constraining attunements, because they are 
estranged from their families and/or were raised by people who 
uncritically value media exposure at any price, are more likely to 
capitalize on transgressive modes of empowerment.  
                         
Figures 136 & 137. Aptitudes
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SEX TAPER 
Some preexisting media 
visibility. Shamelessness. 
Attractive appearance. 
Ability to “leak” tape. 
SUICIDE BOMBER 
Access to explosives. 
Access to victims. 
Ruthlessness. Sense of 
moral superiority. 
 
“Aptitudes” are how we afford affordances. Thus they are 
reciprocally related to constraints and demands. If an individual 
has low aptitudes in relation to a particular affordance, the 
constraints and demands of that affordance will appear higher. 
“Aptitudes” are how we afford affordances. Thus they are 
reciprocally related to constraints and demands. If an individual 
has low aptitudes in relation to a particular affordance, the 
constraints and demands of that affordance will appear higher. If 
an individual has high aptitudes in relation to a particular 
affordance, the constraints and demands of that affordance will 
appear lower. In general, the more tenuous the medium’s claim to 
a particular ritual identity, the more she must struggle to muster the 
aptitudes necessary to enact it successfully. Thus when ritual actors 
suspect they lack the natural aptitudes to achieve specific desires, 
they seek the assistance of ritual. In general, the greater the 
practical gap between objective circumstances and subjective 
desire, the greater the leap of faith one must negotiate (see 
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Malinowski 1948). And extreme leaps of faith require extreme 
rituals.  
Scientific analysis is, on some level, a faith-based 
enterprise requiring researchers to view their empirical findings in 
relation to a particular conceptual scheme. Yet, because it has a 
stronger grounding in observed reality, the rituals associated with 
affirming the validity of scientific theories (awards, conferences, 
journal articles) tend not to be socially disruptive. In contrast, the 
uncertainty underscoring sporting events, religious crusades, and 
wars is far more pronounced, thus the rituals associated with these 
phenomena tends to be emotionally charged and elaborate.  
In regards to media affordances, aptitudes might include 
physical abilities, mental capacities, emotional dispositions and 
other intangibles including insight, intuition, and empathy. 89 The 
aptitudes we lack also influence the rituals we do and do not enact. 
For instance, a person who lacks traditional talents such as singing 
or acting ability cannot effectively capitalize on the media 
affordances related to these modes of empowerment. If they, 
nonetheless, have strong attunements for media visibility, they may 
seek out alternative means of attaining it. Affordances begat 
affordances, so as more people attain visibility without cultivating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Shaw, Turvey & Mace call the individual’s capacity to capitalize 
on a particular affordance an “effectivity” (1982). Yet because the 
familiar term “aptitude” expresses, more or less, the same idea, I 
resist adopting their neologism.  
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traditional aptitudes, the motivation for cultivating these talents is 
necessarily diminished. Why struggle to master a complex skill, 
when you can become well known by simply behaving 
outrageously on camera? Of course, not everyone who behaves 
outrageously in public becomes world famous. Usually, one must 
possess other compensating aptitudes: famous relations, sexual 
attractiveness, a highly distinctive appearance, etc. 
Aptitudes are never stable. They increase, decrease, appear 
and disappear throughout our lifetimes. This week’s sex symbol is 
next year’s old maid. What’s more, aptitudes have different 
impacts in different contexts. A facial tattoo may be a sign of ritual 
authority in prison but it can be detrimental in a job interview.  
 
Role Profiling. 
An effects view can tell us one of two things about the sex 
taper and the suicide bomber: either an emergent trend is driving 
their behavior, or determined norms have constructed them to 
behave in certain ways. In contrast to such sweeping, “across-the-
board” pronouncements, the affordance view requires us to 
perform fine-grained analyses of the ritualized behaviors of 
particular individuals. A ritual role is not presumed to be wholly 
consistent. Nonetheless, it is defined by certain identifiable 
patterns, thus one can perform a ritual analysis focusing on how 
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faithfully a particular ritualist appears to commit to exigencies of 
these patterns. 
The sex taper and the suicide bomber are both performing 
shocking, transgressive acts, but they are doing so for different 
reasons in different ways. Certainly, they have been steeped in 
cultural milieus that privilege particular modes of empowerment, 
but others with similar backgrounds have not capitalized on the 
media affordances they have been drawn to. By considering what 
these ritual roles afford and require, we are able to see two distinct 
“role profiles” coming into view. Behavioral patterns related to 
particular positive and negative affordances and specific 
attunements, constraints and demands begin to gradually emerge.  
Because ritual roles are historically contingent phenomena rather 
than ahistoric archetypes, they are unstable and subject to change. 
They do, nonetheless, reflect reasonably durable cultural trends 
and the behaviors associated with them. And unlike more 
generalized effects theories, they can suggest why certain 
individuals, and not others, might elect to behave in a particular 
fashion. They can even identify particular character-traits 
predictive of specific behaviors. This may, in turn, suggest 
methods for mitigating more socially disruptive activities via the 
construction of appealing “counter-roles.”  
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Of course deciding whether or not a ritual role is culturally 
problematic may present another type of dilemma. A third wave 
feminist might argue that appearing in a sex tape is a positive way 
of celebrating feminine sexuality, whereas a second wave feminist 
might describe it as a degrading form of objectification. In order to 
support such claims, these two pundits would need to assume 
particular ritual roles, deploying some media affordances and 
eschewing others. To a certain extent, these commitments would 
curtail and dictate what they could and could not say and how they 
could and could not act, thus protecting them from certain 
accusations and laying them open to others.  
Media effects purportedly impose the same type and degree 
of influence on everyone, whereas media affordances appeal only 
to select individuals who are willing and able to negotiate their 
meanings via ritual action. This is not a purely reactive process. It 
is strategic. Thus by rejecting arguments that simplistically suggest 
that, “the media made me do it,” we relocate cultural engagement 
at the intersection of the individual and the environment, the realm 
of the medium.  
 
Next. 
 Some media affordances are real world, real-time 
perceptions, some are more contrived abstract conceptions and 
	  	   268	  
some are combinations of the two. The following section provides 
tools for grappling with the ambiguous relationship between the 
map and the territory by defining three types of media tropes: 
“chronotopes,” “mythotopes” and “logotopes.”    
 




            reality TV      map chronotopes 
 territory   mythotopes     Tea Party democracy 
        modality  M.M. Bakhtin   logotopes Werther 
     polytroping Rupert Murdoch counter-troping viral videos 
 Gaza   confessionals trope new journalism 
         terrorism    tropic deconstruction Werther 
Disney Fox News nationalism Jorge Luis Borges 
anti-theater celeb-fantas programming capitalism  
 remediation gonzo transgression Facebook  praxism 
 
Figure 138. Trope Cloud 
 
 Jorge Luis Borges’ shortest short story is one paragraph 
long. It is titled “Del rigor en la ciencia,” or “On Exactitude in 
Science.” Written in the form of a literary forgery, it describes an 
all-but forgotten empire where, long ago, the science of 
cartography was perfected to an absurd degree. In this ancient land, 
a map was constructed that was the exact size of the kingdom, 
matching it point for point and covering it entirely. The original 
mapmakers were proud of this creation, but subsequent generations 
found it useless and let it fall into disrepair. Eventually, only a few 
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tattered scraps remained. These were located in a remote desert 
and were inhabited by animals and beggars.  
 Borges vision of a territory-sized map seems surreal 
because we tend to think of maps as interpretations of physical 
space rather than physical spaces in their own right. The notion of 
an actual-scale map seems redundant and pointless. Even if every 
detail were correct, it would be a mere imitation of the territory it 
was patterned after. It might match the scale of the real territory, 
but it could never match its complexity. After all, maps are not 
meant to mirror reality. They are meant to reduce it. A map has to 
reduce. It needs to establish borders and focus on some features 
and not others. It is a sort of “terministic screen,” concealing far 
more than it can ever reveal (Burke 1966). 
Yet in Borges’ story, the map valiantly struggles to become 
territory. A similar thing is occurring in today’s mediascape. When 
entering a 3D video game, or a virtual reality simulation, we are 
tempted to believe we can directly perceive an actual environment. 
We can move through cyberspace much like navigating our own 
neighborhoods. Real-time feedback loops, viewpoint dependent 
graphics and interactive media displays all conspire to deceive our 
senses. At times, these experiences are deeply immersive, but what 
exactly are we becoming immersed in? A man-made environment 
is different than a natural environment because it has been founded 
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on a substrate of ritual intent. Just as the consumerist paradise 
Disneyland reflects the values of a particular cultural milieu, 
today’s media environments—from elaborate RPGs to simple 
Facebook pages—cannot help but echo the ideological biases of 
the ecologies from which they emerged. Maps have agendas. They 
help us navigate the territory, but only if we submit to the 
interpretative frames that they propose.  
Exploring a media environment is not the same as taking a 
walk in the woods. Media worlds are more map than territory, and 
maps distort perception. They artificially flatten terrain, radically 
alter physical scale, prominently display invisible borders, enlarge 
and highlight certain features and completely elide others. They are 
not physical spaces authored by nature. They are metaphysical 
texts authored by human beings. When entering a map, we are 
venturing into a kind of ‘virtual cathedral’ designed to influence 
not only our sensory perceptions, but our ideological conceptions 
as well.  Technology has not advanced to the state where the copy 
is indistinguishable from the original, so by and large, we can still 
distinguish between virtual worlds and unmediated sensory 
experience. In fact (in fiction?), this may be one of the comforting 
pleasures these ‘”worlds” afford. After all, in our increasingly 
mediated environment, such clear-cut distinctions are getting 
harder to come by. The teenager listening to his iPod, the student 
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texting a friend, the businesswoman checking her emails, all have 
one foot in the territory and one foot in some sort of map. So much 
of our time is spent in this divided state; the line between the 
territory and the map is becoming extremely blurred. Therefore, as 
we strive to gain some mastery over new media forms, we must 
also resist the inventive new ways that they are striving to master 
us.  
This chapter explores complex interplay between map and 
territory, concept and percept. In order to provide theorists with 
more productive means of grappling with such complexity, it will 
define three key terms: “chronotope,” “mythotope,” and 
“logotope.” Examples will be draw from classical literature, new 
journalism and pop culture. I will also drawn on scholarship from a 
number of fields, including media studies (Dyer 1986; Ponce de 
Leon 2002), Literary criticism (Bakhtin 1986; Campbell 1987), 
Historical and cultural criticism (Boorstin 1961; White 1973; 
Baudrillard 2001; Sontag 2003; Shirk 2007), anthropology 
(Appadurai 1996) social semiotics (Hodge & Kress 1988) and 
ecological psychology (Gibson 1979). 
 
Gibson’s Perception. 
According to James Gibson, the philosophers have it 
exactly backwards. The perceived world will always turn out to be 
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much larger and more complex than the conceived one and for a 
simple reason: we can perceive without conceiving, but not visa 
versa. In other words, we can observe the world around us without 
conceptualizing it, but we cannot conceptualize the world without 
first observing it. Because the building blocks of conceptual 
thinking are experiences derived from direct perception, the map 
can never swallow the territory. This is Gibson’s most radical 
insight. 
 
The doctrine that we could not perceive the world 
around us unless we already had the concept of space 
is nonsense. It is quite the other way around: We 
could not conceive of empty space unless we could 
see the ground under our feet and the sky above. 
Space is a myth, a ghost, a fiction for geometers. All 
that sounds very strange, no doubt, but I urge the 
reader to entertain the hypothesis. For if you agree to 
abandon the dogma that ‘percepts without concepts 
are blind,’ as Kant put it, a deep theoretical mess, a 
genuine quagmire, will dry up (Gibson 1979, 3). 
  
Gibson insists that perception comes first. We see the 
pattern and then draw the conclusion. We make the correlation 
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then posit the causation. According to this perspective, we do not 
inhabit two separate realities, the conceptual and the perceptual. 
Instead, we engage with the conceptual via the perceptual. We 
don’t construct cultural meaning in some internal psychic 
laboratory; we engage with it in the world, albeit a highly mediated 
one. 
Gibson’s view is at odds with the theory of cognitive maps, 
proposed by his contemporary Edward Tolman. While Tolman 
acknowledged the influence of environmental factors on mental 
processes, he believed that our minds create internal maps that 
direct the ways in which we engage with the external world. 
Gibson felt that this approach was too solipsistic, a mere extension 
of Cartesian dualism, which foreclosed the possibility of shared 
perception. He saw that animals often engage in cooperative 
behavior and concluded that the only way that this could occur was 
if different organisms are capable of viewing aspects of the 
environment in more or less the same way. This meant that the 
persisting features of the environment must have an objective 
existence independent of the conceptual space inside the mind of a 
particular individual (Reed 1988, 287). 
Building on Gibson’s concept of affordances, I argue that 
“media affordances” are observable mediation practices, examples 
of how to mediate the territory and make it more map-like. 
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Praxism is the study of “ideological cartography.” It examines how 
ritual mediums attempt to make sense of the territory around them 
by locating the practice of mediation in the “eye of the perceiver.” 
Unlike cognitive maps, cultural ecologies and niches can be 
directly perceived by a variety of ritual actors. This is what makes 
their various features “media affordances,” which can be exploited 
in repeatable ways, exerting clear and demonstrable influence on 
the environment. 
Certainly, we can gain and store knowledge, but this occurs 
via ritual practices that involve mediating available perceptions 
and remediating available texts. After all, the perceived world is 
not merely a pasture; it is also a library filled with codified 
experience, including instruction manuals, social protocols, 
dramatic performances, policy debates and compositional tropes. 
This means that rituals that involve assuming the role of author, 
actor or audience are all public events related to engaging with the 
perceived world, including its many preconceived (or “meditated”) 
features.  
The map can never swallow the territory, or become the 
territory, yet it remains very much of the territory. Despite the 
mapmaker’s most valiant efforts, it will never exist on some 
exalted transcendent plain. This is fortunate for us. It means we get 
to view our maps directly, including their flaws. They may beguile 
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us with lofty themes, poetic language and well-documented 
empirical proofs, and at times, we may become convinced that they 
literally define us, but we have to work hard to stay in the map for 
longer than a minute or two. The territory is always creeping back 
into view, and then there are all of those other maps vying for our 
attention. We drift between them, often several at a time, and as 
long as we don’t become too transfixed by their symbols, they can 
help us to navigate the more accessible corners of the vast and 
infinitely complex territory that begat them. 
 
Media Maps. 
An ecology is a cluster of ritual practices, striving to define 
a particular ecological domain in a particular way. A media map is 
a snap shot of this process in action. Just as an electron microscope 
must kill subatomic particles in order to observe them, media maps 




Figures 139—141. Chicago Maps 
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Picture three maps of the city of Chicago created in the 
same year. All define the city borders and its chief landmarks at 
the same scale and in the same relationship with one another, but 
there are also significant differences. The first map displays the 
subway system. The second focuses on surface streets and 
highways. The third features local points of interest: restaurants, 
museums and the like. Although the maps are similar in some 
respects and different in others, no single one of them depicts the 
essential nature of the city, its innate “Chicagoness.” What’s 
more, maps from different eras may define the same the 
geographical space in a much different manner. 
While these maps contain many intricate details, they are 
not “ecologies.” They are closed systems. Changes in one do not 
create changes in another. Also, they are not influenced by changes 
in the actual territory known as Chicago. In contrast, the cultural 
ecologies that these maps represent are very much alive, existing 
as constantly evolving patterns of ritual discourse. Changes in one 
of these Chicago ecologies may well create changes in the other 
two. And changes in the overall ecosystem known as Chicago will 
create changes in all three. Additionally, the manner in which 
various media maps depict the environment may influence the 
environment itself (for instance, drawing attention to a particular 
landmark and directing more tourists to that spot). Thus maps and 
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territories, concepts and percepts are intimately entwined and 
mutually influential, but hardly identical.  Maps are always 
meaningful in at least two ways. They are a mix of pattern and 
text.  
At first glance, a pattern may appear to be purely nonlinear, 
yet it is comprised of many edges and contours that can be traced 
in a linear fashion. Despite this, patterns do favor the nonlinear as 
they initially confront the eye with a multiplicity of images all at 
once. They are primarily synchronic. 
On the other hand, a textual statement may appear to be a 
purely linear construction, yet because each word that comprises it 
can be interpreted in a number of ways, it contains a nonlinear or 
synchronic dimension. Nonetheless, texts tend to favor linear 
constructions, directing the eye along a sequential course toward a 
periodic conclusion. They are primarily diachronic.  
             
Figures 142—144. The United States: Pattern, Text & Map 
Patterns and texts favor different modes of cognition. 
Patterns privilege analogic. Texts privilege logic. What’s more, 
patterns and texts perform different functions with different 
degrees of proficiency. The textual abbreviation “U.S.A.” is the 
most efficient way to articulate the concept of a particular country 
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in the western hemisphere. Conveying the same idea by drawing a 
pattern that resembles the United States is far more time 
consuming. On the other hand, if one wants to get a sense of 
complex terrain that comprises the territory and the basic relations 
of its geographical landmarks, the pattern can do so more 
efficiently than the pages of text required to convey the same 
amount of information. 
In order to effectively navigate the territory, one must strike 
a balance between text and pattern. This requires a map. Maps are 
inherently ecological, both logic and analogic, both diachronic and 
synchronic. By featuring several paths branch in many directions, 
they provide a variety of options for exploring a single 
environment.  
A geographical map gives us a particular perspective on a 
particular bit of physical terrain and suggesting how we might 
navigate around it. In a similar sense, the patterns I call “media 
maps” are snap shots of cultural ecologies, suggesting particular 
“paths of view.” Whereas a cultural ecology is a constantly 
evolving system of discursive relations, a media map is a glimpse 
of key aspects of a particular ecology frozen in time. The details it 
brings into relief are media affordances arrayed in both a linear and 
nonlinear manner. 
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Whereas ordinary maps have roads, media maps have 
rituals, ways of making meaning through ritual practice. 90 We 
study a traditional map in order to learn how to navigate around a 
physical territory. We study media maps to consider how various 
cartographers have chosen to make sense of a particular domain.91 
The features that crisscross these topographies are formal rites 
enacted in order to construct specific types of discursive patterns. 
Media maps are glimpses of particular phenomena viewed in 
particular ways at particular moments in time.  
A media map centering on a famous pop star can be viewed 
as both a pastiche of nonlinear patterns (photographs, fashion 
statements, products), as well as a network of linear narratives 
(biographical anecdotes, promotional strategies, interviews). Media 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Media maps are similar to the concept of “semiotic domains,” a 
term coined by James Paul Gee. According to Gee, the practice of 
playing video games is a type of “semiotic domain” with its own 
internal and external design grammars. The internal rules and 
content of the game serve to inform and influence the external 
social interactions of the gamer (2001, 36). In a similar respect, the 
internal design grammar of cultural ecologies (media affordances) 
can serve to inform and influence social interactions on the scale of 
the individual ritualist.  
 
91 Researchers at MIT Media Labs have experimented with 
mapping online discourses. Warren Sack’s “Conversation Maps” is 
a Usenet newsgroup browser that analyzes the text of an archive of 
newsgroup messages and outputs a graphical interface that can be 
used to search and read the messages of the archive.  With the 
graphical interface one can browse a set of Usenet newsgroup 
articles according to who is “talking” to whom, what they are 
“talking” about, and the central terms and possible emergent 
metaphors of the conversation. 
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maps may center on an event, an idea, a person, a group, or any 
other observable cultural phenomenon. While they are informed by 
linguistic abstractions, their connection to the environment is 
explicit, historic, and necessarily provisional. They are formalized 
spaces that suggest degrees of maneuverability within particular 
cultural domains. 
As with real maps, media maps hold our logical and 
analogical minds in a state of counterpoised mutual tension. 
Therefore, they encourage “ecological” (critical) thinking. Despite 
the inevitable distortions, they allow us to strategize. And as long 
as we stay on the paths that they describe and submit to their view 
of the cultural environment, we can navigate in multiple directions 
under our own volition. What’s more, via particularly compelling 
acts of mediumship, we may occasionally redraw the contours of 
their very maps we are exploring! 
 
Tea Party Paradox. 
Being a member of a cultural ecology means negotiating 
between determined and emergent influences. Consider the “Tea 
Party Movement.” Members tend to describe the group as a 
spontaneously emerging grassroots organization fed up with 
“business as usual” in Washington and committed to “taking the 
country back” from Beltway insiders (in particular, Democrats). 
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Yet critics of the group see them as little more than a front 
organization for the Republican Party. Which perspective is more 
accurate?  
 
Figure 145. Tea Party Protestors 
I argue that no group, the tea party included, is ever “purely 
grassroots,” emerging spontaneously from the common clay. A 
flock of geese may spontaneously take flight, but cultural ecologies 
are always guided by ideology, which must be, at least partly, 
determined in advance. An ideology is an aim, an organizing 
principle that implies an entire structure, including an internal 
hierarchy, various gate-keeping mechanisms, and a counter-
position to oppose.   
Pundits often debate whether an organization is truly 
emergent or entirely fabricated, but such sweeping critiques do not 
get us any closer to discerning how they actually operate. Some 
groups are certainly more grassroots than others, and some are 
almost entirely controlled by powerful forces operating behind the 
scenes. This is why we need tools for looking at these matters 
more complexly, discerning how much of a group’s ideological 
rhetoric is being generated internally, how much is being 
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manufactured by others, and how much is an ambiguous mix of the 
two. For instance, some Tea Party members have shown up at 
rallies carrying weapons, a symbol that they are concerned about 
retaining their second amendment rights, as well as an implied 
threat to those who oppose them. The Republican Party has been 
reluctant to condemn these actions, but there is no indication that 
they have officially sanctioned them. On the other hand, the 
“Heritage Foundation,” a conservative think tank established in the 
Reagan era, regularly posts online talking points that Tea Party 
members repeat verbatim at their rallies. Finally, through the use of 
social media, Sarah Palin has become an unofficial “figurehead” of 
the tea party movement. Her Twitter posts represent an ongoing 
dialogue with the actions of the group. It is often difficult to tell 
how much she is leading them and how much they are leading her. 
In order to address such complexities, media studies needs a way 
of clearly discerning between determined and emergent behavior in 
the age of participatory media.  
 
Remixing “The Real.” 
In common parlance, a trope is a figure of speech, a way of 
placing a word in a new context to create a different sort of 
meaning, as with the metaphor, “the sun was a furnace.” In media 
studies the word “trope” is defined more liberally. It may apply to 
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cinematic techniques such as camera angles, blocking, and 
wardrobe. It might also refer to familiar narrative elements such as 
a “last minute rescue” or a “villain in a black hat.” 
Praxism stretches this fairly elastic term further still. In a 
praxist context, tropes refer to mediating practices. Tropes, in this 
sense, are ways of transforming perceived or conceived reality into 
mediated discourse. The benefit of discussing mediation rites in 
terms of tropes is that tropes are not concrete objects. They are 
relationships between objects, ways of organizing texts, and 
utilizing technologies rather than the texts and technologies 
themselves.  
Because anything human beings can perceive is potential 
fodder for mediation, attempting to categorize media affordances 
according to fixed functions or structures is impossible. This is 
why I have chosen to describe them in terms of their general 
“tropic” characteristics. At bare minimum, reality can be reduced 
to two competing contexts: the determined and the emergent, what 
we conceptualize and what we directly perceive. Concepts and 
percepts are the raw materials that comprise media affordances. 
When engaging in a mediation rite, we can snare a detail from our 
immediate surroundings (percept), or we can conjure a poetic 
flourish appropriated from a text (concept), or we can exploit a 
widely accepted conflation that merges concepts and percepts 
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seeing them as identical and natural. Here are three general types 
of tropes: 
 
Chronotope: the practice of mediating percepts. 
Mythotope: the practice of mediating concepts. 
Logotope: the practice of mediating conflations. 
 
As James Gibson stresses, we view the world around us 
through our own subjective filters, focusing on some things more 
than others (1979). This does not mean our view of the world is 
purely subjective; merely that it is biased toward fixating on 
certain types of objective features. Thus the tropes I am describing 
are, at best, “quazi-truths,” each inflected by the subjectivity of the 
medium articulating them and the objective features of a specific 
local and historic context. 
Praxism bears some resemblance to the field of social 
semiotics. Both focus on mediation practices. However, they 
define these practices in different ways. The primary unit of study 
in social semiotics is what is known as a “modality” or simply a 
“mode.” A mode is a particular form of mediation, i.e. writing, 
sound effects, verbal utterances or visual codes (Hodge & Kress 
1988). In contrast, praxist tropes are actions informed by the 
relationship between a particular cultural context and a specific 
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form of cognition. Here, “multi-media” means “multi-mind,” 
different mental perspectives of the world juxtaposed like camera 
angles and mixed like daubs of paint. By utilizing praxist tropes, 
we can mediate within the territory, within the map, between the 
map and the territory, or between the territory and the map. While 
we can never neatly disentangle such intimately entwined 
phenomena, we can at least attempt to analyze how they 
intermingle. Thus, in this section, I examine ways in which the 
territory gets onto the map (chronotopes), ways in which map 
seeps onto the territory (mythotopes), and also ways in which the 
map and territory appear to merge (logotopes).  
 
Chronotopes.  
A “chronotope” is the practice of transforming life into art. 
It is how directly perceived reality invigorates a mediated text. 
Chronotopes are always tied to particular places and times and to 
immediately observable phenomena. They are emergent, rather 
than determined, spontaneous rather than contrived, immediate 
rather than inferred. Chronotopes are ways of accumulating raw 
perceptions in a manner that allows them to seem as unmediated as 
possible. They deconstruct and deformalize the observed world, 
dismantling contrivance. 
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Russian literary critic Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin coined 
the term “chronotope” to describe the way that “life enters 
language through concrete utterances” (1986, 63). The name 
literally means “time/space.” It reflects “the intrinsic 
connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are 
artistically expressed in literature” (84). Bakhtin adds, “The 
chronotope makes narrative events concrete, helps them take on 
flesh, causes blood to flow in their veins. An event can be 
communicated. It becomes information. One can give precise data 
on the place and time of its occurrence” (250). 
Chronotopes capitalize on the visceral impact of direct 
perception. As Hodge and Kress point out, modes of 
communication that are a mimetic match to reality, have strong 
emotional salience (1988, 130). Thus, in many respects, shooting 
footage of an actual person in pain is a more emotionally 
compelling act of mediation than painting a stylized portrait of the 
same person.  
Chronotopes sample space and time. Those related to 
specific geographical sites capture local customs including styles 
of dress, speech patterns and forms of interaction. Those related to 
the temporal dimension seize on nostalgic touchstones such as 
hairstyles, slang and trends. All of these modes of mediation can 
be mixed and matched at will. However, chronotopes should not be 
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confused with stylistic flourishes meant to make media seem more 
gritty and “real.” These might include grainy film stock, shaky 
camera moves, lens flares and bad audio. Such embellishments are 
actually “mythotopes”—formalizing media practices—meant to 
make a bit of footage seem more chronotopic. The footage in 
question might actually have been shot on a set with actors 
following a script and hitting carefully blocked marks, so the sense 
of a spontaneously perceived reality might be little more than a 
meticulously choreographed affectation. I will discuss mythotopes 
in detail in a moment, but first, a bit more about chronotopes.  
Chronotopes are strategies for mediating emergent 
behaviors. If a director is shooting a film script, he might allow the 
actors to improvise and the cinematographer to follow the action 
with handheld camera. Inasmuch as the camerawork adds a 
stylistic dimension to the piece, it is a mythotopic practice, but the 
manner in which it allows the cameraman to move about and 
follow the action spontaneously is chronotopic. In a similar sense, 
cell phone cameras lend themselves to chronotopy, as do security 
cameras, hidden microphones and “bullet-points” extracted from 
carefully composed speeches. Chronotopes involve interacting, 
engaging and inventing in the moment. They take things as they 
come, gather what is immediately apparent and place it in a new 
context. 
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Chronotopes are related to “chronicles,” lists of 
chronologically occurring events that have been observed and 
written down, but this does not mean they are purely impartial. As 
James Gibson points out, perception always contains a subjective 
dimension (1979, 138). Thus we each notice different things about 
the environment. This is why the same event might inspire one 
person to laugh and another to take offense, while going 
completely unnoticed by a third party. The chronotopic is always 
inflected by the mythotopic because we are constantly constructing 
ongoing stories about the world around us, making choices about 
what to focus on, who to trust and when to feel threatened or 
elated.   
The mythotopic dimension introduces the notion of 
“emplotment,” the tendency to fashion observed reality into a 
coherent and, hopefully captivating, narrative. Some events are 
included. Others are excluded. Some facts are placed to the 
periphery. Others are moved to the center. Some elements are 
encoded as causes, others as effects. And the sequence is given a 
discernible beginning, middle, and end. The medium also arranges 
the events according to various literary tropes, including metaphor, 
metonymy, synecdoche, and irony (White 1973, 1978). In this 
process, he or she is both providing the audience with a taste of the 
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“real world” (chronotope) and a taste of his or her own ideological 
worldview (mythotope). 
Sampling the many chronotopes now on offer is similar to 
being a medieval reader of The Canterbury Tales, yet there are a 
few key differences. For one thing, the slices of life on reality TV 
have been co-authored by the people who are actually living them. 
Moreover, the audience is increasingly able to interact with the text 
via online polls and blogs, inserting their own chronotopic 
influence as well. The medium thrives in such a habitat. Rather 
than agonize over which version of reality represents the “ultimate 
truth,” he or she creates a pastiche of multiple realities. 
               
Figures 146—148. Confessionals 
When we “turn life into art,” we reveal many of our own 
biases in the process. After all, reality comes in many flavors and 
often the most flavorful are the most subjective. Reality TV trades 
on this idea via the on-camera “confessional.” These Rashomon-
like sequences feature juxtapose one-shots of cast members 
intercut with footage of an often controversial event. The cast-
members share their unique “takes” on the event in question and 
the audience is invited to extrapolate among these competing 
versions of reality and the event itself as captured by the show’s 
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crew. The appeal of these mythotopically-inflected chronotopes is 
not that they present viewers with a singular objective perspective, 
but rather that they pit multiple perspectives against one another. 
Thus chronotopes should never be viewed as “reality” pure and 
unadulterated. They are always “reality with a twist.” 
In the mass media era, reality is a spice rack of different 
ingredients waiting to be combined and recombined to different 
thrilling effects. In the mid-sixties, a craving for such exotic 
recipes gave rise to the phenomenon known as “New Journalism,” 
a style of reportage that blurred the line between autobiographic 
confessional and “straight,” “objective” news coverage. Mixing 
bland, more or less, “objective” chronotopes with spicy, highly 
subjective ingredients was not an entirely new idea. Tabloid 
reporters had been doing it since the 19th century (Ponce de Leon 
2002). But New Journalism added increased respectability to the 
enterprise, as its chief practitioners were some of the most admired 
novelists of the day. Tom Wolfe, Norman Mailer and Truman 
Capote were all masters of the form. Their works gave readers an 
opportunity to see the stories from the newspapers through new 
eyes, getting the East Coast intelligentsia’s take on the hippy 
counter culture, the left wing politico’s take on police brutality, 
and the cosmopolitan homosexual’s take on murder in small town 
Americana. Adding drug consumption to the mix, Hunter S. 
	  	   292	  
Thompson invented “gonzo journalism,” suggesting that one man’s 
“reality” may be another man’s hallucination.   
              
Figures 149 & 150. Goethe & Werther 
An early master of the chronotope was Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe, author of the proto-romantic novel The Sorrows of 
Young Werther, which was embellished with many autobiographic 
details. Late in life, Goethe would write in his essay “Reflection on 
Werther,” “The decision to let my inner self rule me at will and 
permit all outside events to penetrate in a way characteristic of 
them drove me into the wonderful element in which Werther was 
conceived and written” (1962, 132-33). 
As creatures living at the intersection of determined and 
emergent events, we are all intrigued by the interplay of fictional 
worlds and observed events. Goethe capitalized on this intrigue by 
populating his narrative with concrete details appropriated from 
real life. Bakhtin has this to say about the author’s work: “It 
contains no inanimate, immobile, petrified places, no immutable 
background that does not participate in action and emergence (in 
events), no decorations or sets … In Goethe’s world there are no 
events, plots, or temporal motifs that are related in an essential way 
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to the particular spatial place of their occurrence, that could occur 
anywhere or nowhere (‘eternal’ plots and motifs). Everything in 
this world is a time-space a true chronotope” (1986, 42).  
Goethe saw media affordances everywhere and availed 
himself of them freely, seizing characters, settings, dialogue and 
events from real life in a manner more deliberate and aggressive 
than his predecessors. Readers found this practice irresistible.92 
Throughout his career, the author of Werther would freely merge 
details from real life with his fictional worlds to powerful effect. 
Studying some of his unpublished manuscripts, Bakhtin lauds this 
“chronotopic” tendency, noting, “Time and space merge here into 
an inseparable unity, both in the plot and in the individual images. 
In the majority of cases, a definite and absolutely concrete locality 
serves as the starting point for the creative imagination” (1986, 
49). Goethe adds details from current events. Again Bakhtin 
approves, “The world and history did not become poorer or smaller 
as a result of this process of mutual concretization and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Goethe explains how the use of chronotopes invited readers to 
focus of details unrelated to his artistic intentions. “Instead of 
saying something nice about the book just as it was, all of them 
wanted to know how much of it was true! This made me angry, and 
my reply was invariably extremely rude. For, in order to answer this 
question, I would have had to tear apart and destroy the form of this 
little book over which I had brooded for such a long time to give it 
some elements of poetic unity.” Goethe adds that these 
“embarrassing inquiries” pursued and oppressed him throughout his 
life. (152-4).  
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interpenetration. On the contrary, they were condensed, compacted 
and filled with the creative possibilities” (50). 
 What Bakhtin is describing sounds a bit like the process of 
“sampling” whereby recording artists remix sounds taken from 
field recordings or other songs. This idea of incorporating “found 
perceptions” into artistic works—freely merging determinism and 
emergence, Logos and chronos—is a hallmark of the burgeoning 
ecological mindset, the type of “new mediumship,” or literate 
ritualism that would come to characterize high modernism. The 
advent of photography, cinema, sound recording, and radio, 
allowed technicians to capture “lifelike” glimpses of reality and 
reproduce them on a mass scale. This inspired artists to dig deeper, 
exploring internal realities by producing increasingly subjective 
and expressionistic works. Marcel Proust, James Joyce, and Ernest 
Hemingway borrowed copiously from their inner and outer worlds, 
and Jack Kerouac felt “the confessional” was the dominant literary 
form of the 20th century. As the private and public sphere 
continued melding into one another, new realities were revealed in 
surprising new ways. 
 
Figure 151. Reality TV 
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In order for a plot to command our attention, it must feature 
transgressive acts, conflicts and polarizing behaviors. Even a 
“likeable everyman” needs to be confronted by a situation that 
violates normative expectations. At such moments, the plot 
thickens and the story takes flight. For life to successfully qualify 
as art, it needs to challenge the mundane. There have to be 
dramatic twists. Bad things need to happen. Tabloid culture is 
trauma culture, and the “reality format” demands trauma on cue, a 
steady diet of transgressions served up on a reliable basis and shot 
on a budget. Thus “reality producers” are trauma-generators. If not 
personally experiencing extreme states in public, they must be 
inducing others to do so. At the very least, someone should be 
describing a previous trauma that they somehow participated in, 
either as a victim or as a perpetrator. That is the formula. Anything 
does not merit the audience’s sustained devotion in an over 
crowded, hyper-stimulated marketplace, hence the many images of 
“reality stars” getting in brawls and getting naked in full view of 
the camera, not to mention the tell-all bios and confessional 
interviews clogging bookstores and newsstands.  
Most reality TV fodder is fairly banal. The cast of Survivor 
was fighting over a stolen can of beans as the U.S. was invading 
Iraq. Yet these petty squabbles provide both a diversion and an 
emotional outlet for audiences during troubled times. Chronotopes 
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do more than ground fiction in reality. They also distract us with 
“the hyperreal.” Most reality programming is highly contrived. 
People who would probably never cross paths, much less associate 
in real life, are thrown together in artificial situations and forced to 
interact in a ritualized manner that compels them to experience 
extreme emotional states before the camera’s unblinking eye. 
Viewers are aware of the artificial nature of the scenarios, but 
watch for moments of slippage, instances where the practiced 
smiles and the mannered gestures fall away, when something a bit 
more raw and unrehearsed is revealed in the form of extreme 
anger, extreme pleasure, extreme pain, extreme anything.  
Because televisual texts are, by definition, mediated, the 
term “reality TV” is a misnomer. This commonly vilified genre is 
actually reality distorted and amplified. Reality is a man mowing 
his lawn. Reality TV is a man running over his foot with a lawn 
mower. This is nothing new. Even in Goethe’s day, the chronotope 
was a slice of life with the boring bits cut out, life accelerated, 
contorted and showcased in a manner designed to lend it 
heightened allure.   
 
Figure 152. Keyboard Cat 
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Chronotopes are not confined to mere on-camera 
confessions and tabloid traumas. They also include “viral videos.” 
These homegrown spectacles of the absurd offer innocuous 
diversions and can spread globally in a matter of seconds.  
 
Figure 153. 9/11 
 Terrorist acts are highly effective chronotopes. After all, 
what competitive news organization could resist putting an 
extremely violent terrorist “act” as its top story? “If it bleeds, it 
leads,” as the journalistic slogan goes. Susan Sontag writes, “In a 
culture radically revamped by the ascendancy of mercantile values, 
to ask that images be jarring, clamorous, eye-opening seems like 
elementary realism as well as good business sense” (2003, 23). 
This is how capitalism cannibalizes itself. And even if mainstream 
news organizations choose to play down certain hyper-traumatic 
chronotopes, these practices will, nonetheless, spread virally 
online. What’s more, they are bound to grow increasingly 
transgressive. For as all terrorist groups know, the best way to get 
media attention is to make the next attack more violent and to 
focus on even more sensitive targets.  
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Because chronotopes center on direct perception, they 
involve real-time emergent behaviors. All social interactions are 
informed by a degree of ritual (Goffman 1997). However, because 
less formalized exchanges appear to emerge spontaneously, they 
are recognized as chronotopic. When we step into view of a 
camera, or speak on an answering machine, our behaviors are 
chronotopes as well, coded by various immediately apparent 
details. We can alter our appearance by dying our hair or wearing 
different types of clothing and jewelry, but the more chronotopic 
aspects of our bodies are less mediated. They include things such 
as height, weight, race, sex, hair color and eye color.  
These biological characteristics are all potential media 
affordances that can be incorporated into particular mediation 
practices in order to express particular ideas. Because they are 
recognized as unmediated, they often have high emotional salience 
for ritualists and their potential audiences. When we are “getting 
real,” or “keeping it real,” these are the aspects of appearance we 
tend to foreground.  
 
Mythotopes. 
An opinion poll is taken regarding the economy. The 
results are published. This influences public opinion, which again 
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which again influences the market, and so on, and so forth, an 
infinite regress echoing over the mountaintops. In this example, 
perception is tied to cultural change, but perception can also inhibit 
and even counteract change by distorting observed reality. People 
are living longer and getting more obese than ever, but so-called 
“reality stars” keep getting younger and fitter. We are living in the 
most mediated era in history, yet our self-image is increasingly 
distorted. As the divide between observed and mediated reality 
grows more turbulent and confused, the so-called “objective truth” 
becomes impossible to locate. In terms of media studies, this 
means there can be no “object of study” in the traditional sense.  In 
order to navigate the reality divide, we need to focus on the 
practice of mediation itself.  
A “mythotope” is art becoming life.93 It is how a mental 
concept is transformed into an observable phenomenon. 
Mythotopes are acting techniques, poetic flourishes, hairstyles, 
narrative strategies, editing patterns, special effects and genre 
distinctions. Whereas chronotopes are partly subjective, 
mythotopes are partly objective, necessarily influenced by the 
historic era and locale from which they emerged. This means, they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 The “mythotope” is similar to Claude Lévi-Strauss’ notion of the 
“mytheme,” the basic unit of mythic composition. Yet there is a key 
different. A mytheme is a kind of narrative element, while a 
mythotope is a mediation rite bringing such elements into being. 
Also mythemes are assumed to be invariant structures, whereas 
mythotopes are mutable patterns of behavior. 
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are not absolutely fictive. They are, nonetheless, highly mannered 
and abstract. While they may not claim to be the literal truth, they 
do assert a sense of “higher truth” aimed at eventually acquiring 
more concrete status.  
While chronotopes capture what is immediately apparent, 
mythotopes embellish and interpret. They can be employed to 
enhance observed reality, to stylize it, to transform it, or to entirely 
belie it. They can be simultaneously deployed, as in a multi-modal 
composition (Hodge and Kress 1988). They can also remediate 
preexisting texts, arranging and rearranging them in countless 
ways, creating remixes, mashups, director’s cuts and alternate 
takes. 
              
Figures 154 & 155. Remix & Mashup 
These days, people often act as if there is a camera in the 
room and, in fact, there usually is! Jean Baudrillard speaks of the 
rise of “anti-theater,” which he describes as “the ecstatic form of 
theater: no more stage, no more content; theater in the streets, 
without actors, theater for everyone by everyone, which would 
merge with the exact unfolding of our lives.” (2001, 19) As we 
become increasingly aware of the performed aspects of day-to-day 
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existence, we see that “anti-theater” is everywhere and begin to 
consciously author roles that allow us to be seen by others—and to 
see ourselves—in increasingly impactful ways. 
 
Figure 156: Hannah Montana is Miley Cyrus 
Miley Cyrus’ fans buy blond wigs so they can portray her 
portraying Miley Stewart, a character who occasionally 
masquerades as a famous pop star, Hannah Montana. The series 
Hannah Montana (2006-2011) centers on the double life of an 
ordinary girl who is secretly an internationally renowned celebrity. 
Thus, as Cyrus sings in the theme song, she has “the best of both 
worlds.” Yet Cyrus inhabits more realities than this. The TV role 
has transformed her into a “real life” pop star with number one 
albums and sold out concert tours. As Miley Cyrus becomes 
increasingly famous, her TV persona, Miley Stewart, remains 
endearingly grounded and humble while bonding with her fictional 
brother, Jackson, and her real-life father-slash-TV father, Billy Ray 
Cyrus-slash-Robby Stewart.  
To tune in Disney’s Hannah Montana is to witness 
Baudrillard’s “vanishing referent” disappear up its own virtual 
fundament. This multi-platformed marketing juggernaut is a pop 
culture hall of mirrors in which pseudo realities are shuffled at 
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such an alarming rate, Hannah herself has a hard time keeping 
track. Yet despite—or perhaps because of—the hyperreal 
trappings, it is one of the most popular shows on the Disney 
Channel.  
Another popular kid’s show I, Carly (2007-2010), on 
Nickelodeon, focuses on a teenager who, as the host of her own 
popular web series, deals with such issues as bad reviews, pushy 
sponsors, fan mail, and ratings spikes. Also on “Nick,” young 
viewers can watch The Naked Brothers (2007-2009), or they can 
plug in their Xbox 360 and strum artificial guitars and bang plastic 
drums along with CGI avatars depicting the “Brothers” playing 
virtual instruments. This show is, more or less, a knock off of one 
of the Disney Channel’s other successful franchises, The Jonas 
Brothers, a band of three real life siblings who play themselves 
playing world famous rock stars in a number of films and TV 
shows. 
Whereas previous generations watched programs about 
people with a fairly wide range of professional interests—
cowboys, soldiers, doctors, ballerinas, firemen, etc.— young 
viewers are increasingly watching celebrities play celebrities. If 
“stories are equipment for living” as Kenneth Burke says, what 
exactly are these “celeb-fantasy” shows equipping young viewers 
to do?  
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In the eighteenth century Gothic novels were all the rage, 
but some social commentators worried that young people—and in 
particular young girls—were becoming too caught up in these 
fictional worlds. In The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern 
Consumerism, Colin Campbell writes, “We can now see how 
consumption of these [Gothic and sentimental fiction] novels 
might have helped to bring about a critical change of attitude 
toward the world, one characterized by a rejection of a traditional 
pattern of life on the grounds that it was too dull, and a consequent 
search for the kind of pleasure which could be experienced in the 
imagination.” Critics blamed these novels for making young 
women unfit for household duties, disrespectful toward their 
parents, discontented with their social positions and generally 
determined to “become heroines by striving for the unattainable” 
(1987, 176). Campbell suggests that, “the reading of novels was a 
major factor in the critical break with traditionalism which 
occurred in the second half of the eighteenth century” (176). 
Two hundred years later, American pop culture would 
prove a new cause for concern. Writing in 1961, Daniel J.  
Boorstin describes Americans succumbing to a “feat of national 
self-hypnosis.” He says, “we have used our wealth, our literacy, 
our technology, and our progress, to create a thicket of unreality 
which stands between us and the facts of life…[This has] given us 
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unprecedented opportunities to deceive ourselves and to befog our 
experience…We want and we believe these illusions because we 
suffer from extravagance expectations. We expect too much of the 
world” (3). Boorstin sounded this cautionary note when there were 
just three U.S. television networks broadcasting in black and white 
and most children’s programs featured puppets not publicists.   
No one is certain how the onslaught of celeb-fantasy 
programming will influence the behavior of media prosumers in 
the years to come. Will social networking sites provide enough 
exposure to satisfy our increasingly “extravagant expectations?”94 
What if we aren’t content with the pseudo-fame and marginal self-
exposure that they afford? Will our desire for celebrity become a 
threat to the very system that generated it? Warhol gave Valerie 
Solanis her fifteen minutes of fame, but she wanted more. 
On the other hand, young viewers may not be entirely self-
deluding. After all, with the help of new media discourses, each of 
us is becoming a kind of pseudo-celebrity in our own right. In 
some respects, celeb-fantasy narratives may be imparting valuable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Gunther Kress points out, “Authorship is no longer rare. Of 
course the change to the power of the author brings with it a 
consequent lessening in the author’s or the text’s authority. The 
processes of selection, which accompanied the bestowal of the role 
of author brought authority. When that selection is no longer there, 
authority is lost as well. The promise of greater democracy is 
accompanied by a leveling of power; that which may have been 
desired by many may turn out to be worth less than it seemed when 
it was unavailable” (6, 2003). 
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21st century skills. In the era of participatory media, learning the 
behaviors of a successful public figure is no longer a pointless idle. 
It has become a cultural imperative, perhaps even an indispensable 
survival skill. Young people spending hours each day updating 
their Facebook profiles, texting, tweeting, sharing files and 
uploading videos, need narrative tools for conceptualizing what it 
means to cultivate a positive, appealing and authoritative ritual 
persona.  
Still, the amount of celeb-fantasy programming on offer 
presents viewers with a tantalizing array of apparent media 
affordances that may actually be quite difficult to capitalize on. For 
Hannah Montana becoming famous is as easy as donning a wig, 
but for her fans gaining worldwide notoriety presents more of a 
challenge. Certainly, they can make themselves visible by merely 
posting content online, but getting a mass audience to take notice 
requires more drastic measures.  
  
Logotopes. 
Because chronotopes have a subjective dimension and 
mythotopes have an objective dimension, there is no neat 
distinction between them. They are more like opposite poles of a 
continuum. Chronotopes favors the immediate and the apparent. 
Mythotopes favor the distant and the ahistorical. Yet occasionally, 
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these two poles come together forming a seemingly immutable 
conflation of reality and fantasy, AKA the “logotope.”  
The logotope is the most difficult and the most important 
praxist trope to identify.95  All cultures are founded on these 
categorical distinctions and they are usually so engrained, they are 
almost invisible. One of the main goals of deconstructive analysis, 
or any other “countercultural” act, is to make the logotopes of a 
particular discourse seem strange, to reveal their mythic origins.  
Every culture perpetuates certain key ideological practices. 
These practices underwrite the policies and structural frameworks 
of dominant social institutions. Once we successfully glean the 
logotopes of a particular culture, we can contrive to reject or 
subvert them. If this fails, we can turn those same practices against 
the culture itself, using them as ideological weapons. For instance, 
Israel has a longstanding policy regarding the burial of its soldiers. 
Any young man or woman who joins the Israeli army is assured 
that if they are killed in the line of duty, the Jewish State will do 
whatever is necessary to retrieve his or her body and bury it on 
Israeli soil. Critics say this policy only encourages militant groups 
to kidnap and kill Israeli soldiers. And indeed, in 2008, the group 
Hezbollah took advantage of this Israeli logotope, kidnapping two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 The “logotope” relates to Kenneth Burke’s theory of “logology,” 
the study of language in search of divine Truths (1961). Logology is 
the analysis of logotopic practices, that is, the conscious and 
unconscious leveraging of said Truths. 
	  	   307	  
soldiers, killing them and then exchanging their bodies for five live 
Hezbollah prisoners, including one man convicted of killing a 
father in front of his four year old daughter with a rifle butt 
(Yorkshire Post 7/18/08). Non-Israelis may find such bargaining 
illogical, but according to the cultural logic of the logotope, it 
makes perfect sense. 
Logotopes are so familiar and so deeply enmeshed in the 
territory, we often mistake them for natural landmarks. They are 
not merely attempts to stylize reality (as with mythotopes), they 
are practices relating to the status quo and the way things actually 
operate. If mythotopes are attempts to manipulate ideological 
software, logotopes grapple with ideological hardware. They are 
mediating practices related to established structures such as rules, 
regulations, Internet firewalls, borders, buildings, stoplights, speed 
signs, speed limits, political parties, ratings boards, network 
programming, presidential speeches and social protocols. They are 
the inner and outer workings of the world’s dominant cultural 
institutions. 
All logotopes were once mythotopes. That is, they were 
beliefs aspiring to become “social facts.” Mythotopes become 
logotopes through successful acts of conflation that fuse emergent 
events with accepted norms and render them hegemonic. While 
mythotopes demand attention, logotopes are most effective when 
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we take them for granted. As Colin Sparks points out, citizens in 
nascent democracies tend to be politically engaged, while citizens 
in stable and well-established democracies focus on apolitical, pop 
culture discourses (1988, 380). The most engrained logotopes are 
difficult to detect. We may nod to their existence by reciting 
pledges or by taking oaths, but these legitimating acts are only 
ways of maintaining order. They are not urgent attempts to 
establish a new worldview. 
Logotopes are ways of working within the design-structure 
of a particular cultural ecology, or working against it. Because 
different cultures have different social norms, logotopes frequently 
clash. The deepest and most abiding rifts between cultures are 
logotopic. These are the behaviors we are most resistant to change 
and most eager for others to alter or dispense with. The ways in 
which different individuals conceptualize social norms are often at 
odds, so logotopes may drive us into feuding and even war. When 
this occurs, logotopes are deployed against one another. A 
totalitarian regime declares a media blackout. A western 
corporation gives the regime’s citizens access to social media sites. 
These policy-related maneuvers have profound cultural 
implications.  
Leveraging favored logotopes means opposing the 
logotopes of others. In such instances, containment and subversion 
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are preferable to open coercion. Overt tactics can backfire and 
generate an emergent backlash. Logotopes exert more sustained 
pressure when allowed to subtly maintain or undermine hegemonic 
status. For example, under capitalism, citizens are often inclined to 
reject social reforms for fear of increased taxes (hegemonic 
containment) and under patriarchy women are increasingly 
entering the work force, commanding higher salaries and more 
prominent positions (hegemonic subversion). 
Whenever counterculture discourses reveal the ideological 
biases of social norms, logotopes are drawn into the open. Those 
who have traditionally championed them must continue to defend 
them, or amend them or admit that they are motivated by self-
serving beliefs. For instance, a government may refer to itself as a 
democracy, but if it quashes political dissent and rigs elections, its 
credibility is compromised in the eyes of its own citizens and other 
nations as well. Thus leaders of purported democracies generally 
prefer to discredit and marginalize those who oppose them without 
resorting to more draconian tactics.   
Because logotopes are most effective when they are 
invisible, much effort is expended concealing “the man behind the 
curtain,” hence the conjuring of mythotopes. Operating as 
rhetorical strategies, mythotopes can be deployed to camouflage 
particularly unseemly logotopes. For instance, a logotope of 
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imperialist conquest might be disguised via the mythotopic 
euphemism, “peace keeping mission,” or a logotope exploiting 
natural resources might be disguised by the mythotopic 
euphemism, “Clear Skies Initiative.”  
Human beings are inherently complex, so discerning our 
ideological “bottom line” in all conceivable contexts is impossible. 
However, by carefully discerning between mythotopes and 
logotopes, we can come closer to gleaning a general sense of a 
particular medium’s ideological priorities. 
 Media titan Rupert Murdoch is an illustrative example. The 
outspoken CEO of News Corp seldom hesitates to voice his 
political views. Yet even an arch conservative and political hawk 
such as Murdoch is never entirely consistent. Because he is torn 
between ideological commitments that are not always perfectly 
compatible, he cannot be. As founder of the Fox News channel, the 
Australian tycoon has promised viewers objective coverage. At the 
same time, critics accuse Fox of parroting the agenda of the 
Republican Party. Murdoch is not only committed to U.S. 
nationalism, his style of reporting plays up polarizing narratives in 
countries around the globe and some of these narratives oppose 
U.S. interests. And while Murdoch is a committed capitalist, he has 
made billions in the age of globalization and this has required him 
to do business with some whose political ideologies appear to clash 
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with his own. Clearly Murdoch is torn between many competing 
logotopic commitments. So which logotope does he generally 
value most? The role of unbiased journalist? Republican 
supporter? U.S. patriot? Nationalist ideologue? Western capitalist? 
Or cross-cultural diplomat?  
 To begin with, the notion that Murdoch is an impartial 
journalist seems particularly questionable. After all, Fox News 
traffics in inflammatory and racially coded headlines such as 
“Obama Praises Indian Chief Who Killed U.S. General” and 
“Obama loves Gangsta rap.” As with the “Clear Skies Initiative,” 
the network’s so-called “Fair and Balanced” policy appears to be 
more of a mythotope than a logotope. As with a magician’s sleight 
of hand, this slogan directs attention away from the right wing 
pandering that network executives wish to conceal. Fox uses 
ongoing debates between right and left wing pundits to create the 
illusion of objectivity. Rather than attempting to actually make 
their reportage less biased, they have created small highly 
constrained spaces within their rhetorical universe for a few 
handpicked liberals to express opposing views in an ineffectual 
manner. This is what passes for objective journalism on the 
network, a cursory nod to the opposition that is dismissed by the 
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right wing pundits and, quite often, the purportedly objective Fox 
moderators as well.96  
In addition to making U.S. airwaves more nationalistic, 
Murdoch has been repeating this formula for success in China. 
Phoenix Television is a joint venture founded in 1996 between 
Murdoch’s Star TV and several Chinese investors, including the 
government-owned Bank of China. According to Susan Shirk, 
Phoenix Television is “splashy and nationalistic and favored by its 
ties with the Communist Party. But it is highly believable to 
Chinese viewers because it sounds nothing at all like old-style 
propaganda” (2007, 89). The type of nationalism that sells in China 
feeds on suspicion of Japan and western powers, in particular, the 
United States, but this is not Murdoch’s only logotopic 
inconsistency.  
In 2003, his son, James, publically denounced the Falun 
Gong, a spiritual movement persecuted by China’s Communist 
government. He called them a “dangerous” and “apocalyptic cult” 
that “clearly does not have the success of China at heart.” James 
Murdoch also chastised the western media for painting a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 In response to this trend, MSNC has offered a liberal news 
format. Its reportage is slanted to appeal to left wing viewers and 
the formula has allowed it to pull ahead of rival CNN, which, while 
leaning increasingly to the left, has resisted going quite as far. 
Nevertheless, this concept of letting members of “the other side” 
express themselves, and then rhetorically undermining them at 
every turn is becoming a common feature of cable news.  
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relentlessly negative picture of the Chinese government. These 
comments were an attempt to curry favor with the Chinese 
government and secure carriage for his father’s Star TV 
organization in the country (MediaGuardian 11/03).  
 
Figure 157. Rupert Murdoch and Chinese President Hu Jintao  
In the age of globalization, such clashing realities 
increasingly characterize discourse in both the public and the 
private spheres. As anthropologist, Arjun Appadurai points out,  
“We live in a world of many kinds if realism, some magical, some 
socialist, some capitalist, and some that are yet to be named” 
(1996, 53). What’s more, each of these ecologies can be 
subdivided into multiple niches with their own competing agendas. 
Thus we can no longer convincingly speak of global capitalism. 
We can only speak of global capitalisms, some aligned with 
western interests, some, ironically enough, aligned with its old foe, 
communism. Even a free market champion like Rupert Murdoch is 
not immune to such ideological conflicts. His avowed allegiances 
are to journalism, the United States, democracy, nationalist politics 
and capitalism, but because these domains are not neatly 
commensurable, his “bottom line” can only be located in one of 
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them. Not surprisingly, his deepest logotopic commitment appears 
to be the one that has made him a multi-billionaire: capitalism.  
 
Counter-Troping. 
In the age of reality television, the audience has become the 
star. This creates a thorny theoretical problem. Despite the 
lingering allure of the effects mode, most media scholars seek to 
define that audience as “active” and possessed of real agency (Hall 
1980). At the same time, we are leery of myths that valorize 
supposedly self-determined celebrities, while ignoring the highly 
constructed nature of their “star images” (Dyer 1986). When 
audience becomes, to some extent, the co-author of its own 
narrative, theorists are confronted with a blurring of the frontiers 
between the personal and the public spheres. Should we consider 
audience-members-turned-“reality-stars” primarily active? Or 
primarily passive? Or should we take an altogether different tact, 
defining them as particular types of ritual actors? 
The reality star stands at the intersection of two competing 
currents. Certainly, some of these figures appear to cultivate 
particular identities in pursuit of particular ends. But even when a 
ritual actor asserts some degree of agency, how can we be sure that 
this is not merely another performance?  
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Witness Britney Spears in her video for the song Circus 
(2008), hitting her marks, executing choreographed dance steps, 
singing a highly polished, well produced tune, wearing make-up, 
clothes and a hairstyle all created by other people, while declaring, 
“I’m like the ringleader, I call the shots. I’m like a firecracker. I 
make it hot.”   
Becoming the medium means asserting the ability to think 
and act for oneself. This can create an interesting tension between 
ritual actions that afford increased status by almost entirely 
eclipsing any meaningful sense of agency. In some respects, 
perceived power can be more culturally resonant than the actual 
thing. The myth of the heroic individual is enormously appealing. 
At the same time, the public prefers heroes who conform to 
predictable cultural scripts. The trouble with highly individualistic 
thinkers is that they are notoriously unreliable, hard to control and 
thus difficult to relate to and to market.  
Spears’ erratic “personal life” is an alarming counterpoint 
to her highly managed public persona. When left to her “own 
devices,” she often appears more self-destructive than self-
determined. Perhaps fleeing the constraints of a rigidly formal 
public role, she abandons restraint and invites controversy via 
pitiable exhibitionist displays. Yet even this apparently erratic 
behavior—shaving her head, flashing photographers—has become 
	  	   316	  
a type of ritual persona, demanding increasingly outrageous 
behavior in exchange for sustained public interest.  
 
Figure 158. Britney Spears at the 2007 MTV Music Awards 
In 2007, a somewhat bloated and disoriented Spears 
stumbled through a lip-synched song and dance routine at the 
MTV music awards, a “performance” that invited much public 
derision, but also provided a glimpse at what happens when two 
types of ritual personae—the calculating sex symbol and the erratic 
reality star—merge.   
As Madonna had done before her, Spears began her career 
by playing up contradictions, the virgin/whore dichotomy at core 
of feminine gender politics. Yet while Madonna’s on and off stage 
personae appear highly calculated and controlled, Spears 
increasingly exhibits an alarming inability to maintain composure. 
In previous eras, such erratic behavior might generate a brief flurry 
of interest before derailing a promising career, but in the current 
media environment, it can create sustained interest. A celebrity 
who is able to offer such trauma and titillation on a regular basis is 
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rewarded with ongoing media visibility. This should not be 
confused with the type of adoration associated with more 
traditional concepts of fame. The audience avidly watching Britney 
“flame out” is not what might be described as a typical “fan” base. 
Rather than affording familiar forms of renown, their morbid 
fascination provides visibility for its own sake, though a marker of 
cultural distinction, nonetheless. Media titans consider rating 
points, and trending “hits” reflections of cultural cache, so reality 
stars are often willing to maintain audience interest at any cost. In 
this respect, fame and infamy have become fairly interchangeable. 
Nonetheless, different types of visibility afford different modes of 
empowerment.  
In addition to being a troubled individual, Spears is also a 
cottage industry. Two groups of people are currently making a 
living off of her competing public personae: her close circle of 
collaborators and the tabloid media. Both groups exert a degree of 
influence on her behavior, but they have competing aims. Those 
who collaborate with Spears need for her to summon an, at least 
marginally, stable public persona, so her viability as a performer 
and recording artist is not irreparably undermined. Meanwhile, the 
tabloid media just want more grist for the mill. A substance 
abusing celebrity being pulled in such polarizing directions, is 
bound to oscillate wildly between different modes of identification. 
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Yet it might be possible to suggest a small degree of orientation 
amid the tumult, if we consider the notion of “counter-troping.”  
This neologism refers to the strategy of playing one type of 
ritual practice off of another. For instance, the emergent chaos of 
Spears’ personal life is a morbidly fascinating “chronotope.” And 
the manner in which her behavior is rigidly determined and 
carefully controlled by others is a slickly produced “logotope.” 
These competing performances have created two popular 
narratives. Spears is often described as either entirely out of 
control or entirely controlled by others. While either of these 
narratives makes for good tabloid fodder, they are both corrosive 
to her status as a durable recording artist and performer. Those in 
her inner circle have a problem. If they don’t want their livelihoods 
threatened, Spears must be made to appear somewhat stable and 
self-possessed. She must perform agency.  
The “ringleader” persona is a “mythotope,” a bit of image 
management calculated to play against the two other tropes 
competing to define Spears. Although she did not write the song, 
the “Spears Machine” needs her to sing it, to tell us that she is a 
strong, willful individual who actually does “call the shots.” 
Ironically, this is being done in order to downplay the very 
existence of the people who have helped to carefully craft this 
supposedly self-possessed persona. Because Britney Spears and the 
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people around her need us to believe that she controls her own 
destiny, those in the Spears camp are deeply invested in supporting 
this performance. The degree to which Spears is consciously 
participating in the construction of this particular role is very much 
an open question. Yet there is little doubt that it behooves her 
handlers to create the appearance that she has a measure of mastery 
over herself and over them as well.  
 
Polytroping. 
 Digital media productions combine sound, imagery and 
linguistic signs to produce powerful multimodal experiences 
(Hodge and Kress 1988). In a similar sense, ritual practices deploy 
many different “tropes” toward a common end. This approach 
might be termed “polytroping,” as it involves employing several 
different modes of mediation.97  For example, on May 31st 2010, 
an Israeli naval blockade stopped several boats carrying supplies 
bound for the Gaza strip (CBS News). After Hamas took control of 
Gaza in 2007, Israel instituted an embargo to prevent groups such 
as Hezbollah from smuggling weapons into the area. Their naval 
blockade prevented the Palestinian populous from receiving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 In his essay “Polytropy,” Paul Friedrich considers the ways in 
which various literary tropes inform one another and indentifies, “a 
major problem for the anthropological poetics of the future,” 
namely, “to describe and better understand how the combinations of 
tropes interact with each other” (1991, 25). 
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humanitarian aid, which had plunged the territory’s 1.5 million 
residents into deeper poverty and raised Mid-east tensions.  
 The boats that were stopped had embarked from Turkey 
and contained 700 activists sponsored by an Islamic aid group, 
Mavi Marmara (AP 6/3/10). The large lead vessel contained 600 
activists and another 100 activists followed in smaller crafts. 
Alarmed by the large number of people in the flotilla, Israeli 
commandos boarded the lead boat. Footage of the incident showed 
protestors swarming the commandos as they rappelled from a 
helicopter, hitting them with sticks until they fell to the deck, 
throwing one off of the ship and hurling what the military said was 
a firebomb. The commandos eventually gained control of the ship, 
but the skirmish left nine passengers dead. This incident generated 
protests across the globe, attracting harsh criticism of the blockade. 
Yet Israeli vowed to continue searching boats bound for Gaza 
(CBS News 5/31/10). 
 In order to protest the blockade, a different group of 
activists organized an additional high profile shipment of supplies. 
This team was much smaller than the first, but their tropic 
strategies were highly sophisticated. In terms of chronotopes, the 
group sought to capitalize on the newly emergent media focus, 
which would afford them the ability to draw attention to the 
ongoing humanitarian crisis. In terms of logotopes, the move was 
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calculated to draw more negative exposure to the unpopular Israeli 
policy. Finally, a number of mythotopes were effectively enacted. 
The ship set out from a western port, Ireland. Only eleven unarmed 
crewmembers were on board, so they presented no substantial 
threat to the Israeli navy. A winner of the Nobel Peace prize, 
Mairead Corrigan, was amongst them, underscoring the crew’s 
commitment to nonviolence. The ship had been christened “Rachel 
Corrie” after a U.S. college student who was crushed to death in 
2003, while protesting Israeli house demolitions in Gaza. This 
rhetorical flourish was an appeal to peace advocates in the west, 
whereas the Cambodian flag that the ship flew under was a sharp 
rebuke to western imperialism, serving as a reminder of U.S. 
conquest in the era of the Vietnam War. Finally, the Rachel Corrie 
was carrying hundreds of tons of humanitarian supplies, including 
wheelchairs, medicine and cement. This cargo had both practical 
and symbolic value for the people of Gaza. Perhaps sensing this, 
the Israeli navy only briefly detained the Rachel Corrie. After the 
ship was subjected to a thorough search, it was allowed to deliver 
its supplies to Gaza (Jerusalem Post 6/5/11).  
The crew of the Rachel Corrie was able to summon 
multiple modes of ritual authority by deploying a polytropic array 
of mediation practices. Rather than merely ship in supplies, they 
had drawn on a variety of symbolic resources to construct and 
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defend a particular type of high profile narrative. The many 
different tropic frames deployed combined to create a particularly 
impactful multivalent symbolic gesture.  
 
Next. 
The concluding chapter refutes the idea that society can 
ever be entirely “secular” and argues that we are all ritual 
mediums. As such, we are constantly mediating and remediating 
the world around us in an attempt to achieve particular ideological 
aims. 
	  	   323	  
Chapter 8 
CONCLUSION: WE WILL NEVER BE SECULAR 
 




Figure 159. Pattern Recognition 
 
The snake in the Garden of Eden was an agent of evil, 
tempting Eve with worldly knowledge. The Gnostic snake, 
Ouroboros, was an agent of good, gracing the human race with 
illuminating insights. But the ritual snake is older than either of 
these metaphoric creations and far more complex. He hails from 
the age of animism, when even trees and mountains were thought 
to possess magical powers. As such, he remains a productive 
symbol of the ways in which human beings continually draw 
inspiration from the observed environment in an attempt to cast off 
our superficial selves, while striving to embody perfect, yet 
ultimately unattainable transcendence.  
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Praxism insists that all modes of analysis are premised on 
some element of belief. This means we can never transcend belief 
itself, only particular beliefs, and the beliefs we strip away only 
reveal additional, more firmly attached beliefs. Like a snake 
shedding one skin after another, we are constantly in the process of 
rejecting outmoded myths only to replace them with more 
appealing and, for a time, more flattering “logics.” We are always 
on the cusp of a more expansive and insightful worldview, yet we 
never quite arrive, as before the previous skin is entirely shed, the 
new one has begun to blister and come loose in places.  
We possess many different skins, or ritual personae, that 
allow us to see and be seen in particular ways in particular 
contexts. We do not slip into these ritual selves as we might a piece 
of clothing. Instead we reveal them by breaking free of previous 
personae. For a time, we may relate to the new role so intensely, 
we mistake it for our true identity. Though, inevitably, we come to 
realize that it is just another ill-fitting cultural artifact constraining 
us in far too many ways, and so the process of shedding selves 
continues.  
When no lighting bolt of divine insight is forthcoming, we 
may eventually glean a more modest revelation. Rather than 
discovering a single core identity, we may begin to see ourselves 
as both the authors of our own actions and performers taking on 
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various socially inflected personae. Arriving at this perspective 
means recognizing that agency requires an agent. We must adopt 
specific behaviors that we can then leverage our desires against. 
This means submitting to the requirements of a ritual role. 
In the concluding section, I focus on society’s futile efforts 
to transcend ideology and consider how this is related to our 
conflicted view of mediumship, which is considered both a poison 
and a cure. Mediumship is commonly thought to create social ills 
and also heal them. What’s more—although we are all potential 
mediums—we are frequently oblivious to our own acts of 
mediumship and commonly vilify the mediumship of others. We 
are fascinated with ritual performance yet we fear the spread of 
“ritual pollution.” Meanwhile, we savor “guilty pleasures” related 
to the suffering and punishment of cultural scapegoats, 
experiencing a complex mix of vicarious identification and moral 
indignation. To explicate these ancient paradoxes, I draw on the 
work of anthropologists (Frazer 1922; Girard 1972; Burkert 1987; 
Hughes 1991; Shore 1996; Bloch 1998;), scholars	  of	  classical	  antiquity	  (Dodd	  1951;	  Guépen 1968), sociologists (Cohen	  1971;	  
Giddens 1991; McRobbie	  &	  Thorton	  1995) and media scholars 
(Glynn 2000; Daniel Biltereyst 2004). 
 
Agency. 
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One of the most seductive things about behaviorist 
arguments is that they overlook motives. When theorists simply 
eliminate desire and the capacity for strategic thought, our actions 
take on impressive clarity. All that we lose in the bargain is our 
humanity. On the other hand, locating evidence of intent behind 
the ritual mask presents a real challenge. Human motives are 
messy, multi-faceted and contradictory things. We behave as we 
do for all sorts of complicated reasons. Amid the swirling, ill-
articulated, half-truths of cultural discourse we often have trouble 
discerning our own motives, so it's hardly surprising that the 
intentions of others are even more difficult to discern. Even if 
someone states outright what their intentions are, how can we be 
sure that they aren’t lying to us? And even if they think they are 
telling the truth, how do we know they aren’t lying to themselves? 
To make matters worse, people do things for many conflicting 
reason, often at the same instant. A partial list of possible motives 
includes: the desire to achieve a goal, to punish another, to punish 
oneself, to avoid commitment, to embrace commitment, to receive 
acclaim, to stand out, to blend in, to belong, to break free, to 
dominate, to submit and to merely get by. 
The hunt for intentions is not only fraught; it is also 
inherently flawed (though, hopefully, not fatally so). If we accept 
that all cultural utterances are ritual rites, then any attempt to 
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identify the influence of a particular mode of ritual authority is 
itself a type of ritual performance. The theorist is partly deluded by 
his own theorizing as he submits to the dictates of a particular role. 
Even more distressing, like all ritualists, he is blind to his most 
pernicious biases.98    
If this perspective is even partly accurate, we can never 
arrive at the whole Truth, pure and unalloyed, we can only 
juxtapose belief with belief, viewing competing ideologies in 
relation to one another and in relation to specific cultural contexts. 
Any analysis of ritual authority must be relativistic, though not in 
any absolute sense. After all, some perspectives are clearly more 
dogmatic than others. An argument supported by empirical 
observations and carefully considered analysis is bound to be more 
plausible than wild speculation, or rote superstition. 
While this pragmatic perspective may not be much to hang 
one’s hat on, it is at least something more than a blind leap of 
faith.99 If intentions cannot be definitively pinned down, they can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 In Mythologies, Roland Barthes confesses his own inability to 
transcend belief as he seeks to analyze mythological dogma. “Is 
there a mythology of the mythologist? No doubt, and reader will 
easily see where I stand” (Barthes 2005, 12). 
 
99 James W. Fernandez says, “in my view, anthropology is essential 
a pragmatic and not a platonic or idealistic enterprise. It is the kind 
of study primary concerned with how humans in real situations get 
things done such as living together with some sense of fulfillment 
and satisfaction, mastering an environment, providing food, 
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at least be teased out and delicately suggested. In this way, we can 
learn something about the price we pay for attempting to portray a 
particular facsimile of ourselves. Intentions matter because 
ideology is not just something that is done to us; it is also 
something we do. As the American philosopher, Charles Sanders 
Peirce argues, hewing to belief is not enough. We feel the need to 
prove that our beliefs are irrefutable facts and this drives us to 
defend them as a bridegroom defends his bride (1997, 25). 
Consider a reality show contestant being interviewed by a 
magazine reporter insisting that her televised behavior was a 
calculated performance, or that scheming producers manipulated 
the footage in order to portray her in an unflattering light. In both 
cases, she is asserting agency, claiming authorship of her own 
televised role or rejecting a performance supposedly contrived by 
the show’s producers and, in the process, authoring a new role, that 
of outspoken media pundit. Of course, claiming the ability to self-
determine and actually doing so is not necessarily the same thing. 
Often people insist that they are expressing something unique 
about themselves when they are actually falling back on rote 
behaviors and familiar cultural scripts. 
So why bother? If agency is largely in the eye of the 
beholder, and that eye is always befogged by self-deception, if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
clothing and shelter, creating some sense of ultimate meaning to 
life” (1986, ix).  
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ritual roles are often more culturally significant regardless of 
individual intent rather than because of it, chances are we will 
never be able to glean anything more than a vague semblance of 
true agency. Still, without this glimmer, who are we? 
 
Pharmakoi. 
The two prisoners are being dragged from their cells. For 
hours, the crowd outside has been chanting, eager for them to 
appear. Coarse ropes attached to long tethers bind their hands. 
They have been stripped of their robes. The guards produce two 
garlands made of figs: one white and one black. As the black 
garland is placed around the younger prisoner’s neck, the older 
prisoner issues a small sigh of relief. Next the white garland is 
placed around his neck. A large guard seizes the tether attached to 
his hands and drags him toward the door. 
After years of confinement, the two prisoners step into the 
open. The summer wind blows hot, yet they tremble with fear. As 
the old man’s eyes gradually adjust to the bright Aegean sunlight, 
he can see that the guards have begun to drag his fellow prisoner 
ahead of him down a long dirt path lined with people.  Seeing the 
black figs draped around the young man’s neck, several men 
emerge from the crowd and set upon him, whipping his genitals 
with switches made of fig tree branches as well as squills.  
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The choice of these bulbous roots is symbolic. A 
potentially lethal medicine called the “pharmakon” is commonly 
extracted from them. In small doses, it can cure minor ailments. In 
large doses, it is lethal. The squills indicate that the two prisoners 
have become “pharmakoi,” a variation on “pharmakon,” the name 
also means both poison and cure. As the captured members of a 
foreign state, they are considered a threat to the community, and 
the presumed cause of the latest crisis—a recent plague that has 
claimed the lives of several citizens. At the same time, they are 
viewed as the best means of resolving this dilemma.100  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Just as the pharmakon can be viewed as either a cure or a poison, 
affordances have a double-edged quality. The same affordance can 
be seen as either “positive” or “negative” depending on the 
subjectivity of the perceiver. James Gibson draws our attention to 
“substances that afford ingestion.” He points out, “Some afford 
nutrition for a given animal, some afford poisoning, and some are 
neutral.” Then he says, “Consider the brink of a cliff. On the one 
side it affords walking along, locomotion, whereas on the other it 
affords falling off, injury.” He continues, “Consider a detached 
object with a sharp edge, a knife. It affords cutting if manipulated in 
one manner, but it affords being cut if manipulated in another 
manner. Similarly, but at a different level of complexity, a middle-
sized metallic object affords grasping, but if charged with current it 
affords electric shock.” Finally, he says, “Consider the other person. 
The animate object can give caresses or blows, contact injury, 
reward or punishment, and it is not always easy to perceive which 
will be provided. Note that all these benefits and injuries, these 
safeties and dangers, these positive and negative affordances are 
properties of things taken with reference to an observer but not 
properties of the experiences of the observer. They are not 
subjective values; they are not feelings of pleasure or pain added to 
neutral perceptions” (1979, 137). Gibson resists locating the 
significance of the affordance solely in the individual or the 
environment, as he his striving to break with such dichotomous 
thinking altogether. “Affordances are neither in [one] world or the 
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Presently, some of women spot the white figs draped 
around the old man’s neck and begin lashing him with fig branches 
and squills as well. They shriek, hurl insults and spit on him. All 
the while, the guard pulls him deeper into the crowd. Next, comes 
a hail of stones, hurled by people on both sides of the long road. 
They shout insults at both pharmakoi, blaming them for the deaths 
of their kinsmen, while cheering for their expulsion. They know 
that the pharmakoi are not merely a threat to the community; they 
are also its greatest hope, figures whose banishment is the best 
means for returning Athens to a state of peace and prosperity.   
By the time the pharmakoi reach the crossroads at the edge 
of the city, they are staggering, bloody and disoriented. A large 
stone strikes the old man on the forehead. As he falls to his knees, 
a cheer rises up from the crowd. Now, the guards begin dragging 
his limp body through the dirt toward the border.  
At this point, the story must end. For even though scholars 
concur on details involving the expulsion of the Athenian 
pharmakoi (Frazer 1922; Girard 1972; Hughes 1991), the exact 
culmination of the rite remains a point of controversy. Some 
maintain that the pharmakoi were executed by being thrown onto 
flaming pyres or driven off sea cliffs (Burkert 1987; Girard 1986). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
other inasmuch as the theory of two worlds is rejected. There is 
only one environment, although it contains many observers with 
limitless opportunities for them to live in it” (138). 
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Others believe the pharmakoi were simply pelted with stones and 
then permanently banished from the city (Hughes 1991). Yet 
whether the pharmakoi were sacrificed or merely banished, the 
nature of their ritual authority is the same. They were mediums 
with the ability to stabilize and/or modify culture in two ways, by 
representing both a poison and a cure. First they would embody the 
antithesis of society’s dominant norms, performing the role of a 
social threat. Next, they would be punished and shunned for their 
transgressions, an act of expulsion thought to heal the community. 
Hegemony requires the illusion of coherence, but ritual 
demands paradox.  Like the double-headed sacrificial axe that was 
commonly employed in Greek times, it cuts two ways, evoking the 
sacred and the profane, pleasure and pain, death and rebirth, 
corruption and purity, poison and cure. Rituals do different things 
in different ways for different people. This is why functionalist 
arguments are inherently flawed. Bronislaw Malinowski believed 
ritual was primarily a means of alleviating cultural anxiety, but 
Alfred Radcliffe-Brown challenged this perspective, arguing that 
rituals often have the opposite effect, giving rise to increased 
anxiety (Giddens 1991, 148). The trouble with the pharmakon is he 
is not a single person. He is a “complex,” a living/dying paradox. 
To some, he is a demon who must die in order reunite social 
factions (Girard 1972, 102). To others, he is a martyr who has 
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sacrificed himself for the greater good (Burke 1950, 266). To still 
others, he is a sacrificial offering allowing the community to 
experience a sense of spiritual transcendence (Bloch 1998, 176). 
By insisting that rituals have no single consistent function, praxism 
draws our attention to their irreducible complexity. It focuses on 
how particular mediums believe they function in particular 
contexts. While this tends to undermine totalizing assumptions, it 
also draws our attention to the source of ritual’s dynamic power.  
The medium is a pharmakon because ritual itself is 
contradictory. Its greatest strengths are tied to its greatest 
weaknesses. Unlike scientific methods, ritual practices privilege 
intuition over analysis, instinct over observation (Arno 2003).101 
This makes their conclusions impossible to verify and also 
impossible to disprove. Because rituals promise to address 
emotionally charged issues, the incentive for verifying their claims 
is high, but the means of effectively doing so is low. In order to 
compensate for this disparity, ritual mediums fiercely commit to 
the modes of identification most likely to assist them in attaining a 
particular end. This means embracing complexity. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  Andrew	  Arno	  states,	  “rituals	  are	  often	  observed	  to	  have	  important	  practical	  meaning	  outside	  of	  language.”	  What’s	  more,	  “practical	  meaning	  systems	  can	  also	  constitute	  metaphor	  and	  accomplish	  reference	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  parallel	  to,	  yet	  distinct	  from,	  verbal	  and	  gestural	  language	  functions”	  (2003,	  807).	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The Trouble with Mediums. 
Standing astride the chasm between determined and 
emergent influence, the medium is always at risk. He has the 
ability to save society, or to destroy it, so our feelings toward him 
are profoundly ambivalent. He earns our respect and our fear. He 
also earns our identification. After all, we are all potentially him—
though we often work hard to deny this. The medium reminds us 
of our own potential “Otherness,” the source of our own ritual 
authority and the greatest threat to our bid for inclusion.  
Dead mediums are more reliable than living ones, who are 
notoriously fickle figures often regarded with suspicion and even 
outright scorn. This is why communities tend to closes rank against 
living difference, exalting it post hoc and in absentia. We are 
deeply invested in Othering the medium, locating him anterior to 
ourselves. This is the chief value of “effects arguments.” They 
allow us to distance ourselves from our darker cultural obsessions, 
to drive them outside the sacred circle, beyond the borders of the 
community.  
According to effects arguments, we do not personally 
circulate violent and sexual discourses, the media does. We do not 
objectify others and ourselves, the media does. We are not guilty 
of fetishizing dysfunction, the media is. Rather than holding 
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ourselves responsible, we blame texts, technologies and vaguely 
defined groups, i.e. journalists, corporations, politicians.  
Because the medium has some ability to celebrate or resist 
change, his power cuts two ways. He can re-imagine culture by 
actively modifying its symbols, or he can affirm the validity of 
established norms by submitting to their dictates. The scapegoating 
mechanism relates to the latter practice. It is a means of absolving 
a sense of collective guilt and sanctifying the status quo. Because 
the scapegoat must suffer painful and highly public torments, he is 
not always a willing victim. Then again, many famous scapegoats 
appear to have deliberately martyred themselves in the name of an 
ideological cause. 
In any event, the moral panic associated with a specific 
instance of scapegoating often reveals more about the persecutors 
than the persecuted.102 For instance, after the civil war, a moral 
panic gripped the southern United States and white Klansman 
began lynching freed black males. For hundreds of years, slave 
owners had been sexually assaulting back woman. Once black men 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 While they may or may not be triggered by actual normative 
transgressions, moral panics always accomplish something for the 
“high minded” individuals who instigate and perpetuate them. A 
puritan male attracted to an unmarried female may seek to burn her 
for the crime of “bewitching him.” And in the 1980s, the outbreak 
of AIDs led to a moral panic that justified reactionary homophobic 
rhetoric and greatly undermined the burgeoning gay rights 
movement, which was becoming an increasing threat to 
heteronormative values.  
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were free, they feared retribution. I believe that the scapegoating of 
black males accused of “dishonoring” white women had less to do 
with any actual transgressions then with the projected guilt of 
ritualists in the grip of a moral panic. After all, persecutors do not 
attack just anyone, they go after specific targets in order to 
dissociate themselves from what those targets are thought to 
represent. Scapegoating is a means of self-absolution, but—when 
more carefully considered—it is also a form of self-incrimination, 
a fairly transparent process of projecting ones own guilt onto 
another and then treating them as a moral purgative. The finger of 
accusation points in order to direct attention away from itself. 
The public does not do not merely panic in reaction to 
social trends, as Daniel Biltereyst explains, new media 
technologies, formats and genre innovations can also create unrest, 
as with the backlash against horror comics in the 1950s and 
contemporary fears about Internet pornography. Biltereyst calls 
this phenomenon “media panic” and explains that new media are 
often perceived as “a threat to dominant cultural and societal 
values” (2004, 106).  
Technical and aesthetic innovations do change culture but 
not by imposing positive or negative effects. They do so by 
offering affordances. For instance, in the age of the Internet, media 
users can increasingly adopt new modes of identification. By 
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affiliating with a wide variety of online groups, we become less 
narrowly defined by a single social milieu. This affords us a “meta-
perspective” that can lead to a degree of disenfranchisement from 
traditional communities and may even invite an open rejection of 
once uncritically accepted social values.  
As McRobbie	  &	  Thorton	  argue,	  “society can control 
effectively only those who perceive themselves to be members of 
it” (1995, 267). Thus, as new media discourses afforded 
opportunities for new mediums to question longstanding social 
affiliations, we are likely to witness an amplification of behaviors 
traditionally viewed as deviant. When this occurs, the outrage 
circulated by a moral panic may actually generate more 
transgressive behavior. McRobbie	  &	  Thorton	  elaborate,	  “The 
media coverage of deviance acts as a kind of handbook of 
possibilities to be picked over by new recruits” (267). 
In a world in which media visibility at any cost is 
considered a highly desirable marker of cultural status, many 
people are likely to seek attention by challenging taboos. As Stan 
Cohen reminds us traditional sociology assumes that the exposure 
of deviance automatically leads to social control. However, in a 
multi-centered social world, the reverse is often true. In many 
instances, social control may actually foster and even exacerbate 
deviance (1971, 33).  
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Then there is the issue of power. As self-serving 
individuals break with norms in greater numbers, institutions must 
increasingly contain and quash these behaviors. Dominant 
institutions are threatened by the pharmakos but also need the 
pharmakos to justify their consolidated power. The more potent the 
perceived “poison,” the more justifiable the measures taken to 
transform it into a “cure.” A truly threatening pharmakos needs to 
be located in the center of the social field. Thus, in Athens, the 
pharmakoi were always jailed in the middle of the city. This was 
ritually significant as it identified them as a threat within the heart 
of the body politic to be carefully contained and eventually 
expunged (though not before other pharmakoi were captured and 
contained therein). Today’s urban centers are also teaming with 
pharmakoi, poor young men, usually black and Latino, who are 
considered a threat to the affluent suburban enclaves surrounding 
them. Thus, Los Angeles, one of the wealthiest cities in one of the 
wealthiest countries in the world is the site of horrific street 
violence that has claimed the lives of tens of thousands. As with its 
ancient antecedent, contemporary scapegoating involves 
containing a threat at the heart of the community, accompanied by 
acts of ritual expulsion via death, banishment and incarceration. 
Therefore, when a gang member tags “his turf,” he is not only 
claiming ideological terrain for himself, he is also assuming a 
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ritual role that serves to justify the very oppression that perpetuates 
his disenfranchisement, subjugation and persecution. Meanwhile, 
the celebration of “thug life” characteristic of rap music is a 
collection of media affordances, offering potential pharmakoi 
heightened cultural significance, though at a steep price.  
 
Guilty-Pleasure and Empathic Engagement. 
Natural ecologies are open chaotic systems, yet they do 
exhibit some forms of spontaneous self-organization, moments 
when increased chaos gives rise to order with the aid of naturally 
occurring negative feedback. For instance a fixed amount of 
grasslands places a natural limit on the number of grazing animals. 
This reduces the chance that they will over-populate and drive 
other species into extinction.  
Cultural ecologies are also constrained by negative 
feedback in the form of guilt and shaming mechanisms. These 
naturally emerging “damping forces” operate as an organic array 
of checks and balances that helps to mitigate social disequilibrium 
by curtailing disruptive innovation. Such feedback loops are only 
effective if they can simultaneously trigger revulsion and 
fascination, hence the term “guilty pleasure.” A guilty pleasure is a 
media affordance experienced as simultaneously negative and 
positive. The adjective “guilty” indicates the negative aspects of 
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the affordance, which, generally tends to discourage certain 
behaviors. The noun “pleasure” refers to the sense of morbid 
fascination associated with such rites, as well as the delight 
viewers can take in adopting stances of moral superiority and 
vicarious identification in relation to the ritualist. 
In his essay “Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture,” 
Fredric Jameson described the double-edged nature of media, 
which simultaneously acknowledges and manages social anxieties 
with an implied promise of ideological utopia. He calls this 
phenomenon “the fantasy bribe” (Jameson 2007 30). Building off 
Jameson’s concept, Dana Cloud considers a paradox at the heart of 
much reality TV. This is defined as “the irony bribe.” Cloud 
describes it as follows: “a strategic mechanism of a cultural text 
that invites audiences to identify with the pleasures of the reaction 
against the taking seriously of a patently ideological fantasy (such 
as faith in true love as a source of women’s agency). Ironically, the 
irony bribe naturalizes the worldview of a hegemonic text in the 
process of denaturalizing it.” It is a type of “investment through 
disinvestment” (Cloud 2010, 415). As with “the fantasy bribe” and 
“the irony bribe,” the concept of “guilty pleasure” cuts two ways. 
Yet it is less about investing in utopian fantasies than constraining 
them. 
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There is a thin line between envy and admiration, and often 
we both respect and resent mediums who invoke modes of ritual 
authority unavailable to us, or those who invoke our favored 
modes of authority more effectively than we do. When this occurs, 
we are likely to have mixed feelings about our fellow ritualists. In 
the present era, the enticements of fame are immense. Few things 
are prized as much as celebrity, yet few people hazard the 
committed and sustained efforts commonly associated with the 
attainment of cultural renown. This is because the barriers to 
actually achieving fame are extremely high. The competition is 
fierce and the inevitable criticism and rejection can be withering. 
While dreams of fame are certainly appealing, the actual pursuit of 
fame is daunting, even terrifying. Negative affordances are forms 
of self-justification, cautionary tales that assure us that actually 
striving for the stardom that many of us secretly dream about is far 
too risky, too degrading, and simply too hard.  
 
Figure 160. American Idol 
American Idol (Fox 2002-2011) is promoted as a type of 
Horatio Alger story about talented unknowns bootstrapping their 
way to success. Certainly, this is one of is allurements. But the 
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show also operates as a powerful and compelling negative 
affordance, repeatedly assuring viewers that attempting to become 
famous simply isn’t worth it. Much of the airtime involves the host 
ruthlessly berating aspiring singers with critiques far more scathing 
than any they would likely receive in a traditional audition setting. 
This public humiliation occurs before millions of viewers, 
underscoring a message that is one of the chief “pleasures” the 
program affords. 
Because human beings are complex, we may take pleasure 
in viewing a particular program for multiple reasons. American 
Idol may justify our fears about actually pursuing celebrity status, 
but it also placates us with a taste of vicarious fame. Thus, when 
the Idol judges aren’t subjecting hopefuls to shaming taunts, they 
are holding out the promise of apotheosis. By voting for an 
American Idol contestant, we can actively participate in the 
creation of a star. This allows us to safely project our desire for 
stardom onto a courageous surrogate who becomes a stand-in for 
our own nascent potential. This is an effective means of eliciting 
audience loyalty. Cheering for the outcome of a sporting event or 
voting for the contestants in a reality show allows us to invest in 
the success of particular participants. This emotional commitment 
continues beyond the individual game or performance. American 
Idol has launched more viable careers than its predecessor Star 
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Search (1983-1995). This may be related to the concept of 
“empathic engagement” (Shore 1996), the idea that viewers are 
able to vote on the show’s outcome. Once an “Idol” has achieved 
celebrity-apotheosis, viewer-stakeholders can continue facilitating 
his or her success by purchasing CD’s, magazines, books, video 
games and movie tickets. In this way, we can continue our 
identification with the celebrity and feel invested in their ongoing 
success, a part of their stardom, without ever leaving the safety and 
comfort of our homes.  
Cultural innovation is inherently disruptive, so the 
psychological state commonly called “guilty pleasure” performs a 
valuable social function, shaming people into adopting more 
cooperative behaviors. However, in a mass-media ecology, high 
profile transgressions also serve as media affordances, blueprints 
for aspiring innovators who crave large-scale visibility at any cost.  
Defining what does and does not count as legitimate 
innovation is challenging. There is no consistent behavioral 
standard for all people in every conceivable cultural context. Also, 
an individual may have one set of standards for herself and another 
for her fellow mediums. In terms of how others behave, actions 
that help to maintain the status quo may be prized, whereas actions 
that challenge norms may be considered negative and maladaptive. 
In contrast, the medium herself may seek unconventional modes of 
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empowerment even if this means challenging the status quo.  To 
further complicate matters, the same media affordance may strike 
one person as positive and another as negative. For example, when 
a cultural enfranchised young man accustomed to a comfortable 
middle class existence watches a gangster film, he may consider it 
a cautionary tale. When the protagonist is gunned down in a hail of 
bullets during the climactic sequence, he may even experience a 
sense of catharsis. On the other hand, a more disenfranchised 
young man might consider the same character a type of cultural 
hero, or even a role model to emulate. His mimetic reaction 
involves seeing the actions of the protagonist as positive rather 
than negative affordances. Because he personally has few options 
for legitimate social empowerment, he considers the criminal 
character’s meteoric rise and fall a type of inspirational success 
story.  
This response is not an effect imposed by the film, nor is it 
a form of psychological gratification freely available to all viewers 
on equal terms. Instead, it is a media affordance tied to the way a 
specific individual relates to a particular ritual role. The reaction in 
question is linked to his own preferred modes of identification as 
influenced by the social milieu that such perspectives have 
emerged from. What's more, because people are complex, a single 
individual might view the same media affordance in two different 
	  	   345	  
ways. For example, a celebrity might agree to reveal some details 
of his personal life in exchange for heightened publicity. This type 
of cultural “trade off” is what occurs when an affordance is 
considered simultaneously positive and negative. 
 
Ritual Pollution. 
Popular rituals must serve up a steady diet of transgressions 
in order to command sustained audience attention. However, 
transgressive behaviors can also spread virally and disrupt the 
body politic, as when instances of school shootings, or teen suicide 
suddenly spike. In tribal cultures, this type of viral behavior is tied 
to the notion of “ritual pollution,” a type of moral contagion 
unleashed at the moment of sacrifice. Ideally, this free-floating 
toxin merely dissipates freeing the community from the evils that 
have plagued it (Guépen 1968, 59), but under certain conditions, it 
can spread throughout the community and wreak havoc.103 
No one stands to gain more from a successful ritual than 
the ritual-conductor or “priest” who oversees it. By first 
condemning, then sacrificing, then finally praising the ritual 
scapegoat, he appears to restore social order, and, in the process, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 In Plato’s Laws, he advocates drafting legal rules to enforce 
mythical prohibitions related to ritual pollution. For instance, an 
animal, or even an inanimate object, which has caused the death of 
a man, is to be tried, condemned, and banished from the State 
because it is thought to carry a corrupting  “miasma” (Dodd 1951, 
223). 
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affirms his status as an ideological leader. But such benefits entail 
a risk. If the priest allows the ritual to grow too chaotic and 
unsettling, he puts the whole tribe at risk. Rather than containing 
cultural anxiety, he is unleashing it, threatening to corrupt on-
lookers with new feelings of shame and inadequacy. Concerns 
about “ritual pollution” protect us from recognizing that we too are 
capable of becoming the medium. This is why the priest risks 
being seen as corrupt, contaminated by the very pollutants he has 
sought to remove from the community. In fact, there are many 
accounts of priests being attacked by their own congregations and 
even stoned to death by ritual participants hoping to evade the risk 
of becoming tainted as well. Elaborating on this point, J.P. Guépen 
explains, “It appears that the close connection between rite and 
myth here presents a new problem: the sacrifice meant to propitiate 
the murder is itself a similar murder. It looks like an imitation of 
the original crime” (1968, 59). In some instances, “The slayer had 
to flee: he had killed Dionysus, or something very close to him. 
The sacrifice was therefore interpreted as a crime, which set the 
machinery of talion [penalty corresponding to crime] in motion: 
the killer must be killed; the slayer is stoned and has to run for his 
life” (32-3). 
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Figures 161 & 162. Ritual Pollution: Contained and Unleashed 
This is perhaps why the ritual conductor often feels 
compelled to project a pious air. A contemporary example of such 
a figure is tabloid TV pioneer Rupert Murdock, whose logotopic 
commitments were analyzed in the previous chapter. Murdoch has 
been relentlessly pilloried in the press, described as everything 
from “a barbarian, to Dr. Frankenstein, to the Antichrist of 
Professional Journalism” (Glynn 2000, 28). He has deflected such 
criticism by assuming the ironic role of “moral paragon.” His Fox 
News Network features the ethical castigations of self-described 
“culture warrior,” Bill O’Reilly. 
 
Ritual Blindness. 
What does it mean to live in a “secular society?” The name 
suggests that we have somehow transcended ideology. Other 
cultures have belief and ritual. We have truth and reality. Okay, 
sure, we may dabble in mythological narratives—celebrating 
superheroes and sports figures in colorful costumes, but we don 
not actually consider them gods, do we? No, we’re above that. And 
yes, we may go online and vote for a contestant in a reality show, 
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but that isn’t really engaging in a type of primitive rite, is it? Of 
course not! These are just diversions, light entertainments, fun and 
frivolous, eminently trivial. After all, we’re rational now, 
reasonable and utterly non-dogmatic. Like all true believers, we 
are privy to the whole Truth and nothing but…at least this is what 
we keep telling ourselves.  
Some lament the “loss of the sacred,” some celebrate it, but 
most accept that postmodern life is primarily secular. Anthony 
Giddens writes, “Much has been made by social observers of the 
decline of ritual activities in relation to major transitions of life: 
birth, adolescence, marriage and death. The relative absence of 
ritual in modern social contexts, it has been suggested, removes an 
important psychological prop to the individual’s capacity to cope 
with such transitions (1991, 148). As Giddens indicates, traditional 
rituals such as weddings, baptisms and ceremonial rites of passage 
are practiced less frequently and with a diminished sense of moral 
conviction. To many, this has signaled a loss of ritual significance. 
I disagree. 
In an era in which media discourses have become highly 
fragmented and multivalent, it stands to reason that the ritual 
practices that produce and sustain such discourses must be growing 
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equally complex.104 Thus what we are currently experiencing is not 
a loss of ritual, but a sense of “ritual complexification.” Salome is 
dancing faster than ever now, shedding more and more veils, just 
as the animistic snake is shedding skin after skin with no ultimate 
revelation in sight. Even if we wished to abandon ritual, we could 
not, for we can’t begin to make sense of the world without it. The 
ritual medium is a pharmakon, neither good nor bad, merely 
inevitable. So rather than attempt to transcend belief, or bemoan 
the loss of traditional ethics, we must instead strive for a more 
complex and comprehensive worldview, seeking a dynamic if 
highly contingent balance between rigidly determined hegemonic 
norms and emergent chaos. In so doing, we must attempt to 
juxtapose traditional ethics and the ethics of invention to create a 
new “ethics of equilibrium.” If this is to occur, it will necessarily 
be accompanied by a flowering or ritual awareness, a growing 
acceptance of the promise and the threat of media affordances We 
need to unflinchingly consider the nature of the opportunities such 
behavioral models provide for doing good or ill. Before we can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 In the essay “Against Ritual,” Jack Goody complains that ritual 
has too many conflicting definitions. (27). In contrast, Erving 
Goffman defines all formalized human actions and interactions as 
“rituals” (1997). Along with Goffman, I argue that, this broadness 
does not make ritual meaningless. To the contrary, it makes it the 
necessary precondition for the emergence of culture.  
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begin to consciously model our own beliefs, we have to understand 
the ways that they are already being modeled for us.  
We have not transcended ritual, I argue, so much as turned 
a blind eye to it. Ritual blindness is the blight of our age, a 
destructive force disrupting cultural equanimity while our backs 
are blithely turned. This work is not as an uncritical celebration of 
mediumship, nor is it an effort to illuminate any kind of universal 
truth. It is simply an attempt to draw attention to an all-too-
common lie, the belief that we can ever be truly “secular.” For it is 
this destructive illusion that too often prevents us from more 
cautiously considering the implications of the beliefs we are 
ceaselessly impelled to challenge, circulate, and invent. 
Ultimately, praxism is not just a theory of practice; it is a 
theory as practice, a reminder that attempting to make sense of the 
world is a mode of active engagement, which always entails 
embracing some mode of belief, though hopefully, not too 
zealously. The history of western rationalism is a litany of 
cartographical failures. Again and again, the mapmakers have 
promised to create an explanatory scheme big enough and clever 
enough to swallow nature whole, yet we are always disappointed 
with the end product. The promise of transcendence turns out to be 
an undercooked soufflé. So along comes another mapmaker ready 
to debunk the frauds that came before him and finally unveil the 
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grand conceptual scheme that we have been waiting. We may 
actually want to believe him and, for a time, we almost do, but then 
a small thread comes lose, then another, and another. Soon the 
whole marvelous contrivance is unraveling. After a time, the 
mapmakers become nothing but a parade of targets in a shooting 
gallery. We amuse ourselves by picking them off, one by one. Yet 
the idea that debunking frauds is better than getting duped by them 
is cold comfort. We may take cynical pleasure in tearing down 
false prophets, but in the end, we only love the things that we 
create. 
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